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MAN.

LO STUDIO.

Printed in Oil Colours, by G. Baxter, (Patentee.) 3, Charterhouse Square.

From a Painting by G. F. Sargeant.

MAN,

IN HIS INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES AND ADAPTATIONS.

BY ROBERT MUDIE,

AUTHOR OF "THE HEAVENS," THE FOUR SEASONS,
"THE BRITISH NATURALIST," &c. &c.

MICHAEL ANGELO'S MOSES.

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MDCCCXXXIX.

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PREFACE.

In works which treat, or profess to treat, of the Mind, or intellectual part of Man, the subject is taken up in very nearly the same way as the subjects of physical science—of that material creation, the existence of which is palpable to the senses, and the fact of the existence of which is thus established by direct observation, and cannot be made more plain and palpable by any process of reasoning. For this reason, even the best and most rational systems of Mental Philosophy—those with the details of which there is the least reason to find fault—are absolutely foundationless; so that a man may have the most perfect knowledge of them in all their details, and yet be a positive sceptic on the grand question of mind and its immortality. They may be read with pleasure, just as we read with pleasure the developements of imaginary character in a romance, though we know that not one word of the romance is true, or give ourselves no trouble about its truth or its falsehood; and, when the philosophy of mind is treated in this manner, it follows, as a matter of course, that religion and morality (which have their only sure foundations in the belief,—the certain conviction, of the existence and immortality of mind) are regarded in the same imaginary manner,—looked upon as mere matters of fancy, which are pleasant withal in the

details, but into the truth and reality of which it is not necessary, and not very safe, to look.

The object of this volume is, in some sort, to supply the desideratum,—to call the attention of the reader to the ground upon which, and upon which alone, the immortal hopes of mankind can be founded. I have attempted to do this by means of statements and illustrations which are familiar to all who think, and to express them in the most simple and familiar language, so that the work may be equally intelligible to the unlearned and the learned. I am aware that there are difficulties to be overcome in this, for I have felt them, and also felt my own inability to grapple with some of them in the way that I could have desired. If, however, I have not accomplished all that one who is desirous of obtaining full information upon this subject may wish for, I have endeavoured to point out the means whereby that which is desired may be obtained; and these means have so little to do with what is usually called learning, and are so much in the power of every man who chooses to make a right use of them, that little more is necessary than the calling of attention to them; and this, accordingly, is the principal object which has been aimed at. But, though apparently a very simple object, it is one which is very difficult to accomplish. We have to supply, in the very first element of the philosophy of mind, that which the senses, without any study on our part, supply in the philosophy of matter; and there is no complete analogy by means of which we can pass from the physical to the mental, so as to make the one a continuation of the other.

In physical studies it is very different. We have a be-

ginning—a foundation for them, without any study at all. We have perceptions of physical substance, and experiences of physical cause and effect, by simple observation, and even whether we will or no; and although our familiarity with these beginnings makes us consider them as matters of course, and not in any way connected with any species of philosophy, yet they are of the very same nature as the most profound and elaborate conclusions at which the student of physical science can arrive. Thus, in our physical studies and inquiries, we can go on in a regular course from the first simple workings of our childhood, to the utmost extent to which the philosophy of material nature, and of the sciences founded upon that nature, can be carried; and, when any one step of this is once known to us, it feels just as simple and easy as that which we became acquainted with without any effort, or even a wish, on our part.

Such being the case with all physical subjects—with all our knowledge, with the exception only of Mind, Immortality, Religion, and the applications of these to our moral conduct, there is a constant tendency in us to bring them into the physical connexion, and to reason and conclude respecting them in the very same way as we do about subjects which relate wholly to matter. Farther, as there is not, in the study of intellect, anything which can immediately attract and gratify any one of the senses, we are very apt to overlook that study altogether, or to consider it as a mere idling of time among certain philosophic visionaries, which has no reality in it, and consequently no bearing on the usefulness or the enjoyment of life.

This indifference to the study of mind, and this impossibility of bringing it into the train of our ordinary physical studies, and means and modes of judging and acting in the business of life, are the grand obstacles to be overcome in the study of Man as an intellectual and immortal being; and, if they are once overcome, all else becomes both more easy and more delightful than any physical study or pursuit, be it what it may. But they meet us at the threshold of the study; and we must get the better of them before we can, by possibility, advance even a single step. For this reason I have, in the present volume, addressed myself chiefly to difficulties which even the most candid inquirer has to encounter before he is in a condition for entering upon the study of intellectual science. I have endeavoured to do for the beginner in this branch of knowledge that which nature does for all mankind in every other branch. For this purpose I have begun by stating the question of immortality, which is the foundation of the whole matter, inasmuch as a mind which perished with the body would be, in truth, no mind at all, and could not, in principle or in kind, whatever it might do in degree or in modification, differ from the life in the mindless animals. I have endeavoured to point out some of the causes and the dangers of a merely nominal assent—a verbal "faith," upon this most vital of all questions. Next, I have endeavoured to point out some of the grounds of ignorance and doubt upon this question; and among the observations which are offered on this part of the subject, there are some which are, so far as I know, new, and not unworthy of attention. After this, I have endeavoured to trace some of the branches of the

natural or philosophical argument for the existence and immortality of mind, as a separate and distinct creation in the case of every individual of the species, and not a matter which is continued by generation as the body is. This form of the argument is not often brought forward, and yet it is the essential one, without which all the others are inadequate to the making out of a demonstrated case, and thus render the whole doctrine nothing better than mere credulity—with only faith, and hope founded on that faith, for which the holder can give no reason, and which leave him without any alternative to becoming an infidel, whenever the arguments of the sceptic are brought to bear upon him. Some remarks on the intellectual states and the training of the mind, especially in that early period of life during which the foundation of the character is laid, follow these; and with them the volume concludes.

In the whole of it, I have been studious to avoid even the appearance of system, from a firm conviction that, in all the works which profess to treat of Intellectual Man, how able soever they may be, the system leads the reader away from the subject, to such an extent, that there are many who are well versed in the school philosophy of mind, and who are, at the same time, absolute sceptics upon the grand question of the existence of mind. To all such, the philosophy of the intellectual part of Man is, in reality, nothing better than a romance,—a pleasant tale, but a tale which has no substantial foundation. This is the reason why I have directed, or at all events attempted to direct, the attention of the reader to the proofs of the existence of mind, rather than to even the most unexcep-

tionable System of mental philosophy; for I well know, that, if the doctrine of mind can once be brought home to a man as the doctrine of himself,—as a doctrine in which he has an eternal interest,—he will require no other inducement to the study of it. To produce this conviction has been the object of my labour, and I hope it will be found that I have not laboured wholly in vain.

ROBERT MUDIE.

Winchester, March 1, 1839.

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MAN,

AS AN INTELLECTUAL AND IMMORTAL BEING.

CHAPTER I.

PRELIMINARY REMARKS.

"SHALL the death of my body be the final end of my existence, and shall all that I have hoped or feared, enjoyed or suffered, learned or done, be for ever laid in the cold oblivion of the grave; or shall I live for ever in the consciousness of my existence, and be in the eternal joy of an approving conscience, or the eternal agony of ceaseless remorse, through ages which, though numbered by the birth, the maturity, the decline, and the dissolution of successive millions of worlds and systems of worlds, durable as that of which my body is an atom, and yet have no measure of their length expended,—which will still be beginning, while all things are ending?"—"Shall it be, with me, the one or the other of these alternatives — one of them it must be?"—is, above all degree and all kind, the most important question which any human being can propose for self-decision. It is, also, a question which no oblivion of idleness, and no dissipation of

the sense or of the thought, can altogether and securely hide,—or if, by these, or by any other means, it be kept down in the days of our youth and the years of our vigour and activity, yet we can have no security against its coming upon us in our day of darkness and desolation, and turning those reverses of life, which they who have well-grounded hopes of immortality can endure with calm resignation, into forecast shadows of that retribution, of the torment of which the gnawing of the undying worm and the burning of the eternal fire are but faint and feeble emblems — ease and pleasure in comparison with the reality itself.

Had the lines of our life been cast in the dark ages or the lone places of the earth, where not only the light of revelation never beamed, but where thought never soared above the gratification of the animal appetites, we might have lived like the beasts, and like the beasts have lain down in death, without the exultation or the anguish of this question, to meet the future without any care or knowledge of its coming.

This is a sorry and even a sickening kind of security; and to escape the doubts which may perplex the man, by sinking down into the idealess oblivion of the mere animal — to eat, to drink, to die to-morrow, and there to be an end, is a pitiful summing up of human life,—scarcely worth being born for, and certainly no adequate requital for even an hour of such labour as the man of most ease in a civilized country is constrained to take.

But, wretched and degrading as this security is, there is no certainty of obtaining it in any situation of life, or in any locality of a country like Britain. The body, or bodily possession, distinction, or enjoyment of some kind or other, is certainly the grand pursuit of all, and almost the sole pursuit of many; but though it may be, and is, "almost" in nearly every case, it is absolutely "altogether" in no one case. We shall not attempt to class or describe the several means of enlightenment; but we feel that we are within the truth when we say that the country is altogether too enlightened for allowing any human being capable of thought to go down to the grave a mere animal, without once propounding to himself the question whether he is or is not an immortal being. But, as we have no security that this question shall not come upon us, or rather as we have the certainty that, sooner or later, it will come, and as it is especially to be desired that it should come, and, coming, be thoroughly sifted and settled, in every light in which we can view it, it cannot be brought forward too often or in too many different forms.

There was a time when simple verbal belief was held to be quite sufficient for establishing full confidence in the affirmative of this great question of immortality; and even at the present day there are not wanting many who cling to and propagate this doctrine with all the zeal of enthusiasm, and all the stubbornness of dogmatism. But, by whatever names these parties may be called, and how much or how justly soever we may venerate them upon other ac-

counts, they are in error on this most essential of all matters; their zeal is zeal without knowledge, and their stubbornness is that of ignorance; nor could they themselves bear a searching analysis and cross-examination of that which they fulminate against others for not believing upon the simple doctrine. The lip may assert, not only without conviction, but when that lies wholly the other way; but belief cannot be forced, and that faith or hope, for which the professor can give no reason, is an unmeaning dream—a delusion by means of which thousands are ruined in their temporal interests, and we cannot suppose that it will be better in the case of those more serious and momentous interests which are eternal.

It seems a mere truism to say that,—how often soever, or with what fervency soever of pomp and circumstance, it may be repeated,—that which is not understood can neither be true nor false to the understanding. But it is a truism involving an important truth, and therefore ought to be generally known. There is an historical proof of its importance, which is not unworthy of a passing notice. When human nature, under the enlightening influence of science, first shook the foundations of implicit belief, the hope of immortality was shaken along with it; and those who first broke the chains of superstition, were materialists, or sceptics of some description or other. This historical fact is, in itself, sufficient to show us that there must be some argument addressed to men in the same way as upon other matters which require analysis and explanation, before they can have a

belief in the doctrine of immortality so well grounded as not to be shaken and brought into doubt by the exercise of their own understandings, although there is, at the same time, every disposition on their part to believe the doctrine if they could.

The disposition thus to believe, must be regarded as natural to human beings as soon as the question occurs to them; for, as the death of the body is the ultimate punishment in this world, after which the individual can suffer no more inflictions at the hand of man, so an annihilation,—a final ending of the whole man as a reflective and conscious being, is a punishment beyond which Almighty power itself can inflict nothing. That the power in this case is infinite, we will admit, and we must also admit that the unrestrained exercise of it in punishment upon a finite and feeble creature like Man, cannot be expressed in words. But immeasurable as is the disparity, it is almost needless to say that the effect of infinite power is reduced to nothing when there is no subject upon which it can act; and that, therefore, God can no more punish an annihilated man than he can make the inhabitants of a world feel pleasure or pain, before His almighty fiat has called them into existence. We know from history and observation, and some of us have felt in our own experience, that there is both enjoyment and hope in the mere fact of conscious existence, even in the very extreme of all the privation, and sorrow, and suffering to which we can by possibility be subjected; and there have been not a few to whom the feeling of this simple fact has been a

heritage as ample and as endeared as all the success, all the wealth, and all the renown of the world's highest prosperity.

Such being the inherent value of life, and the pleasure arising from the consciousness of possessing it, we cannot well believe that any human being, possessed of common understanding and reflection, could, or can, for a single moment voluntarily adopt as applicable to his own case, or propagate among others, a doctrine so repulsive to the very constitution of human nature as that of materialism, or even of scepticism on the grand subject of immortality.

Yet there have been men of the most extensive information upon most other subjects, and men, the mildness of whose nature and the correctness of whose moral conduct must have raised them above all slavish fear of future retribution, who have maintained those doctrines, and who have propagated them with a zeal, and laboured to support them with an ingenuity, worthy of a better cause. Nor have they failed in gaining proselytes to their doctrines, in addition to those who have been driven under their banners by the injudicious conduct of their opponents, who, in but too many instances, have raved when they ought to have reasoned, and essayed to taunt when it was their duty to teach. This last, by the way, is the surest means whereby error upon any subject, and more especially upon a subject of deep interest and importance, can be most successfully promulgated and perpetuated. There is a spirit in man, arising out of the very nature of the social principle,

which never fails to sympathise with the apparently oppressed; and we have only to persecute the promulgator of the most absurd and mischievous falsehood, in order to procure him disciples who shall be as zealous for that as they could be for the most wholesome and clearly-established truth.

Nor is it in the promulgators of sceptical doctrines and their followers only that we find doubt and fear upon this subject: and so abundantly are these found, that in every rank and class of society they may be said to form the rule, and well-established knowledge and hope only the exception.

So much is this the case, that the question of immortality is absolutely *the* "tabooed" question in all polite society — in all society indeed, as much as "hell" was the the forbidden word to courtly preachers in the days of the bard of Twickenham. If an allusion is made to mind—to the intellectual part of human nature, it is "metaphysical stuff, which nobody can understand, and about which nobody cares;" and if the question of immortality is broached, it is "cant," —though this same "cant," on the proper throne of his fulmination, is really the gaoler that keeps the true knowledge of these matters under lock and key, and shakes the conscience of men with incessant fears, in order that he may batten upon, or by means of, their ignorance and misery.

If any one is sceptical upon what has been now stated, let him bring it to the test of experiment; and it will be of little consequence from what class of society he chooses the subjects for his experiment. It

cannot be made in public, or on a stranger, as, in either case, it would be a gross violation of that fundamental rule of good breeding which forbids us from ever touching upon "a sore subject"—a subject which shall either expose ignorance or produce unpleasant feeling. You may palliate society as much as ever you please, but it spurns and ejects you if you attempt to probe it. It will bear any quantity of general animadversion. You may abuse any party in the state or the church,—you may impugn all doctrines of philosophy,—you may labour to prove that white really ought to be called black, and black white,—and, if there were a Cham of Tartary, you would be at perfect liberty to delineate and dub him as the veriest monster that ever cumbered and polluted the earth. All this you may, or might do, to your heart's content; and if you can do it in good set phrase, and place it in skilful contrast with some "dame of renown," who has waded in the indigo and become "bitten of the stain," you may take your degree as "a charming man" in all time coming: but "the present company are always excepted;" and, as you cannot except them on the general question of intellect and immortality, you dart not moot that question.

Try it, therefore, upon a single and most intimate friend; and, if it be in your power, select one who has just been delivering a homily of the most orthodox description, till the ears of all who heard him tingled again at the force and fervour of his eloquence. Take him apart, so that there may be none to hear. Deal with him in the most gentle manner, so that he may

not buckle on the armour of his verbal defences; for if he once does that, you may strike long enough at the brazen cuirass without ever reaching the man. After you have taken these precautions, analyze the doctrine into those little points palpable to common sense, of which every subject that *can* be fully and rationally believed must be made up; and when you collect the results, you shall find, in nine cases out of every ten, that however sincere a believer he may be in the verbal expression of the whole doctrine, he is a sceptic, if not a positive infidel, upon the greater number, if not the whole, of the individual points. One's own case is still more in point than that of the nearest and most intimate friend; but that is a case for feeling rather than for description.

The tendency which we have to assent to the general proposition in cases where we doubt or disbelieve all the elements of which that proposition is composed, is much more general, as well as far more deceptive, than those who are not in the habit of analyzing general propositions are apt to suppose. We leave it to casuists to decide whether indolence or vain-glory is the predisposing cause; but the fact is certain, and may be verified by any one who chooses—that persons of all ranks and degrees of information assent readily to propositions in the gross, of the details of which they resolutely deny every particular, when it is detached from the rest, and presented to them in those simple terms in which it is plain to any person of common understanding.

A simple anecdote, upon the truth of which the

reader may depend, will, perhaps, illustrate this better than any lengthened or elaborate argument:—It is, or was, the practice, in one of the established churches of Britain, for the clergyman, or minister of the parish, annually to test the religious knowledge of the parishioners upon the authenticated catechism, in order to see whether they are fit to be admitted to the communion, or "sacrament," as it is called in Scotland. The wife of a small farmer in a country parish was one of the number who had come to the church to undergo this sort of examination by the Rev. Mr. W——, the minister. A question from the Shorter Catechism of the Westminster Assembly of Divines—a very able tract, certainly, and we believe a very orthodox one, but so very general and metaphysical that it is as difficult to be understood as the Athanasian creed of the other end of the island,—a question from this catechism, is, or used to be, the text, upon which the minister may ground any future question he pleases. These questions are put to the catechumens in succession; and it so happened that, upon the occasion alluded to, the question put to Margaret was that respecting the possibility of keeping the commandments of God. Margaret, in the words of her catechism, answered that she broke them all every day. "What, Margaret, every day?"—"Ay, Sir, all of them, every day, in thought, in word, and in deed."—"Then, pray, Margaret, what god did you prefer, in thought, before the Almighty this morning?"—"Me, Sir!—me prefer false gods!"—"Very well, Margaret, as to the thoughts; now tell me next, in what man-

ner, and how often, you took the name of God in vain, this morning?"—"Me, Sir! I never so much as minced an oath in the whole course of my life."—"Very well again, Margaret, as to the words; and so, now for the deeds,—with whom did you break the seventh commandment this morning?" Margaret's face glowed with the indignation of offended innocence; and she bounced out of the church, exclaiming, "You a minister of the Word of God, and yet dare to take away an honest woman's character! You are rather the devil—the accuser of the brethren!"

There are many points upon which we would all feel very much in the same way as this simple countrywoman: we give a verbal assent to the general proposition, because we have never examined it so as to be able to attach to it any specific meaning; but when the simple elements of which this general proposition is made up, are presented to us, each singly, and judged, or even judgeable, upon its own evidence, the decision is very generally the opposite on each point, of what it is on the general proposition.

It is not difficult to see why this should and must be the case. Every proposition which we can be called upon either to believe or to deny, becomes difficult in proportion as it becomes general; and there is a point beyond which, if the generalizing is carried, the meaning cannot be defined, or, in other words, the proposition is not understood. The proper, or, at all events, the most obvious means of distinguishing between the intelligible and unintelligible here, at least in the case of existences, is whether the painter can, or cannot,

embody the words in a pictorial representation. If he can, then we may calculate that the subject is intelligible; and if he cannot, the conclusion will, of course, be the other way. This, however, supposes a perfect knowledge of language on the one side, and a perfect knowledge of form and appearance on the other.

Take an example:—John Smith, the farmer, and Dobbin, the black horse upon which he rides to market, can be perfectly understood; and the painter can take their likenesses so exactly, that any one who is familiar with the animals can at once say, "This is John Smith, with Dobbin, the black horse." If we generalize only one step, by leaving out the individuality of John Smith, or of Dobbin, and take merely the specific character of man or horse, the painter will still be able to embody on his canvass, and faithfully represent to our eyes, the general idea which we have of the word man or horse.

But if we take even a single step farther in our generalization, by including all the varieties of man, white, olive, red, brown, and black, or the different species which are included in the genus *equus* (horse) of zoologists, the painter fails in being able to represent to the eye all that the word conveys. In his single picture, he can represent only one variety of man, or one species of *equus;* and, therefore, there is, in each of the words taken, with only this partial generalization, something which is not immediately palpable to the senses. This may appear to be a very simple, and even a trifling matter: but it deserves to be borne in mind, as we shall afterwards see, that it

contains a strong, and indeed an irresistible argument for the existence of mind, independently of matter, and, consequently, for immortality.

Continue the generalization to *genus*, *tribe*, *order*, *class*, and any others that may be made use of in the system, till you come to *animal*, the most general name for a creature possessing life of a certain kind; and you will find that the painter is more and more thrown out at every step; so that, in proportion as we generalize, we leave the senses behind. Not only this, for language itself begins to fail us, and the failing is perceptible whenever we come to any more general word than that which denotes a species; and we may say, with truth, that nobody has given, or can give, a perfectly complete and satisfactory definition of the word *animal*: yet every body who understands what he sees has a meaning of his own for this word, which keeps him right in all, except new and extraordinary cases. Not only this, but we have notions, quite satisfactory to ourselves, of the meanings of words still more general, such as the word *being*, and the word *thing*. The word "being," is a general name for whatever is, or whatever can, without absurdity, be imagined to exist; and the word "thing" is still more general than this. "Thing" is literally "the subject of thought;" and thus it may have being or not, as its existence or occurrence may be possible or not possible, according to circumstances.

From this very short and simple enumeration we may see, and, indeed, cannot help seeing, that, even in very common matters, the senses break dowr with

us,—that is, we cannot obtain a likeness, or representation palpable to the senses, completely and faithfully answering to a word of the meaning of which we have a perfect knowledge. Then, after a little more generalization, language gives way; and although we may have a perfectly clear notion in our own minds, we are not able to convey that notion clearly to others.

In this, simple as it may seem, there is matter for very useful meditation. In order to avoid every thing approaching to metaphysical subtlety, we shall suppose the question limited to rational subjects, which are, in every way, and in every part and quality of them, palpable to the senses; and, consequently, such that all the elements of our knowledge of them are originally and immediately derived from the exercise of the senses; so that the whole of the most complex of them can be resolved into those sensal elements. And, making this supposition, we would request any one to ask himself, "Whence comes it that the knowledge which we thus derive from the senses so very soon gets beyond them?" Surely, the senses cannot become too wise for themselves!—the body, considered merely as a body, cannot understand more than it feels! Therefore, in the very first step of generalization, there must be a capacity, or a power—a something, whatever name we may give it, in addition to all that we can by possibility attribute to the body. This is a simple and original argument for the existence of an intellectual principle in Man, which any body may understand, and which nobody who encounters it without prejudice can resist,—though many are apt to overlook it on account of its very simplicity.

The use of language is a strong and striking corroboration of this argument, the more so that Man is the only inhabitant of the earth that has a conventional language. It is true that all animals which breathe the free air, by inspiring and expiring it at the mouth, emit sounds of some kind or other. It is also true that some of the fishes, which breathe air through the medium of water, and expel the water by the gill openings, not by the mouth, make a little noise with their gill-lids; and that many of the invertebrated animals produce sounds by striking certain parts of their bodies against other parts, or against the air. Farther, it is true that many of these sounds are expressive of specific feelings, or they answer certain definite purposes in the economy and physiology of the animals; but these sounds, if we take them in all their volumes, from the murmur of the mullet to the roar of the lion, and in all their tones, from the croak of the bull-frog to the song of the nightingale, are, like the other displays of their instincts, part and parcel of the nature and constitution of the animals. They are not conventional, nor are they, in any respect whatever, the *contrivances* of the animals. The instant obedience to them is a proof of this—shows that they belong to the unerring class of instincts which characterize animals acting wholly upon the impulse of the present feeling, and not of reason, which acts upon the judgments of experience, and upon them only. The ewe and the lamb instantly recognize the bleating of each other, though in a flock of a thousand; but some time must elapse before a

human mother can discriminate the cry of her own child, and perhaps a longer period before the child can know the voice of its mother. This is one of the best contrasts that we can have upon the subject, as the intercourse of the ewe and lamb is the bare and simple voice of nature, and the cry of the infant, and the soothing tones of the fond mother, are perhaps the nearest approach to that simple voice, that can be obtained in the case of human beings.

But there is another view of the difference between the instinctive voices of the animals and the conventional language of Man, which it is useful to take. The voices of all animals, as expressive of the same feeling, are the same; or when they are not, the difference is not greater—indeed, not so great—as we find among the inhabitants of different districts of the same country, whose conventional language is so much the same, that it is impossible, from the style of a book, to say of which district the author of it is a native. In mountainous districts, the lowing of the ox, the bleating of the sheep, the barking of the dog, and, indeed, the voice of almost every animal, is sharper and harder in the tone than upon the low and fertile plains; and the bird-fanciers say that the songs of nightingales, and other warblers, are clearer over dry soils, in a pure atmosphere, than where the soil is clayey, and the air loaded with vapour.

These differences do not, however, arise from convention and choice on the part of the animals, but from physical circumstances which affect the organs of voice, or its medium, or both; and, as the human

organs of speech are of like physical nature as those of animals, and the common medium the same, the tones of the human voice are subject to the same local variations,—to far greater variations, indeed, inasmuch as the human organs, being fitted for far more complicated and extensive use, are much more susceptible of change than those of any other of the animals. Not only this; but, from the fact of human language being conventional, local idioms and modes of pronunciation greatly increase the variety.

But the grand distinction between voice in animals and language in Man, which shows that the former is instinctive, and part of the natural constitution of the animals, while the latter is the contrivance of Man himself, consists in the voice of all animals being, with the few local or climatal changes which have been noticed, constant to the species in all its varieties, and in every region of the world where the species is found, whether it is understood to be native, or has been imported. The ox lows, the sheep bleats, the dog barks, and so of every species of animal, in what country soever it is met with; and when individuals of any species, from different countries, meet each other, they are instantly as familiar in voice as if both had been reared at the same spot. In this they resemble the natural gestures and inarticulate sounds by which the feelings of the human body are expressed, but which convey no knowledge beyond the simple fact that the party uttering or displaying them is under the influence of a certain feeling, the natural expression of which is intelligible to men of every nation,

whether they do or do not understand one word of the articulated or conventional language of each other. Farther, the natural voices of animals do not change in the course of years, either by improvement or by deterioration; and thus, though, like the other actions of animals, they indicate the momentary feelings by which the animal is influenced, they do not give us the least hint that the animal has any knowledge beyond the mere momentary feelings of which the actions or the sounds are the indication.

With human language it is widely different: so different that we cannot reflect upon it for a single moment, without being convinced that it is a contrivance of Man, originally suggested to supply wants which men felt, and could not otherwise increase; and augmented and varied according to the increase and the changes of their wants. This augmentation and change continue at a rate proportional to the increase of knowledge, and the variations of the habits of men, and the manners and customs of society. These changes appear very different in the different classes of which an active and continually changing population, such as that of England, is made up. The classes here alluded to are not formed according to rank, wealth, occupation, or any other of the usually-named distinctions of men. They depend on the habits of the parties; and thus any one of them may contain individuals of any number of the ordinary ranks.

The lowest or least reflective class consists of those who live mentally upon the tale and voice of the day;

and, in large communities, their language changes so often, that one who hears them, after the lapse of a few weeks, finds them speaking a new language,—that is, a language of which the words formerly most in favour and use are forgotten, and others, which were then unknown or unnoticed, have come in their stead. It is of little consequence at which end of town, or in what rank of this class, as topographically defined, the observation is made; for, though the phraseology may not be the same, the change is equally rapid; and a month's absence throws one just as much behind the *ton* in Grosvenor Square and in Grub Street.

The extreme opposite to this may be said to consist of that comparatively limited class who deal only with established facts and principles, and on whom that ephemeral action, upon which the former class are wholly dependent, has little or no effect. These change only with what may be called the substantial changes of society; and, accordingly, one finds them very much the same in language after the lapse of years. The moon is a very appropriate mnemonical emblem of these different classes; for though it presents a different phase every night in relative light and darkness, it is always the same body in itself, and presents very nearly the same face to the earth.

The oral language of the ephemeral-minded part of society is of so very fleeting a nature, that you can no more hold it till it is examined than you can hold the light which is reflected from the dancing ripple on the careering stream; and, therefore, we can but take

note of the more rapid changes of languages from that which appears in print, addressing itself to the taste of the passing time, and is received as such. We pass by the ephemeral and the hebdomadal press, the productions of which are intended to quit, and give room for their successors, the instant that the day or the week elapses. As the purpose of these is not to satisfy, but to whet the appetite of the public, and make this one the means of increasing the desire for the next, they would defeat their own object were they to introduce any thing of a permanent nature. The fashionable romances are therefore the department of written language in which we can best see the rapidity of change in that portion of it which is more immediately an embodyment of the taste of the time, in that portion of society to which it is more specifically addressed. Now, we have the best of all possible evidence, that though the polite slang of the time, or the more pernicious annals of sentimental seduction, are indited in courtly phrase by right honourable ladies, or honourable gentlemen, the duration of such things is brief; and they find their way to the "remainder" merchant, or the trunk-maker, ere yet the fashion of a bonnet, or the tie of a cravat, has become absolutely antiquated; while works which embody truths hold on the quiet tenor of their way, with very little annual variation of language or style, unless where the addition of new truths demands a new nomenclature.

This is a curious subject, and, properly studied, it is far from being an uninstructive one; but as we

have mentioned it only incidentally, we shall not pursue it farther. What we have stated is sufficient to show that mankind, in a changing condition of society, change their language, so that it is always suited to the present taste of those who use it; and this is sufficient proof that conventional language is wholly of human contrivance; that it forms no necessary part of the constitution of Man, as lowing does of that of an ox, or barking of that of a dog; but that every man at his birth, according to the physical developement of his organs of speech, which is not exactly the same in any two districts of which the physical characters differ, or in perhaps any two individuals, has an equal aptitude for all languages, but contains in himself the elements of none.

There was, indeed, a time when certain persons laying claim to the name of learned, maintained that there was some one language which was original and natural to Man, and from which all the diversities which are now spoken or written have been derived by corruption; and that, if a human being were so placed as that he should have no language till he attained the age of speech, he would, as a matter of course, speak this original language. Some held that this original or "father" language of the human race, which was innate in the whole race, though silenced by the dialects of different nations, was Hebrew, and some that it was High Dutch; and the balance hung so even between them, that it was impossible for any impartial person to give a preference to either side. But this doctrine has now been given

up, along with that of innate ideas, of which it is merely a part, except by a very few, with whom it would not be profitable to argue.

As language is the only record of its own history, it is quite impossible that it should contain any note of its own origin among the people of any country, just as it is impossible for any man to give a specific account of the time and manner in which he himself first learned to speak; but still, we see enough of change within the scope of well-authenticated history, to convince us that language is always indebted to the circumstances of the times, without any great—indeed, any perceptible—effort on the part of those who so model it; and that, consequently, by being thus constantly and easily under human control, it is wholly of human contrivance.

In this very simple matter, there is embodied an argument for the existence, in Man, of an intellectual principle wholly different from the body and from sensation; and the inference of the immortality of this principle is so easy and so natural, that it may be said to be absolutely irresistible, to any one who coolly, and dispassionately, and without prejudice, considers the matter.

Language is not a result of the senses, or of any one of them, even of the ear, to which it is addressed in speech, or the eye, to which it is addressed in writing; for were it so, those animals which have the senses more acute than we, should be also more fluent in speech. The owl, for example, has a much finer sense of hearing, and, under peculiar circumstances, it sees much better than Man does; and yet, notwithstanding

this, and all its fabled sagacity, the owl is certainly no orator, even among birds.

It has been already mentioned, that, in the explanation of general terms, the direct address to the senses by pictorial representation breaks down much sooner than language, and that language breaks down long before the stage at which we cease to have a clear and distinct notion of the import of the term. Language is therefore, in reality, a medium of communication between the senses and a power which is higher than the senses: or rather, it has been invented by men, in order that one of these may communicate with another, upon subjects of a nature which cannot be made intelligible by or to the senses of the body.

But, in which of these ways soever the meaning and purpose of it are taken, the existence and the use of language are equally demonstrative of an intellectual principle in Man, not subject to the casualties of the body, and, by obvious consequence, not perishing when the body dies. This language cannot, of course, be said to be, in itself, immortal, because the records in which it is preserved, and the means by which it is made known, are all material, and therefore subject to the contingencies of matter; but still, the truths which are embodied in it have a permanence which does not belong to any thing merely material. The accumulation of them forms an intellectual world which, even in those portions of it which are derived from the things and the events of the material world, is not affected by the contingencies of them. The productions of successive years, the men of succeeding generations, the kingdoms and empires of nations, and

even nations and races themselves, pass away; and when a few centuries of years have passed over the scenes of their exhibition, not a trace remains to tell that they had ever been. But when they are once fairly committed to the record of language, that record is not affected by the destruction of the things, or the obliteration of all other traces of the events that are recorded. We have only to take care of the record itself, and all the facts which it contains are as clear and perfect upon it as they were on the day when first recorded. Here we have a most convincing proof that the recording of language by writing, or by signs or characters of any kind, can no more have originated in the mere senses of the body than language itself, as orally spoken, so originated; and hence there arises another argument for the existence of an intellectual principle in Man.

If brought down to the present time, the argument from the recording of language is stronger than that from the mere use of it in speech. This indicates a much greater removal from mere sensation than the former; and displays a much higher degree of intellectual power. The mere formation of language, of even the most simple language in use by the rudest tribe of the human race, in which the names of existences, qualities, actions, and circumstances are the fewest possible, and where the meaning has to be in part made out from the tones of the voice, the expression of the countenance, and the gestures of the body,— even this is a wonderful matter, as compared with any thing that is done by animals; for this is the contrivance, or invention of the rude

men among whom it was found; and it is their contrivance, not, in the case of the individual, for the supply of any of his own individual wants or the gratification of any of his merely personal appetites, but must be the result of a common understanding among the tribes, and intended as the means by which they are to act in concert with each other.

But wonderful as it is, it is really nothing to the contrivance by means of which the absent member of the horde can be made acquainted with what is going on, even if this is effected to the most limited extent, and by means of the rudest hieroglyphics, or other symbols. When, however, we come to the contrivance of the alphabet, there is an analysis, an exercise of intellect, brought into operation, in comparison with which the mere use of speech sinks into comparative insignificance.

As this has been done for us, not only without care or effort on our part, but done at a period so early that all accounts of its pretended commencement which have come down to us can be regarded as no better than fables, we are in the habit of thinking very lightly of it, as we do of all matters which cause us little or no trouble. But when we reflect upon it, we cannot help perceiving that, simple as it appears to our common observation, it must have been the result of a great intellectual effort,—an effort greater in comparison with the previous state of those who made it than any other single contrivance of mankind, not excepting what we consider as the greatest improvements of modern times.

The grand difference consists in all the others being merely improvements, while the contrivance of language was the beginning, anterior to which men had no means of taking counsel together, neither could the experience of one age be of the smallest avail to the ages that come after. No innate language could have answered this purpose, because it could not have been adapted to experimental contingencies; and the contingencies of human beings are all of this description. Ignorant persons often make use of words of which they do not know the meaning, and thus they misapply them, in a way which appears ridiculous to those who are better informed. This puts a direct negative upon the notion of innate language, if there are any persons at the present day unphilosophical enough to entertain so absurd a doctrine. For, if language were innate, there could be no misapplication of words; as every person would, naturally and without any example or instruction, at once understand, not one language, but all languages— every possible sound of the human voice.

We cannot, as has been hinted, trace the history of language so far backwards as to form even a guess at the manner in which it originated, neither can we, from the investigation of language itself, say whether there has been originally only one or many; and this latter is a point the settlement of which the one way or the other would make nothing for or against our argument, inasmuch as one nation or company of men, inhabiting one place, and contriving one language as the means of mutual communication, is exactly the

same in principle, and as freely proves that language is wholly an intellectual contrivance of Man, as if a thousand different nations had each contrived a thousand different languages, in as many unconnected localities. The real question which this involves, is not the origin of language, but whether mankind in all these varieties are descended from a single pair; and this is a point of faith and not of philosophy.

But though we cannot prove philosophically from an induction of facts, that all the varieties of men are descended from the same pair, yet the physiology contains nothing which is not perfectly in accordance with such a doctrine. All mankind are unquestionably one species; and they are not broken into so many or such striking varieties, even taking the whole extent of the earth and the whole range of their history, as many domesticated animals have been, in our country, and within a moderate period of time.

The languages of mankind, without taking into account individual differences, are certainly more diversified than their bodily appearance, and greater than can be explained upon any difference of physical circumstances, estimated upon the standard of any one particular time. But still, there is, amid all this diversity, a trace of radical sameness running through the whole, which tells us expressly that, although the several languages of tribes and nations are and must be greatly modified by the physical circumstances in which those tribes and nations are placed, yet they are only modified, not produced, by those circumstances.

There is a similarity of radical structure in all lan-

guages—a distinction of *noun* as denoting existence, and *verb* as denoting action; the noun distinguished by some means or other, as an actor, the subject of an action, a giver, a receiver, a possessor, an associate, or some of the other states in which an existence can be considered; and the verb also under some one or other of its modifications. The radical words themselves, and also the means by which these modifications of them are indicated, may be ever so different, and the language of one race may be wholly unintelligible to every other race; but still there is thus much of correspondence in the general structure to show that the intellectual principle which has formed the spoken language of every nation and tribe to suit the particular circumstances under which that tribe is placed, is, in itself, the same in them all. We have already shown that this formation of a conventional language is not the result of sensation, or of any faculty which the body as a mere material body possesses: it now appears that it is not a consequence of the circumstances in which the body is placed; and, therefore, the argument for the existence of an intellectual principle in Man, as drawn from the formation of language only, is complete and unanswerable.

But, as we have the original proof of the existence of an intellectual principle, more palpable to the common understanding of all mankind, whether learned or unlearned, in merely spoken language than in any thing else, so we have a more remarkable display of the power of this principle in the cultivation of language

than in the cultivation of any other subject of science and art. That modification of motion in the air which produces sounds audible by the human ear, into which the whole of spoken language is resolvable, and that modification of light reflected from the surfaces of bodies, by means of which alone hieroglyphs, alphabetical characters, and all other symbols of language, are rendered visible to the eye, have originally no relation to each other; and yet, now that the connexion of them has been established, the transition from the one of them to the other is the most easy that can be imagined. The visible characters can be instantly translated into voice by any one who can read; and the voice can be translated into characters with equal ease, though not with quite the same rapidity, by every one who can write. Even the difference which is felt here shows the superiority of the intellectual process over the bodily one: when we read, or translate the visible characters into voice, we have no manual operation to perform—nothing to move but our own organs of speech; but when we perform the contrary translation, by taking down the words of a speaker, we must put the writing instrument into motion, and regulate it according to certain laws, which is a more complicated operation than the former, and hence it requires more experience to give the same facility in the performance of it.

As we have introduced this argument for the existence of an intellectual principle in Man, from the existence of language, only as an introductory matter, we shall not follow it out to that extent of which it

admits and invites, and to which any reader can easily pursue it; but there is so perfect an instance of science and art — of analysis of that which is known, and of synthesis in that which is done—that it deserves notice as one of the most beautiful as well as one of the most general instances of the manner in which the intellectual principle works, in what we call invention, or contrivance.

First, in order to obtain the foundation upon which the relation between speech and visible characters has to be established, there must be a perfect analysis of the sound of the human voice, into what may be called simplest elements. These elementary sounds are not quite the same in all countries; for there are simple sounds in all languages which strangers cannot pronounce, and for which the alphabets of strange languages have no letter. But, generally speaking, the elementary sounds have been considered as not fewer than about twenty or more than thirty,—those of the English language, as represented by the letters of the alphabet, being the mean, or twenty-five. The ascertaining of the number and tone of these is the analysis.

It must be understood, however, that this is not the first step, or even a step at all, in the *making* of language: for language must be made and in use before this step can be thought of. It is the same with what we call the grammar of language: grammar rules had nothing to do in the original formation of language; for the grammar is learned from the language, not the language from the grammar,— and hence, by the

way, the absurdity of that custom of the schools which pesters children with the rules of grammar, before they are in possession of words, by means of which the rules can be applied or even rendered intelligible.

The adopting of a character to represent each of the elementary sounds, is the synthetical part of the process, in obtaining a visible language corresponding to the audible one; and here, as in the case of the analysis, we confine ourselves to the very first and simplest step.

There is a further nicety in this part of the matter; for neither the elementary sound, nor the letter which is the visible symbol of that sound, has any meaning of its own; and therefore each of them is fit for being an element of words, or significant expressions of the most varied and the most opposite meanings; whereas, if these first elements of language were in themselves significant, their number would have to be most inconveniently increased, before they could form a general language. The Chinese mode of writing labours under this disadvantage; but it admits of a far greater latitude in the pronunciation than our more alphabetical language.

Twenty-four letters appear, at first thought, to be but a small number; but when we estimate the number of changes of which these letters are susceptible, taking them in all numbers from one to twenty-four, the number of words, all different in spelling, that could be formed of them, is absolutely infinite to our understanding, that is, it is greater than any number of which we can form a conception. If a number of

human beings equal to that now upon the whole earth were to continue, night and day, speaking at the rate of a word per second, they could not repeat all the different words that could be formed of these letters, in the long period of a thousand millions of years; and if the mere list of these words, without explanations, were printed in the usual style and type of octavo volumes, all the men, all the beasts of burden, all the ships, and all the other means of conveyance which the world can afford, would not be able to carry or even lift this vocabulary.

Thus, as language may be said to be the grand means or instrument of intellectual improvement, and the only means by which knowledge is arranged, preserved, and communicated, there is no danger that it shall ever be exhausted; or that any new fact, discovery, addition, or improvement of any kind shall be made, without the means of giving it a verbal name and description. This shows how admirably the body and the intellectual parts of human nature are adapted to each other; and with what perfection of design the compound creature Man has been framed by his all-wise and all-bountiful Author. We admire, and justly may we admire, the adaptations which we perceive in the physical creation: the adaptation of the recipient earth to the received influence of the solar beams, the adaptation of the fish to the water, the bird to the air, and of every creature to its particular mode of life; and still more do we admire the universal adaptation of the human body to all the variety of works, useful or ornamental, which that body has to perform; and,

when we attempt to imitate even the most apparently simple of these adaptations, we find that our best ingenuity fails; and we confess our inferiority, acknowledging that there is set before us, in every part of nature, a model which instructs while it defies us, and gratifies while it defeats.

But, wonderful as these adaptations are in their number and their perfections, they are still only physical adaptations. They are the fittings for each other of parts which belong to *one* system; and which, in so far as they are composed of substance, are made of one common matter, which, in the case of one and all of them, is subject to the *one* law of gravitation, from the influence of which not a single particle of matter is exempt, and which, therefore, is one foundation upon which we can rely in all our physical investigations.

The adaptation of the physical and the intellectual parts of the compound being Man to each other, is of a different kind altogether, and brings us upon new ground, where no analogy drawn from physical nature will answer our purpose. We can understand the adaptation of the form and the fins of a fish to a certain habit and rate of motion in the water; and we can do the same in the case of the structure, the form, and the flight feathers of a bird. So also we can say of the feet of any of the Mammalia, that it is adapted to a particular kind of surface, and a particular rate and style of motion over that surface; or that it is fitted for clutching prey, climbing a tree, or performing any of the other numerous functions to which the

feet or paws of such animals are applied. We can do all this; and we can also notice how well the whole skeleton, muscles, and general trim of the animal, harmonize, so as to make the active member perform its work in the best manner, and with the least exertion to the animal. Upon such subjects we can, if our information is extensive enough, and sometimes in spite of its scantiness, "discourse most excellent philosophy," till the world shall wonder again at the depth of our erudition. Nay, we can do the very same with the human body, and find in it the models of half—ay, the whole—of the mechanical engines which human ingenuity has made.

But when we come to the adaptation of body and mind—to the harmonious reciprocations of instruction and obedience which is carried on between the mortal clay and the immortal spirit—our philosophy is at fault; for there is one of the subjects compared, which we cannot measure with the line, weigh in the balance, or decompose in the crucible. Therefore it is that, in the pride of our folly, or the folly of our pride, we are sometimes tempted to fall back upon our physical or material philosophy as our only portion, and deny our own better, and intellectual, and immortal part, and even the God who made us, for no other reason than that these are, in their nature, above the philosophy which rests wholly on the evidence of the senses.

CHAPTER II.

POPULAR GROUNDS OF IGNORANCE AND DOUBT.

NOTWITHSTANDING the simple and comprehensive nature of the argument which the formation and the use of conventional language affords, for the existence of an intellectual or mental principle in Man, in no-wise produced by or proceeding from the body, and not in any way subject to the frailty, the disease, and the mortality of that, there is still a barrier to be broken down, before the doctrine of mind can be rendered attractive and intelligible to common readers, and all doubt and scepticism upon the subject removed.

The main ground of the indifference and aversion which the majority of people have to the study of Intellectual Man, as well as of all the doubt and scepticism which are entertained upon that most important subject more generally than they are confessed, and very far more so than they are avowed, for the purpose of gaining proselytes, was hinted at in the close of the preceding chapter, as consisting in the difficulty of making the transition from the philosophy of matter to the philosophy of mind.

The material creation, in which way soever we pursue the study of it, is one continuous matter: there are certain general principles, or laws, which run through the whole of it, and not only serve us as guides at every step, but which make even the very first step that we take desire us to take another one, and facilitate the accomplishment of the desire. There are common properties of matters, common modes of crystallization among minerals, of growth among plants, of action among animals, and there are common forms of organization among the last two, which guide us on from one to another; so that, when we have made ourselves acquainted with the single one, which is haply brought to our notice by mere accident, or by that humour of the moment for which we cannot account, we feel an irresistible desire to proceed to another; and the study of that other is all pleasure to us, without any difficulty, so true is it that "the ways of wisdom are pleasantness." The progress of any mathematician, natural philosopher, chemist, botanist, zoologist, or any votary of any of the sciences of matter, whose names are so many, might furnish us with a practical illustration of this. The successful, the conspicuous, the foremost men in these matters, are by no means they who, according to our ordinary way of judging and speaking, have had the best opportunities; neither are they the persons who have previously got credit for possessing the brightest talents, and the greatest aptitude for acquiring knowledge: generally speaking, they are the very opposite. The youth before whom the schoolmaster blows a

trumpet, is usually some shallow-minded creature, vain of a little, and so absorbed in the display of that little, that he never learns—that is, will not give himself leisure to learn—to be great. Such persons are too much occupied by the love of show for having time to feel the love of knowledge; and this, by the way, is the real cause why superior attainments in knowledge, especially those kinds of knowledge which lie most out of the way of the common pursuits and occupations of men, have been ascribed to the imaginary possession of the phantom of genius. When the love of knowledge is once fairly excited—and it never fails to be excited by the real acquisition of knowledge—it is far more delightful to the party than any applause; and therefore those who have once attained it, work away, quite pleased with the mere fact of the working, until they have outstripped all their fellows; and the results begin to dazzle and delight the public. It is dangerous to their full fame that this dazzling and delighting of the public should come too soon, because the very applause which we obtain for having done well, is apt, in a very insidious and unsuspected way, to steal from us the capacity of doing better.

The catalogue of those men whom the world delights to honour—after they are dead—abounds in names of original geniuses for all the sciences, and all those higher departments of art which imply great scientific acquirements on the part of such as become eminent in them; but the names of those who have acquired the reputation of original genius for the sci-

ence of Intellect are exceedingly few, in comparison with the others. Whether this be more owing to the difficulty which lies at the very beginning of the study, and embarrasses the student, or to public indifference, arising from the same cause, we shall not attempt to decide; but there can be little doubt that it is owing partly to the one and partly to the other. There is always most natural genius for those subjects which are most in accordance with the taste and fashion of the age. There was a time when natural genius for the drama, or for poetry of some kind or other, predominated over all other kinds of genius; but now there is no natural genius whatever for the drama, and very little for poetry; but there is a great deal for geology, and joint-stock speculations, as well as for the small kind of engineering, finesse, and finance, to which the latter give rise. In short, the public demand can stimulate the production of natural genius, to the same extent as it can stimulate that of any other marketable commodity.

But it has never hitherto stimulated the production of any remarkable quantity or superior quality of natural genius on the subject of the intellectual nature of Man; and, therefore, we may safely conclude that this subject has never been such a favourite with the public as any of the subjects—from the most sublime poetry to the most senseless phrenology—upon which the said natural or original genius has run in the singular cycle of its variations.

No doubt there have been many schools and sects upon a science nearly resembling this in name; and

there have been fiercer contests, and warmer arguments upon it than upon almost any other subject, except religion; but the acrimony of the parties, and the fierceness of the contests, upon either subject, are no proofs that mankind are imbued with the love or the knowledge of either. On the contrary, they are the strongest proofs of general ignorance that we can possibly have.

Mankind rarely dispute, and never come to blows, upon subjects which they perfectly understand. Mathematicians never wrote angrily about the properties of a circle or a triangle; and though an ignorant person now and then springs up, and impugns the doctrine, the cudgels are never crossed on the subject of universal gravitation. Anatomists, too, have never been angry with each other about the organization of the human body, or the actions of the bones and muscles; but there have been bickerings about the nervous energy, the seat of the central sensorium, and the kind and degree of intellect indicated by the shape and size of the cranium.

In proportion as the subjects of science depart from that physical nature which can be referred to the judgment of the senses, and become mixed with intellectual elements, mankind have been more frequently and more fiercely disputaceous concerning them. The science of language may be considered as the first of these; for, though language is, in itself, purely a human contrivance, and as such as completely under human control as mathematics or music, yet it is often the embodyment or representation of matters which

are purely intellectual; and whenever this is the case, the difficulty of the subject of language attaches to the language itself. Hence, grammarians have, on one occasion at least, gone the length of consigning each other to everlasting punishment for certain heresies on the subject of "impersonal verbs," which verbs, it must be admitted, are shadowy expressions, being the names of the performance of certain actions, in which there is no agent which can, as a person or a personification, be separated from the action itself.

Intellectual science, or, as it has been usually, though incorrectly, termed, Moral Philosophy, is with difficulty treated as merely human science, because it is so closely allied to religion — so intimately connected, that if intellectual science is not understood, the very foundations of religion are not understood; and if the foundations of the first are shaken by any doubt, the foundations of the second must be shaken by the same. This must, indeed, be much more the case; for the whole foundation of religion is of an intellectual nature, while a portion at least of the intellectual nature of Man is closely connected with the feelings of the body. Therefore, doubt on the one subject becomes, almost of necessity, total unbelief upon the other.

We have the proof of this, and also of the ignorance of mankind upon these subjects, in the greater degree of animosity which has existed upon them than upon any other subjects whatever. The limited number of those taking an interest in intellectual science has rendered the battles respecting it comparatively few,

but they have not been wanting in fierceness. The actual hostilities of the Nominalists and the Realists are well known; and not more than forty or fifty years have elapsed since the prelections of not a few of the *morality* professors consisted of little else than vituperations against Hume and the other sceptics, which probably tended more to the propagation of doubt than to its removal.

Of the animosities and errors which have arisen from religious causes, or rather from causes pretending to be religious, we have no necessity and no wish to speak in detail; for there have probably been more hostilities on account of this subject than of all the bad passions and vices of men taken together. Religion must not be blamed for this; for "peace and good-will to men" are inseparable from the true knowledge of Christianity, whatever may be the name of the church of which the parties may happen to be members. Yet still it is matter of every-day observation, that religious disputes, to say nothing about actual hostilities, are carried on with more unseemly rancour than those upon any other subject. But the men of a future and more enlightened age will probably tell it as a tale of unprecedented barbarity, that many thousands of the human race have been killed in battle, or butchered in cold blood, because they would not believe that a certain vegetable solid was the real body, and a certain vegetable liquid the real blood, of the incarnate Son of God, merely in consequence of certain words of incantation said over them, and each of them preserving the same appearance to ordinary

observation, and yielding exactly the same results to chemical analysis, as though no words of incantation had been said, and no such assertion had been made respecting them. They will probably regard the mere assertion of this, pretendedly made in the name and by the authority of the God of truth, as one of the most impudent falsehoods, and most audacious pieces of blasphemy and impiety that ever stained the checquered annals of men, pretending to be holy, in order that they might live in luxurious idleness on the fruits of other men's labour. Should the tale of this imposture, and the cruelties by which the belief of it was attempted to be enforced, live, even in that shadowy tradition by which we of the present time hear of giants some fathoms in height, old women in nightly converse with the devil, and spirits wandering about and performing mechanical labours, for no apparent earthly purpose but to frighten the silly, and make themselves ridiculous,—if the tale of them shall live, even in this species of tradition, after mankind generally shall be in possession of rational information—such information as is in accordance with the simple, but sublime and philosophical, declaration of the revealed Word of God—upon the grand questions of immortality and religion, then, assuredly, it will be an especial marvel to them, that any men, accountable at the bar of eternal justice according to their deeds, could possibly abuse the understandings and torture the bodies of God's creatures, upon a pretence so monstrously absurd.

Perhaps the time may also come—for observation

and thought do not slumber, the pen and the press are not idle, and, metaphorically, but without mysticism, the well-wishers of the best interests of man hear, in the distance, the sounding of the wings of the angel of mental deliverance:—yes, putting aside all the idle mummery of the millenium, the reign of the *saints* upon earth (Heaven defend us from the barbaric domination of such saints as now cumber the calendar!), a time is in promise and in prospect when, as there is one Godhead, Nature and Revelation shall be read and understood as one book, and men shall live in this world in virtue and in joy; and, at the close of a sojourn well spent and mature, lie down upon the bed of death in full assurance of eternal happiness, and render up their last breath amid the blessings of that world which it has been the study of their lives to bless. In those happy days, it may haply be told, as among the minor marvels of superstition, the child of ignorance, in the olden time, that some little close of ground, all too rank in the soil, and foul in the atmosphere, for producing one kindly nettle, was yet, in consequence of certain words muttered over it, declared and believed to be more precious in the eyes of the Almighty than the finest farm in the parish, which yielded abundance of wholesome food for more than a hundred human beings.

These passing remarks will show the intelligent reader where the grand causes which have rendered the doctrines of intellect and immortality so uninviting to the great body of mankind are to be found; but these causes do not arise out of the real nature of

the subject, or the individual to whom they make that subject repulsive, but are imposed by one class of mankind upon the other classes: and therefore the farther analysis of them, and their influence upon the state of human beings, can, with much more propriety, be stated in another volume of this series, in which we purpose to give a short popular view of "MAN IN HIS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND RELATIONS;" and we would not have even hinted at them in this place, had it not been that they are the most likely to occur to the reader; and it might have been supposed, from our silence, that we were to blink the most important part of the subject—a part to which we purpose to apply the scalpel, we trust with no reckless, but certainly with no timidly-sparing hand.

Our present object is, therefore, limited to the consideration of the leading causes of dislike and doubt relative to the intellectual nature and eternal duration of Man, which arise out of the subject itself, and the manner in which Man is, by his common experience, and manner of proceeding in the study of other matters, prepared for entering upon it; and, in order to do this properly, we shall put aside all allusion to prejudice, bias, or previous opinion, the one way or the other.

Supposing this done, let us put the case of a man who has been observant, who has acquired such a knowledge of the productions and laws of the physical world, as that he can feel all the beauty of its adaptations, and have a hearty enjoyment of it, far beyond and above that which is necessary for the gratifying

of all his bodily appetites, and the satisfying of his desires of possessions and rank among his fellow-men. Such a man must be aware that, one day, and that not a very distant one, the pleasures of sense and the enjoyments of society shall be at an end, possession shall be to him no more, honour shall be clean gone, and that body which he fed, and clothed, and ornamented, and guarded, with so much solicitude, and the appearance of which was hailed with so much pleasure in the friendly hall, and so warm applause in the public assembly, shall become the most loathsome and offensive thing on the face of the earth, so that those who loved him the most shall be fain to hide it in the oblivion of the grave, there to feed the blind beetle, till the elements of it shall be scattered in viewless atoms towards all the winds of heaven. He must be aware of this, not as an abstract ditty of the common event of human life, to be "said and sung" in ceremonial observance, without thought and without application, but as a personal and practical certainty, which comes home to his own individual case with as little doubt or question, and as truly and constant a feeling of its truth, as he has of his own existence.

Can such a man, we would ask, look abroad upon the all-teeming earth, or the all-encircling sea—the barrier of hostility and the bond of friendly union between nation and nation?—Can he see the flowers blowing, the fruit ripening, and all the animals in full enjoyment around him?—Can he behold the sun, the moon, and the planets, and all the more distant host

of heaven, whose distances link his thoughts with infinitude, and the cycles of whose duration leagues his hopes with eternity?—Can he do this, or any of this, and brook the melancholy, the maddening thought,—"Yet a few days, and all this is, for me, to be blotted out for ever; and I am to be as 'the kneaded clod,' all unconscious that I have ever been, expunged and rased from the book of life—of conscious existence—for ever, and for ever?" Flows there through the heart of one human being blood so maddened by the force of passion, as that the thought of the fearful YES to such an inquiry would not congeal it as stone? Lives there the man upon whom *this* darkness of "the shadow of death" could fall for one moment, and he not rush upon it and end his misery, as the soldier ends his life by rushing on the steel, when he finds the grief thereof in his flesh, during the maddening strife of the closed battle? It were utterly impossible—more than the greatest strength, the most hardened indifference of human nature, could endure.

One who had studied physical nature, even in those common lines of it which are palpable to every man's observation, and who had seen, as he could not fail to see, the perfect beauty of adaptation and economy which runs through the whole, without the slightest trace either of want or of waste, would revolt at the conclusion, and tremble at the very idea of imputing such injustice to a Being all wise, all good, and all bountiful, as the Creator of the world is shown to be by the universal testimony of his visible works. The knowledge of all this—a knowledge which is not abso-

lutely required for the purposes of physical life, and which goes on increasing when the senses become blunted, and the pleasures of the bodily appetites are no more—could not possibly have been given without a use; and as it increases while the use in this world is diminishing, the use of it *must be* in another. This is the light from above, which fell upon such of the sages of antiquity as escaped the mummery of the time, and were at liberty to follow out the train of their own thoughts to even its natural results.

But those enlightenments among the heathens were rare; and they were withstood, and derided, and persecuted, by those who made a gain of the existing superstitions. Even at best, they were but scintillations in comparison with what might be expected to be felt by men of equal candour and proportional information at the present time. All the natural sciences were then in a very imperfect state: their connexion with each other had not been traced, and the numerous gods which crowded the Pantheon showed that, to the great body of the people, physical nature was yet "a thing of shreds," of which the union had not been seen, or the harmony and beauty felt.

On a man of the present day, equally informed and equally philosophical, and free from prejudice, the effect would necessarily be very different. He could not but feel the revelation of the system; and his simple notion of the God of nature, as derived from the study of the works of nature, would recoil with horror from the idea of ascribing the apparent anomaly to One who, in the only conception which an

enlightened human being could form, is all perfect; and the desire of the truth would be strong upon the man, and he would strive with the perplexity; and, as the mind always does in the hour of peril—for, when lightning shivers the towers, or an earthquake rocks the city, the infidel prays—so his longing would be for his Maker: "Oh that I knew where I might find him! that I might come to his seat!" And the desire would not be breathed in vain. The radiance of hope would beam in the cloud; and, in that indescribable feeling which words can but darken, the demand will be made, and the answer will be given; and the awakened mind will take fast hold on "the Rock of Ages," and confidence and joy will be complete.

This is only a supposed case, put for the purpose of showing what might possibly be the result, if one, perfectly instructed in the science of nature, quite philosophical, and entirely free from prejudice, were to be brought to this question, after having carried his physical investigations, and the reasonings founded on them, as far as the utmost range of science, and the most successful and longest-continued attention of man, can by possibility admit. There is probably not any such man to be met with upon the face of the earth; and even the approximations are so few, and so far inferior to the standard, that they cannot be admitted as any thing like that average, by which alone we can get a fair estimate of the human race.

Hence we must consider ourselves as addressing persons of ordinary understanding, who observe and think correctly in a plain way, but are not in the

habit of making extensive generalizations, or drawing conclusions from many particulars, the different natures of which have all to be adjusted and allowed for before the conclusion can be drawn. These are the men who shrink from the study of the intellectual and immortal nature of Man, partly from a belief that it is attended with peculiar difficulty, partly from fear that the result of the investigation would not be pleasant, and partly also because they cannot see in what way this study can be conducive to their worldly interest. It may be that the last of these is the more general motive, and it certainly is the stronger one—so strong, indeed, that wherever it has once taken full and complete hold on the affections, there is no more hope of the acquisition of scientific knowledge, on the subject of intellect or upon any other.

Such persons naturally, and, indeed, necessarily, regard Man simply as an object of the senses, just as they do the other members of the physical creation, differing from these in degree as they also differ from each other, but still essentially the same in kind,—that is, having a similar origin and close to his existence, and subject to the same general laws of matter. Like them, he is born in an immature state, far more feeble, indeed, than any of those which resemble him the most in their general organization; for there are comparatively few of the other animals which cannot, in part, feed, and, in some measure, take care of themselves from the first day of their appearance; while, of human beings, even those who are nearest to a state of nature, and thus have the

greatest hardihood, there are none that could live of themselves in their very early days.

Man grows up to maturity in like manner, and by means of material food, the very same as the animals around him; and though his wants, his enjoyments, and his pursuits, are all different in their modes and their immediate objects from those of other living creatures, they appear, to the ordinary observation of the senses, to be all directed to the accomplishment of the same grand purposes in physical nature,—the comfortable subsistence of the individual, and the continuation of the race.

The circumstances under which these grand purposes, and the means of carrying them into effect, are displayed, vary much with civilization and manners, not only as viewed in their co-existence in different countries, but as viewed in their succession in the progressive history of any one country; yet amid all those variations in place, and changes in time, common observation naturally refers them all to the gratification of the senses of the body, so that, to such observation, Man appears to live for the body, and for the body only, just as the other animals live.

It is true that, in the case of any one species of animal, we find no such local variations, and no such temporary changes in the mode of life, as we find in the single species of which all the nations of men are made up; but, in our common observation, we are apt to overlook this, or to confound the differences between species and species with the mere varieties which occurs in the species itself. In this way, the

observed difference between one species of animal and another is far greater than any that we can observe, or even that we can read of, among the human race. There are no such differences of appearance or observed habit between one individual of the human race and another, as are seen between the water hydra and the dog, the cheese-mite and the elephant, or the animalcula and the whale. Nay, leaving these more striking contrasts out of the question, we neither see nor read of any such diversities among men as we find among the other animals which we meet with in the course of a single summer walk, let us take that walk in what direction we may, and whether the scene of our observation be the inhabited land, or the still more thickly-peopled waters.

These diversities of species and genera, and other sections of animated nature, are, in ordinary observation, confounded with the varieties of the single species, so that the constancy of that, in a state of nature, is lost sight of amid the endless differences which the assembled whole present; and as these are, taken altogether, much greater to ordinary observation and to common reading, and all produced by physical or material means, a different origin is not sought for the apparently minor diversities of the human race.

Then, as the body of Man is composed of the same kind of matter as other animal bodies—as the structure of it, though differing in many particulars, is yet framed upon the general model of the vertebrated animals—as all the more important bodily functions are of the same kind, and as the senses have organs

similar in their general structure and their situation, there is quite enough, both in the structure and the observed economy of Man, to lead the mere external observer to conclude that his destiny is the same,—that Man, like the other living inhabitants of the earth, is of and for the present world only: he is born, and he lives, like the rest; he suffers from hunger and thirst, and he is gratified when these are appeased; he requires sleep when he is wearied, and after sleep he is refreshed; the extremes of cold and of heat affect him as they affect the others; when wounded, he bleeds as they do, and as in them, so in him, there is a power of healing in his flesh, without care or trouble on his part; and, independently of those diseases, which certainly multiply upon him in number, though they are probably upon the whole less fatal, as he advances in civilization, the same casualties occasion his death, as occasion the death of the other animals.

Of all these facts, an ordinary observer has what may be considered as the best evidence,—the direct experience of his own senses, and an experience which is complete, or without one opposing instance to cast the slightest doubt upon it. Now, though very many persons, and those, too, possessed of reflection, or having what are usually termed philosophical minds, believe that they act according to their own "free will," as it is called; and, though they are not less confident in the truth and assertion of this belief than they are in the existence of their senses, yet the belief is false, and there is really no such principle or motive

of human action as this same "free will." Every one knows that this same will, or *wish*—for that is the proper name of it—is the bond-slave of necessity after it is formed; and that man who actually accomplishes even the tenth part of what he has wished for, must be not only a most successful man, but one whose desires are so very moderate that his successes can be of little use to himself or to any one else. Eminence arises from the multitude of wishes, and from them only; and the greatest man that ever lived probably failed in ninety-nine out of every hundred. The great difference is, that wise men conceal their abortive wishes, and get credit for the successful ones, while fools go about lamenting their failures till they teach the world that they are incapable of success.

Man has evidently, therefore, no freedom to carry his "will" into execution, farther than circumstances, over which he really has no control, will allow him. This, however, is not the point upon which the deception lies; for the supposed *freedom* is in the formation of the will—the fact of willing or wishing; and a very little consideration will show us that there is not more freedom in this formation of the will or wish, than there is in the execution of it after it is formed.

This is rather an anticipation; but still it is necessary to understand it, in order that we may fully comprehend how strong the connexion is between our ordinary observation and experience of the senses, and doubt or disbelief on the question of mind and immortality. Therefore, such readers as are not already conversant with the subject, but who wish to under-

stand the causes of doubt upon it, and the means of removing these causes, will have the kindness to study with attention the few sentences which follow.

For the sake of perspicuity, let us put the case in the words in which it is usually stated, namely, that "*Man has free will;*" that is, he is at "liberty" to form any wish that he pleases, and, hating the restraint imposed upon him by the laws and customs of the society of which he is a member, to carry that wish into execution if he can. This is the ordinary and very general belief upon the question; and, as is the case with many other questions that cannot be very well defended or maintained upon their own evidence, or by their own arguments, an auxiliary plea has been entered here, by contending that if Man had not this freedom of will and choice in all that he designs and does, he could not be a moral agent,—could not justly be punished for his crimes, or entitled to any praise or reward for his well-doing.

This argument, like all auxiliary, or as we may term them, *mercenary* arguments, which are called in to support positions not in themselves tenable, is specious, and many are carried away by it; but, nevertheless, it is not sound, and though it were it could not remove, though it might conceal, the weakness of the position in support of which it is brought forward. The full consideration of it must be referred to our volume on the "MORAL RELATION OF MAN," to which it properly belongs; therefore, we shall only remark, in the meantime, that that is a very suspicious kind of morality which propagates a false-

hood from fear, real or pretended, that the knowledge of the truth would be attended with mischievous consequences. Yet this is the foundation of all doctrines by the preaching of which the people are kept in ignorance and error; and upon no subject has it been more practised, or caused more real injury to mankind, than it has done upon that of immortality. Men fancy that this subject cannot bear the test of reason, —that it cannot bear to be tried upon the same kind of evidence as a matter of physical philosophy or of the business of common life; and, therefore, they studiously avoid all such investigation as would lead them to the truth, and appease their occasional anxieties by the opiate of a mumbled creed, not one word of which they understand. Now, if this is not hiding real unbelief under a cloak of pretended religion, we know not where this species of deceit is to be found; and if such is to be the foundation of morality, it certainly is morality which the world would be better without. If the belief of a future state is a fiction which will not bear that investigation of reason which it is our very nature to bestow upon all subjects, then let us manfully say so, in order that they who listen to us, and in part act upon our saying, may make the most of the present life, as their only and final portion: and if, on the other hand, this belief is true, surely mankind cannot have their understandings too well convinced of the truth of it,—they who will not be satisfied without proof upon the most trifling matter connected with this transitory life, cannot surely be contented with mere rumour on a question of eternal interest!

But to return to the subject of free will.—We have already said, and every man must feel experimentally, that we are not free in carrying what we call our "will" into effect; therefore, there remains only the question of our freedom in the formation of the will. Now suppose this admitted, for the sake of argument; then, reader, answer me this question:—Is it your will to eat or drink nothing all next week, except *hrrwnchwygg* and *bdwlggwg?* You cannot tell, because you do not know what *hrrwnchwygg* and *bdwlggwg* are, or whether a human being could live a week upon them or not. Yes, but your will is *free;* and such being the fact, why should you hesitate? "I do not understand what you mean, and so I can have no will about the matter." Then, if you can have no will without knowledge, you can, in fact, have no will at all, as a general principle, either free or not free; and what you call your "will," is merely a consequence of a certain state of your knowledge, which you can no more help or hinder, than you can help or hinder the effect of the operation of any natural cause. Canute commanding the tide was not a more pointed reproof to the vanity of regal power, than this is to the more silly but far more general vanity of the belief of free will in Man.

The fact is, that instead of our having any thing like what is usually meant by "freedom" of will, that state of mind which we call *will*, if the word must be used, is one of the most enslaved and necessitous of all our states. It is under a double trammel of necessity—first, in the original formation of the wish,

and secondly, in the carrying of that wish into execution. In both these parts of the process which is carried on from the mental desire to the deed, the necessity which constitutes the bondage is exactly the same. Without the necessary knowledge, we cannot have the wish; for though we are sometimes in the habit of saying that we wish for we know not what, yet these words are incorrect. What we really wish in such cases is to get rid of an unpleasant feeling; and if we cannot find the means of doing so, it cannot be said that our mere wish, however strong and earnest it may be in itself, can amount to a will to perform any action, or to apply any remedy for our uneasiness.

If we candidly apply the result of this plain and simple argument to the case which led us to the digression, namely, the unbroken chain of the evidence of the senses in favour of the mortality of the whole of Man as a being, in like manner as the other animals, opposed to the mere verbal assertion of Man's immortality, though backed by the authority of ten thousand churches, and the anathema of priests without number, it is easy to see that there can be no freedom of will about the matter; but that we must inevitably, and as a necessary consequence of the very constitution of our nature, be guided entirely by the stronger evidence, and form our inward opinion and belief according to that, whatever may be the expressions which we utter with our mouths.

In penal matters, as between the individual and that society of which he is a member, the words may be all

very well; but with reference to the individual, considered as by himself, and his real belief as influencing his happiness or misery, the moral restraint under which he is held, or his absolvement from all restraint, they are of no value whatever.

Such a man is, as a moral and responsible being, literally "under the law;" that is, he has no rule of conduct but the customs and institutions of that nation or society of which he is a member. His temporal enjoyments engross the whole of his attention; and in the conducting of these he is wholly guided by temporal considerations. He seeks no approbation save that of men, and he fears no censure or punishment, except that which man can inflict. It matters not what his words may be; for his deeds afford the most indubitable evidence that he is of and for this world alone.

To be convinced that this is now, and has always been, the case with the majority of the human race, we have only to look around us and to consult the volume of history. We find a different code of morals, and rule—if rule it can be called—of conduct, not only in every different nation, as defined by its geographical position, its laws, and the predominating customs of its population, but in the different districts of the country, and the different ranks or classes of its inhabitants. In the present state of a country like Britain, where the laws profess to apply equally to all classes of the people, we do not find that the very same act is a statutory vice in one class of society and a statutory virtue in another. But we

do find that there is a practical tendency to this state of things; and when we look back to the annals, and contrast the spirit, and view the literal expression of these, we find that, in the lapse of ages, virtue and vice have often changed places, so that that which has been held to be the greatest glory of Man in one age, has become his blackest shame in another.

We find a little more than this, even in the most momentary glance which we can take at society, provided we take it with eyes unobscured by prejudice. We do not find it universally, or, perhaps, even so strongly marked as to warrant us in saying that it is the general rule; but still we cannot help seeing that society, taken in the whole chain of its ranks, is a flexible thing, of which both ends have a tendency to turn away from those laws which sustain the middle. The one extremity gets above the law, and the other sinks below it. But although the means, or the motive, or whatever else it may be called, is different in the two extremities of society,—though the members of the one can maintain a certain status or rank in that society without much regard to moral observances, and the other offends from having no status or rank to maintain; yet the end is nearly the same in both,—it is animal gratification, and very often animal gratification of so nearly the same kind that the parties become the associates of each other, and the greatest disparity of birth is overcome and obliterated by consanguinity of manners.

The fact just stated requires no illustration, as it is palpable to every one who chooses to observe; but

on this account the inference to be drawn from it is only the more important, and shows the necessity of something farther being necessary to the proper regulation of human conduct than laws and public institutions, how necessary soever these may be.

The details of this belong properly to the *Moral* and *Social* consideration of Man; but the principle is so intimately connected with ignorance, indifference, and scepticism on the question of mind and immortality, that it cannot with propriety be overlooked.

In another volume we shall have to take a short view of the existing framework of society, and the manner in which the different parts of that system work for the well-being of the individual and the nation, so that we may, in the meantime, assume that the system among us is, in the present age, as perfect as the said age will admit. There never before was such activity in the accumulation of all kinds of physical knowledge, both of the subjects in which Man takes pleasure, and of Man himself as a member of society. For more than twenty years, our legislature have had nothing to do but enact statutes for the public welfare; seldom have they been more active than during this period: and never have they had so many sources whence information has been amply poured upon them. Surely, therefore, whatever we may lack, we have no lack of statutes. The very same may be said upon the kindred subjects of religion; for the erection of churches, chapels, and meeting-houses, the gratuitous and other circulation of religious publications, and the imparting of religious know-

ledge, in every form in which it can be imparted, have all increased at a rate quite unprecedented in the days of our fathers. All this has been done, too, not from any selfish motive, with a view either to the gain or the glory of the parties, but, as we are told—and why should we doubt?—expressly and avowedly for the good of the public, with a liberality for which the said public cannot be enough grateful.

And if we turn to matters connected with the augmentation and the diffusion of merely human knowledge, we find that the result has been the same. If not within the last twenty years, at least within much less than a century, the names of more new sciences have been entered upon the catalogue than there were upon it in all a century ago. Nor are these by any means empty names, for there are very few of them which are not under the protection of societies; and the greater part put forth their transactions in most learned and clerkly style; nor are there wanting many who have systems and nomenclatures of their own, till the style and the speech of philosophy have become almost as varied as the subjects. Furthermore, we have the most eminent and influential men of the land combining for the spread of wisdom, in the greatest abundance, and to the repletion of the smallest channels; and, under the guarantee of these highly respectable names, the simple, and such as are fearful of relying upon their own judgments, can purchase the best of all information at one penny and upwards, according to their ability.

The result of all these efforts has necessarily been

very great; and people generally have become much better acquainted with the productions and the workings of nature in all its departments than they were at any former period. Almost every region on the face of the earth, and every sea by which the land is divided, have been visited and examined for purposes heretofore but little attended to except by a few solitary individuals here and there. In former times, the chief objects in the visiting of distant countries were commercial gain and political aggrandizement; and if the country was remote, previously unknown in the history of the civilized world, and inhabited by a simple and rude people, it was claimed and taken possession of by the nation to which it was first known; and in the case of British discovery, the new country was often used as a sort of cess-pool for receiving the dregs of the home population, just as if the object had been to form new nations out of the very worst and most lawless materials.

Colonists of this description, or colonists who could seek to make a gain by the labour of such parties in gangs chained together, or loaded with irons in the case of the individual, for fear of escape or insurrection, could not be expected to civilize the natives, or to acquire a knowledge of the natural productions and resources of the country. Accordingly, the native population of all our colonies was thinned, —that of the older ones exterminated. Any little that we know of the natural history was obtained from occasional visitors—not from the settlers. The land was deterioriated, so that it could not be profitably

cultivated except by slaves under the lash; and though there were pens constructed for the rearing of those slaves, just as there are for rearing domestic animals, the number had to be kept up by purchase.

But matters have changed not a little; and men of enterprise and ability are now to be met with in every region that can be named, whose object is neither gain nor conquest, but who are successfully investigating the physical productions, peculiarities, and capabilities of the several regions, in the most able and disinterested manner—not for the itch of book-making, but in search of knowledge which is as freely given as it is gallantly acquired. No doubt, we have still wandering concoctors of pretty volumes, who go forth of their own inspiration, or more frequently as the hirelings of booksellers or artists; and their doings figure among the gay things of the day; but these do not add, and are not intended to add, to the volume of actual knowledge; and thus, though they may have their use in keeping the idle out of mischief, and the silly out of the way of harm, they have no effect whatever upon the state and progress of the human mind, further than that they engross a certain portion of it which, probably, might be better employed, and, possibly, worse.

Contemplating the progress of society through the medium of those publications which, in a way, are an index to that progress, is not very unlike contemplating the forging of iron when it is at a welding heat. As the workman plies his hammer, the iron is enveloped in a coruscation of brilliant sparks, which fly

and hiss and attract much attention for an instant; but which, though they, during the moment of their brilliance, prevent one from ascertaining the exact shape or purpose of the iron, fall in black scales, quite unprofitable as a material, and only showing that, in the effective working of iron, so much of its substance must be wasted. It is even so with the literary coruscations of the day: they are brilliant and sparkling, but speedily quenched, and good for nothing after their temporary shining is gone. They are evidence that society is working; but they, like their emblems in the case of the iron, conceal the real purpose and progress of the work, so that one who attends to them, and to them only, gets his eyes dazzled by them, and nothing more. The more vigorously that the work is carried on, the sparks are the more brilliant and abundant: and in proportion as this is the case their duration is the shorter.

This is well verified in the literary sparkles of the present time; their abundance, their brilliancy, their levity, the rapidity of their motions, and the rapidity with which they go out, are all clearly illustrative of, and in exact proportion to, the skill and strength with which the useful part of knowledge is hammered and fashioned, and consequently of the activity and improvement of the useful portion of society by and for whom the work is carried on.

From the short notice which we have now quoted of those annals of the time which are open to every body, and appropriated by nobody, it follows, without argument, that human knowledge, in so far as it is

founded on the observation of the senses, and stimulated by those feelings that arise out of a desire to gratify the senses, is in a state of more active, more general, and more successful improvement at the present time, than ever it was before. The individual accessions which are made may not be so startling as those of former times, just as a day of laborious usefulness in old age feels shorter than a day of pleasure in early youth: but the fact may be otherwise in both cases, and the cause is the same—the new acquirement is always measured by the acquired stock; and thus, though the well-informed have much and do much, they wonder, and exult, and boast very little, —which, by the way, is the reason why those who are most successful with the public are very rarely, if ever, the most deserving of success—but that belongs not to our present argument.

We shall suppose, then, that it is seen and felt as a demonstrated truth which nobody can or will dispute, that real knowledge—knowledge discovered by actual observation, or verified by accurate and repeated experiment, is more abundant and accumulating faster than at any former time. Supposing this,—nay, avowing it as a truth that cannot be doubted, we put this question:—*What is the gist and purpose of all this knowledge?* Can it allay the grief of misfortune, assuage the pain of disease, or bring consolation in the hour of death?

These are questions which are often put; but, as they are usually put professionally by those who put them merely as matter of business, we are apt

to disregard them, as we disregard other "words of course" which men use for concealing their real objects, when they hedge and higgle in matters of bargain, or when they cloke themselves in the complimentary language of society to hide their nakedness of its real courtesies. Even when they come in our own suggestion, we cut them short with the habit acquired by our indifference to their professional enunciation; we put them as the Roman put the question "What is truth?" and, like him, we never wait for an answer—unless upon extraordinary occasions, when the answer is torment.

The cause of this is invariably to be found in the ignorance and doubt which we have on the subject of mind and its immortality—the only subject by means of which we can be emancipated from the chains of our physical condition; but let us waive this, and come philosophically to the consideration of the matter, as we would do to that of a problem in abstract mathematics, or astronomy, or any other, in which our feelings and our fortunes are not in the least involved; and let us take separately each of the three branches into which the general question may be divided—as two out of the three refer to the present life only, and thus cannot be affected by any reference to our after-life, or to the means of happiness or misery there.

First, then, Can all this knowledge, which has accumulated and is accumulating so rapidly, allay the grief of misfortune?

As we wish this question to be plain and practical, we do not confine the word "misfortune" to any

specific meaning; but use it as signifying any or all of those states in which Man feels that, without any blame on his part of which he is conscious, he has lost some comfort which he once enjoyed, or is otherwise placed in a situation less pleasant than he fancies himself fairly entitled to. "Fortune," it will be remembered, is "the spirit," or "the burning" — "that which matter and Man cannot withstand;" and it is used as a general name for all causes which are unknown, whether good, bad, or indifferent. Fortune is closely allied to "chance" in meaning,— only Fortune is applied to the unknown cause of an effect, and Chance to the effect of an unknown cause. Hence, misfortune is the general name for the unknown causes of all disagreeable effects; and we very often use the word in cases where we feel the cause, only we are unwilling to confess it.

It matters little whether we suppose the misfortune to be really such as to be the effect of personal ignorance or error, whether confessed or not: for the question is still the same — will the enlightenment of society, and the additional enjoyments which that brings, make the unfortunate member feel more comfortable than if society had been less refined and the enjoyments of life more limited?

The negative to this is self-evident. Acute sensibility, and the contrast which the party feels between himself and others of his class, or the society of which he is a member, are the principal causes of bitterness and grief to the unfortunate. Both of these increase as society improves, and the means of their alleviation

diminish. In highly polished society, the unfortunate man envies the rest, and is despised by them; and if they assist him it is only as a beggar. In rude society, a man has not far to fall; and rude people are hospitable. Polished societies are different in both respects. Therefore, how advantageous soever the highly informed and improved state of society may be for the fortunate members, it deepens the misery of the unfortunates: their fall is farther, and their chance of getting up is much less; and surely it can afford them any thing but satisfaction to know all the beauties and enjoyments of a world from which they have been ejected without the slightest hope of readmission? The riches and beauties of the earth are sorry means of consolation to him who has no hope save that of being buried under its surface as the *final* end of his misery.

Secondly, Can this great increase of knowledge, and the comforts which it brings, assuage the pain of disease? They greatly increase it. Knowledge and personal comfort both tend to make the body more sensitive; and disease and doctory, which appear to increase in nearly an equal ratio in civilized society, are hardly known in its ruder states. The studious can also very generally confirm the truth of the ancient declaration, that "they who increase knowledge, increase sorrow"—physical suffering in diseases which have no very conspicuous external symptom, and for which the faculty have neither descriptive name nor certain remedy.

But it will perhaps give a man a more satisfactory

view if we put the general case:—Let any one look at the matter carefully, and say whether the love of nature and the abundance of the world's enjoyments are at all likely to better the condition or alleviate the feelings of a man when he is debarred from both, and has bodily pain added to the privation. The suffering may be borne with less of the turbulence of animal complaining; but the real suffering must be greater.

In order that each of these branches of the question might be met fairly upon its own merits, we have supposed that the party has no compunctious feelings as to the impropriety of his own conduct, and that he not only has no dread of future punishment, but that he is so utterly ignorant and indifferent upon the subject of a future state as never to have entertained one serious thought respecting it. Still preserving the same view of the matter, let us proceed to the remaining branch, which is by far the most important one.

Thirdly, What consolation can the great accumulation of physical knowledge, and its application, afford to a man at the hour of death? The man who passes through life in the ignorance of an animal, may possibly meet death with the indifference of an animal; and as the beneficent Author of nature has tempered all things for the best, there are disposing causes in the body itself which strengthen the probability of this. The man who is wholly sensual—who has had no object or occupation in life beyond the gratification of his animal appetites, changes with every change of these; and when their gratification can no longer give him

pleasure, he may feel life an insupportable burden, and wish as earnestly to quit life as he ever did for a return of the gratification of even the sweetest of his animal enjoyments. It has been his pleasure—or his misfortune—to live like a beast; and when living like a beast becomes an intolerable burden to him—when the senses can no longer give pleasure, when he loathes all that were once the sweets of life, and when the diseased body becomes useless and intolerable, it is as natural for him to wish to escape from that as from any of the painful sensations, escape from which was the whole business of his previous life. This is not only probable as a matter of theory, but it is as true in fact. Those cases which end in suicides are instances in which fictitious feeling produces the same effect; and they produce it by the same process —a breaking of that connexion between the body and the mind which makes Man a rational being. The only difference is that, in the case of the exhausted man who has had no active life save in the body, the connexion, which is suspended in the case of the suicide, has never been so far exercised as to be felt.

But these are cases to which the question at issue does not apply. We must suppose the case of an individual who is in the possession of his senses, and who has felt and enjoyed an average portion of that increase of knowledge and its benefits on which the question turns. No man can be acquainted with nature or with art, or with any department of the one or the other, without loving it with a fondness and constancy of affection far higher and more powerful

than can be felt in the gratification of any one of the bodily senses; and if we take in the affections which arise from the relations of social life, they are of a still higher order — farther elevated above the mere gratifications of the senses—the mere appetite of the animal body. It is true that there are ties which our merely animal nature does not feel, perhaps so strongly as something analogous to some of them is felt by other animals; for there are nations that are in the habit of murdering their infants when burdensome, and leaving their aged parents to perish of hunger under bushes and in holes of the earth. But these, again, do not participate in any thing resembling the increase of knowledge of which we speak.

The proper subjects of our argument have those higher gratifications to which allusion has been made; —they have lived like men; and is it consistent to suppose that they should be contented to die with all the indifference of beasts? It is impossible; for there is no such anomaly in the whole of creation. The desire of gratifying the animal appetite must naturally pass away with the appetite itself; and when the body is brought down to a certain tone, *it* may be perfectly passive; but before Man can quit the memory of that which he knows or has enjoyed, there is a strong cord to be broken, the parting of which without hope is agony more than can be borne even in thought—what, then, must it be in reality, when that parting is certain, imminent, and inevitable? The dearest and fondest of all else, is parting with

that which is external and may be replaced; but this is parting with *ourselves!*

This is the fearful consideration; and it is one for which there is not a single palliative in the whole mass of our sciences, our arts, or our earthly relations and engagements. It strikes them all into nothingness; and it is our inability to abide this thought which keeps us in general ignorance upon the subject of our Intellectual and Immortal nature.

Our physical observation, which is the foundation of all our sciences, all our arts, and all our bodily attachments, is mental in its very nature: for the body, by the sensations and feelings of which we acquire the elements of these, is mortal; and we need hardly say that nothing immortal can come from a mortal source. There is a term appointed for every material thing that lives and grows upon the earth; and though ample means are, in all cases, provided for the continuation of the species, there are none for giving immortality to the individual. Even in those cases where the utmost attention is paid by Man to the improvement of the form, the size, or some of the qualities, there is no increase of the duration. On the contrary, this is certainly shortened in some cases, and probably the tendency is to shorten it in every case. A planted tree, the seedling of which has been raised in a nursery, makes wood faster than the natural progeny of a natural tree; but it does not live so long, and the timber is less durable. The cultivated grain plants are all annuals, and some of the

hay grasses are annual, or at most biennial, though to be perennial is the natural habit of all the *cerealea*. Bred animals may be considered as more handsome, and they may be more obedient to the guidance of Man, than the same species in a state of nature; but they cannot bear the same fatigue, neither are they so long-lived. The fact is, that all our cultivations, both of plants and of animals, are deteriorations,—they are deviations from nature; and it would be absurd to suppose that Man could work with the same perfection as Man's Maker.

Thus, take whatever view we may of physical nature, or of human knowledge as obtained by the senses, there is nothing in the whole scope of it which gives, or can give, the slightest original hint of Man's having any being other than that which is apparent to the senses, or any life after the last breath of the body has been expired. To say that mortal things can, originally and of themselves, teach immortality, is much the same kind of absurdity as to say that the same being can be both mortal and immortal at the same time, or that it can, at its pleasure, change from the one of these states to the other. If the fact is once established upon other grounds, the whole of physical nature will be found full of illustrations and confirmations of it, but the original feeling or perception of Intellect and Immortality must be in itself intellectual.

No doubt, after Man has made considerable advances in the use of mind,—after he has compared, and reasoned, and generalized, until he has arrived at

some of those laws of material nature which are not apparent to the senses, he feels a want in the system —a longing for something he knows not what. When, for instance, he has so far investigated the motions of the heavenly bodies, as to find that there are regular cycles in their motions, compared to which the longest life of Man upon earth is but as a span,—when he examines the earth itself, and finds, in its strata, indubitable remains of the growing and living creatures of a former world, all unlike those that now exist in any clime under the canopy of heaven, over which the ocean waters have come again and again in such power as could have been displayed only by hundred fathoms of flood, and have deposited stratum after stratum, at long intervals, and under a weight of water which has given them the compactness and consistency of stone; when Man has arrived at even these humble degrees of knowledge, the thought will come over him that there must be something wrong or wanting in the system of nature, if a being who can know these long cycles and periods, and find pleasure in the knowledge of them, must lie down in the dust finally and for ever, as completely blotted out and rased from the book of life and of knowledge as though he had never been. And he will compare his condition with that of the other productions of nature around him; and he will envy the happy ignorance of the plant and the animal to which life has no cares, and upon which no book of life is closed when life comes to an end:—and he will say to himself, in the words of the wise king of Israel, "in much

wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow;" nor will he find any cure for the mental anguish, any balm for the wounded spirit, unless the doctrine of immortality is brought home to him, "in demonstration of the *spirit*," and not in mere words of course, as they are often "said and sung in the churches."

Therefore, if there be no intellectual and immortal principle in Man, he is the imperfection, the blunder of creation, the system is a failure, and the Almighty himself is a fallible and therefore a finite being—a being like the gods of the ancients, which were merely exaggerated embodyments of the virtues and the vices of human nature. If, on the other hand, there be in Man a principle which is intellectual and immortal, that principle cannot be material, neither can it be an emanation of matter. If it were material, it would be palpable to some sense, or discoverable by some physical experiment, for all matter is thus palpable, or thus discoverable. If, again, it were an emanation of matter, it would follow the laws which are common to all emanations of matter. The lightning does not strike, the fire does not burn, and the life of the plant or the animal does not remain, for ever. Physical *action* is certainly not *substance*, though some modifications of it, such as heat, electricity, and others, have been regarded as such; but still, without physical substance, there can be no physical action; and when the substance is removed beyond the sphere of its action, that action ceases. There are many physical actions of which we know

neither the beginning nor the end,—as, for instance, the motion of the earth upon its axis, and its motion round the sun in its orbit; but still, although these motions have no connection with each other that we can trace, and though we cannot say that either of them is owing to any physical cause that we can name, yet the earth itself, in every particle of the matter which it contains, is essential to the continuance of both motions; and if by any means the matter of the earth were to be annihilated, the motions of the earth would be at an end, without leaving one single memorial trace. It is even so with every thing physical—with our bodies in all their functions, and with all else. Not a trace of immortality is to be found in the whole range of material nature; neither is there, in any one language, any original positive name for it,—our common names are all negatives, they all say what it is not, but not one of them tells what it is.

Thus, to our experience—our only guide in all matters of common occupation and physical knowledge—Man presents the same kind of object of observation as the other animals; and, in so far as he differs from them, the differences, as palpable to the senses, are circumstantial rather than essential. Even in the very lowest state of civilization, his *mode* of life is different from that of any other animal, though not more different than some of these are from each other; but still, to physical observation, the end appears the same,—a life wholly of and for the present material system of things, and "rounded by a sleep" —that sleep of death which knows no waking.

It is true that there is, in rude states of society, and among the ignorant in all states of society—when they live quietly and temperately, and are not habitually and utterly sunk in the slough of their animal passions and appetites—it is true, that there is in them what has been termed "a natural feeling" of immortality; and those upon whom the light of revelation has beamed, can, by its means, work this into something like a demonstration. But, truly it is in itself only a dream of the night of ignorance, of the same nature and origin as those other dreams which make them people all nature with spiritual beings, varying in character and office with the physical circumstances in which they who imagine them are placed. They are spectres of the night, the same as those which haunt a man on his bed when he is on the feverish edge between sleeping and waking. But when the light of the morning, whether of the day or of knowledge, rouses the erewhile slumberer to the full exercise of his powers, all these spectral imagin ings vanish with the darkness that occasioned them, and nothing remains palpable to the awakened senses, but the physical creation. Unless under particular modifications of disease, the spectres of the physical night do not return, even with the return of that night itself; and it is even so with the spectres of the night of ignorance, and with the dream of immortality among the rest.

As the light advances, and waxes brighter, the spectral feeling of immortality wastes away, and complete scepticism comes in its stead; and it "grows

with the growth" of ordinary knowledge among mankind,—even that portion of them who have a just title to the epithet learned, not merely in the ways and wiles of the world, but in the "verbiality" of religion—of the Christian religion itself.

So much is this the case, so nearly does it approximate to a general, almost to an axiomatic truth, that the more intellectual any people and their religion are, there is always a larger proportion of sceptics among them, — more among Mohammedans than among Pagans, more among Christians than among Mohammedans, and more among the members of the Reformed Churches than among the Catholics. In proportion as mankind are ignorant, they are held in the chains of unreasoning belief; and they break those chains in proportion as they advance in the practice of thinking—unless they grapple with the question of their own immortality, in the only way that it can come home to the mind as a philosophic truth, in perfect accordance with all the other volumes of the book of knowledge.

This may seem a little harsh, and it may seem to be more so when we say that, of those who professionally minister at Christian altars, and repeat the Christian "Belief" as part of their hebdomadal, or even of their daily formulary, not a few are sceptics in their hearts, so that, when the question is pressed home to them, they can give no *reason* for the faith which they profess; but are constrained to fall back upon the authority of their church, or upon some other dogma.

This, by the way, is the reason why *religious* disputes, as they are generally, though improperly called, are carried on with more animosity than disputes of any other kind. When men know that what they state is true, they never state it angrily; and least of all should or can they do it upon the subject of the Christian religion; for if they understand the doctrines and are imbued with the spirit of that, they will imitate the pattern given by its Sacred Founder.

It must not be supposed that, in these remarks, we are censuring any man or class of men, as for *wrong done*. We have no such intention. Men cannot believe what they do not understand; and though ignorance of the law cannot be pleaded as a justification in the court of philosophy, any more than in the common courts, ignorance is not a crime.

CHAPTER III.

IMPORTANCE AND NEGLECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF MIND AND IMMORTALITY.

THE remark which we made in the concluding part of the preceding chapter, that scepticism begins with the beginning of knowledge, that the increase of physical knowledge increases and strengthens it, and that the merely verbal part of religion tends farther to strengthen it, may not be the most pleasing and palatable of all doctrines; but it is, nevertheless, strictly and literally true; and it may be verified by any one who chooses to examine either the progressive history of mankind, or the characters of those with whom he has had intimate personal acquaintance, if the latter have been numerous enough for grounding a fair estimate upon them. He may find confirmations of it in the writings of authors, more especially in the writings of those authors who are furious upon religious subjects, and who try to terrify the rest of mankind with the flash and the report, from inward consciousness that they carry no bullet. Nay, more, if he is a well-informed believer in the great doctrine of immortality himself—and if not well informed, he is no believer at all—he must find the

strongest proof of it in his own case. John Bunyan knew human nature well, for his own heart was his library, and he had read it diligently; and he brings his Pilgrim through "the Slough of Despond" before he even enters the gate which is to lead him to the Christian faith and to Paradise. In like manner, every one who arrives at true knowledge of the doctrine of mind and immortality, must pass through the slough of scepticism. We all begin our lives in credulity, and we do so of necessity, just because we begin them in ignorance. Other than this, there is no beginning; and, with very many, this simple and complete credulity continues to the very end of life. Those who thus remain may, in mere matters of fact, belong either to the popular class of the ignorant or that of the learned; for it is not the mere facts, but the use that is made of them, which is the important part of the matter. Instances of as unreasoning credulity are as common, in proportion to the numbers of the class; and truly those most learned and most credulous personages cut a far more lamentably ridiculous figure, in the judgment of reason, than those of their co-believers, whose ignorance is the most complete. We simply pity the man who is ignorant, and wish that he were instructed; but it is difficult to prevent the lip from curling in derision at him who has been taught much, and yet has not understanding enough for turning it to account. Besides, there may be hope in the former, but in the latter there is none.

It must be admitted that there are difficulties in the way of our making this experiment upon others, by

which the question of their understanding and belief on the question of immortality can alone be decided. The shield of politeness is always in use, and the sword of bigotry is generally ready to be drawn. "Are you a sceptic?" is a question which we can no more put to a man than we can ask, "Are you dishonest?" and as there are not the same business reasons for obtaining an indirect answer to the first of these questions as there are to the second, it is generally passed over as a matter of indifference.

Most men can answer the question, according to the catechism; and this answer they are ready enough to give, if it be demanded of them with due politeness; but push them a single step beyond the formulary, and they are instantly up in arms against you. Another volume of this series will be the proper place for offering a few hints on the influence of religion upon Man, and the influence of churches, and formularies, and authorities upon religion; and therefore we shall not, in the meantime, enter upon that branch of the subject, important as it is in every inquiry relating to the nature of Man, and his condition in the present life, and prospects when this life comes to a close, as it must do soon, and may do suddenly.

Every man, however, may put the question to himself; and every man should put it, and not quit the subject till he has arrived at a satisfactory answer, one way or another. If any one has never been sceptical upon the subject, we tell him, at once, that he does not understand it: if any man is sceptical now, we tell him that he has begun the inquiry, but not finished

it. But let such a man beware how he lingers in his scepticism; for, if he has got thus far, he may depend upon it that the unfinished inquiry will be as "a whip of scorpions" to him, at a time when he shall find neither hope nor help, whereas, if he goes on with his inquiry, the result will not fail to be consolation to him in every ill of life that can be his lot, and the full assurance of faith when life shall draw to its close.

We may add that, unless this doctrine of immortality is brought fully and clearly to the light of reason, and of such demonstration as the nature of it admits, professions, ceremonies, or practices of formal religion, are really of no more avail than their opposites. Indeed, they are less so; for the man who puts on the semblance of religion, and is destitute of this, the only sure foundation upon which religion can be built, "has denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." He is a hypocrite; and, as such, he is one against whom the denunciation of Him who cannot lie has gone forth—his "*hope shall perish.*" These three words form but a short sentence, but it is one of fearful import, and the realization of it would be unutterable woe. "It were better for that man that a millstone were hung about his neck, and he were cast into the depths of the sea."

This is not said merely of the hypocrite who is at the same time a villain—the man who puts on the semblance of religion to hide the leopard, or leprous spots of his conduct to his fellow men—although this, in as far as the weal of others is concerned, is hypocrisy in its most loathsome phase. No doubt he is a

wretch—a mean and a miserable wretch—but he is a wretch that moves our pity along with our contempt. If he does not stupify himself habitually in one or other of the world's intoxications,—if he does not put the man clean away from him, and be the very animal at all times, and under all circumstances, then it is easy to see under what anguish he spends his days and his nights, and how the condition to which he has degraded himself turns the best blessings of Heaven into curses of the most deadly cast. Mark how the colour waxes and wanes upon his cheek, like foam on the waves of the troubled sea,—take note how fearfully his quivering glance comes out at the corner of his downcast and troubled eye, like a murderer peeping from his den when the tread of the avenger of blood is sounding in his ear,—behold how the feverish shadow of despair withers him like a mildew, or shakes him like an ague, when the name of those virtues to which he has forfeited all title are pronounced; and how he quails and cowers into nothing at the slightest allusion to those deceptions for the sake of which he has disgraced his species, and estranged himself from his God, in every character save that of the avenger upon the wilfully guilty. Mark these things; and then say whether you do not pity the poor and miserable wretch—so poor and miserable that all the wealth of the world cannot buy for him one tithe of the heart-felt enjoyment of the man of honest poverty, who toils and moils the livelong day, and lies down upon his pallet of straw at night, thanking the Almighty for his goodness in giving health and refreshing sleep to one

so ill deserving? This description of hypocrite is no hypocrite in his own eyes: he has taken up his iniquity in full knowledge of its being such; he is "joined to his idols: let him alone;" "the arrow of the Almighty is within him: the poison thereof drinketh up his spirit;" and why should you add even your execration to that misery which is, in itself, all too mighty for mortal endurance?

But there is another species of hypocrite—one who is a sort of moral and mental pestilence in society, without being aware that such is the fact.

The hypocrite upon whom we would "bestow the tediousness" of our charity is a very different character from the one we have attempted, in vain, to describe. The man who puts on religion, not as a cloke to cover the offensiveness of his conduct, but as the customary habit of his nation, his tribe, or his party, whatever that party may be, is the hypocrite who most demands commiseration, because he is perfectly satisfied in a condition in which he ought not to be satisfied; he wishes to be secure, and he fancies that he is, but in truth he is not; he believes that he is truly and honestly religious, and yet his religion has no solid foundation; he flatters himself with the hope of eternal happiness, and yet he has not convinced himself that there is any eternal principle in his nature; he, in short, repeats certain words by rote and of course, because he hears others repeat them, but he has taken no means of informing himself of their truth. That this is the case of very many, every one who studies society around him must admit; that

it should be the case of a single individual, every well-wisher of society must regret.

If Man is not thoroughly informed and convinced upon the subject of this greatest and most important of all truths, the pillars of all the good which should be in him are at the mercy of circumstances, and liable to be shaken by every wind that blows. Whatever words may be upon the lip, the language of the heart is, "Let us eat, drink, and be merry, for to-morrow we shall die;" and in that there will be a final end of our being. With such a feeling there can be no religion; and without religion there can be no virtue—no respect for our fellow men—no regard for the welfare of society—no desire to keep the laws of God, of nature, or of man, except in so far as the disguised breach, under the semblance of obedience, may enable us to gratify our appetites with the more certain impunity.

If the present world is our only portion, and if, when our eyes close upon it, we go into utter nothingness, why should we restrain any propensity, be it what it may? Under such a belief, it is perfectly evident that there would be no restraint whatever upon the plans and purposes which men formed in their own minds, and none upon their putting those plans into execution, save the fear of being worsted and punished by their fellows. Even if we suppose some degree of civilization, and the arts to which civilization leads, or rather perhaps in which it consists, still that would have little or no effect upon the formation of the purpose, or the desire of carrying that

purpose into effect. Nay, even if there were a law emanating from a more intimate knowledge of human nature than all the lawgivers of the nations of ancient and of modern times, that law would not restrain the purpose, or lessen the desire of effecting it, though it might increase the cunning by which the breach of the law should be concealed; and arm with more desperation those who had brought up their purpose to a positive determination violently to break the law. When many of the laws of England were enacted, the care and solicitude of the enactors were far more interested about property than about human life; and the consequence has been, that, in countless instances, the law has made a murderer of him who would have been only a thief, if no such law had existed.

Even now, when the pile of our statute book has been built up till it is Babel, in all senses of the word, literal and metaphorical—when "its top reaches to heaven," and is enveloped in thick darkness of clouds which no eye of common understanding can penetrate—*caput inter nebulas condit*,—even now, it is not the statute which restrains the bad passions and propensities of men, and conserves the safety and peace of the citizens: it is the police—the increased vigilance with which the violators of the law are sought out, and rendered obnoxious to punishment.

And if we had not this present example before our eyes, set forth in characters so plain and palpable that he who runs may read them, we have it established on a record, the truth of which if any man doubts there is an end of all argument with him. Turn to

the historical books of the Bible, and examine and compare, in a candid, but, at the same time, in the most searching manner, the progressive steps of these, and the influence of even divine legislation upon them. The law of the ten commandments, written on the two tables of stone, amid the thunders of Sinai, when the whole congregation were trembling at the physical display of creative power, which is by no means the rarest phenomena of that country,—this law is still held to be the moral law of all Christian churches, and the foundation of all Christian legislation; and every one who reads it must admit, that, though it is a law of penalties rather than of forgiveness—a law for the restraint of bad passions rather than for the excitement of what are called the better feelings of human nature —yet the foundations of it are strictly just, and the expression is clear and simple.

Well, no one who reverences the principles of religion, or even those of common justice, will find fault with the principle of this law; neither will any man venture to say that the Almighty would give to his chosen people—to a people specially called by him as the instruments in the revealment of that gracious scheme, which, in the fulness of time, was to spread the blessings of wisdom, and peace, and happiness, over every zone of the earth and every isle of the sea, and which was, to all eternity, to people the regions of celestial bliss with a great multitude which no man can number, redeemed out of every kindred and every tongue, clothed in the spotless robe of imputed righteousness, kneeling down before the throne in the fer-

vour of gratitude, and taking up their song of everlasting joy—"Alleluja! for the Lord God Omnipotent reigneth!"—surely no one will dare to say, that the enactment of such a law, given for such a purpose, must not have been, and actually was, the very wisest and the very best.

But this moral code, divine as it was in its origin, was addressed to the children of Israel in the same way as the laws of human lawgivers were addressed to the people of other nations. In moral purity and perfection, it certainly was superior to any and to all of these, but still it was only a moral law, having all its bearing upon the present life. There was no revealment of the doctrine of mind and immortality in it: the only part which might be warped so as to appear to have such a meaning, is that part of the third commandment which threatens the vengeance of the Lord upon the taker of false oaths—"The Lord will not hold him guiltless who taketh his name in vain;" but this relates to the taking or administering of oaths between man and man, in matters of conduct in this world, where there is no other evidence; and the chief inference which we can draw from this commandment's forming part of the Decalogue, is the extreme fallibility of an oath as a test of truth, and its extreme fragibility as a bond of justice, unless it is secured by other means than any which have reference to the present life. We need not go far for a complete practical confirmation and illustration of the principle now stated; for, even under the profession of the Christian religion, and with a reference to a future judgment,

always understood, if not always expressed, our own custom-houses and courts have a long tale to tell of the inefficiency—perhaps we should say the iniquity—of oaths. The case cannot well be otherwise; for, if the party who voluntarily takes the oath, or to whom it is formally administered, as part of any proceeding, legal or otherwise, has no well-grounded belief in the doctrine of mind or immortality, then the oath becomes a mere thing of the present world, and the appropriate name for it, in very many cases, is "a lie according to law,"—a species of engine more fraught with mischief than most others that could be named.

But to return to the chosen people, and the law as promulgated to them by the Almighty himself. Let any one take up the history with a view to obtain information as to what influence this law had upon the moral character and conduct of the Jews, and he will not fail in finding a demonstration—a painful and revolting demonstration certainly, but still a complete demonstration—of the small efficiency of even divine legislation, when there is nothing within to respond to its mandates.

It is true that the moral practices of the Jews, before the promulgation of the law from Sinai, are not so well brought out as they are in the subsequent period. Enough appears, however, to show that their morals were not improved by the legislation. David was certainly not morally a better character than Joseph, though we are taught to believe that he was more immediately under the inspiration, and, therefore, under the direction of God; and Solomon was, un-

questionably, not morally a better man than Moses, though he had all the advantages of established power and wealth, and much wisdom and learning in supplement, while the life of Moses was one continued scene of hardship and difficulty.

The full investigation of this matter can be made with more propriety in a future volume; but thus much appeared necessary, to show the vast importance of a thorough knowledge and belief of the great doctrine of mind and immortality, as the very foundation of every thing good in society. Nor can we fail to observe, in passing, that one grand purpose of the history of the Jews, especially of the most immoral and repulsive parts of their history, was to afford a demonstration of this truth so palpable as to strike the mind of every one capable of understanding even the simplest language. The whole tenor of it shows that they could be restrained from idolatry in their religion, and immorality in their conduct, by nothing but the whip of power constantly brandished over them,—that, in short, the state of things among them very much resembled that state of things among us to which we have alluded,—namely, government by the police rather than by the statute. There was indeed a difference in degree, inasmuch as the whole of them were in a similar condition, mentally, to those among us who have no well-founded belief or hope beyond the present life. Consequently, when by any means the arm of the executive was broken, and the power of compulsory obedience suspended, they erred as a nation, and generally suffered for so doing; but these

national errors were not the only ones; for the crimes committed by individuals, during these periods of anarchy, were often such as to make one's blood run cold with horror.

If the reader will turn to the last chapter of the Book of Joshua, he will find that, previous to his demise, that leader had put to the assembled people the alternative of serving God according to the law, or of following the bent of their own desires in any manner that they liked. They voluntarily chose the former alternative, which Joshua recorded in "the Book of the Law of God," and set up a great stone as a physical memorial of the covenant. But how was this solemn covenant kept? Why, in the course of a few years afterwards, the people of Israel departed from the service of their God, and "corrupted themselves more than their fathers,"—of whose corruption enough is to be found in the preceding part of their history. This, it will be observed, was only eighty-five years after the promulgation of the law at Sinai, and but forty-five years after the death of Moses.

After this, one has only to look into the Book of Judges, and there it will be found, that no sooner was the strong hand of their judge, or rather of their ruler, removed from them, than they again fell into evil courses, evil not merely as respected the observances of their religion, but revolting in the extreme as respected human nature generally. A sufficient instance of this is detailed in the nineteenth chapter of Judges, from which, however, we shall make no quotation.

Now, the reader who has not been much accustomed to ponder this matter well, will be very apt to ask, "Why all this display of human perverseness and vice? Why this habitual departure from the law of a Being, who had been so often a God of special deliverance to this most unaccountable race? And why should there be in the volume of inspiration, such a tale of moral horror as that to which we have alluded?" The answer to these questions is plain and palpable, and full of the most wholesome instruction. The law given on Mount Sinai did not alter the nature and disposition of the Jews, any more than the laws given at Westminster alter the nature and disposition of the people of England. They were born in the same ignorance, and had the same natural propensities, after the promulgation of the law, as they had before it; and the native ignorance and natural propensities of Man continue the same now as they were then. A law was given to the people, no doubt, and there is as little doubt that if they had continued stedfast in obedience to that law, it would have been better for them, both nationally and as individuals. We are not to suppose that the Almighty could not have so changed the people of Israel as that they could have kept the whole law, and abstained from every crime; because he who can create systems of worlds, with all their inhabitants, and blot them out of the book of existence at his pleasure, can of course change one and all as he lists. But it is His good pleasure to deal with men as men, and through the instrumentality of means which he has seen meet to appoint, and

which are necessarily the best adapted to their condition.

Men are born in utter ignorance, and as the body comes to maturity, in the common way of physical growth, in like manner as the bodies of all other animals, while the awakening of the mind is, so to speak, the action of the man himself, the desires of acquiring and doing always naturally take the precedence of the knowledge of what ought to be acquired and what done, in order to promote the best interest even of the individual itself. The animal appetites, those which merely conduce to the existence and welfare of the body considered as an animal, are developed without any purpose or knowledge; but not so the considerations which are to guide the party to the most safe and wholesome gratification of even these. The infant draws the breast, in all probability, before it is in the least conscious of its own existence. But though this animal instinct of being fed seems perfect at the very outset, yet the very earliest developement of the sense of observation shows that it is not,—that, so far from being adequate to the safe guidance and preservation of the infant, as the instinct of the young of other animals is of them, it would be a very certain and speedy means of destruction, if the care of those about the infant did not prevent. As soon as it can stretch out its hand, and direct it by its eye, it endeavours to seize, not those substances which are the most wholesome for it, but those that make the most impression on the sight,—a lighted candle, for instance, in preference to

a piece of bread. None of the animals, whether old or young, attempts to do this,—a lamb or a kitten never makes the slightest attempt to eat a live coal or the flame of a candle, but gets away from such objects as fast as ever it can. The moths and other winged insects of the night, which come to the candle to their own mutilation and destruction, form no exception to this. They come, not because they have any instinctive fondness for candle, but because the light so bewilders them that they are unable to direct their way; and then the air of the room, which is drawn toward the candle by the current which the heat of the flame causes to ascend, draws them toward the candle along with it.

Such has been the initial condition of the human race in all ages, and such it must ever continue to be; and it would not be more absurd to promulgate a law strictly forbidding all young infants to burn their fingers or otherwise injure themselves in their first efforts in perception and action, than it would be to expect that the mere promulgation of any law—even were it ten times more solemn than that of Moses—could restrain, or very much regulate in any way, the desires of men. If the constant breach of the law by the children of Israel, at all times when they had no controlling power over them, had gone no farther than this, it would still have been a most useful lesson to the men of every age and country in which the fact became known.

But the grand object of the volume of inspiration consisted in making the moral law, as promulgated on

Sinai to the Jews, "a schoolmaster to bring the nations to Christ," to the full and rational knowledge of the doctrines of the Gospel, and to a conviction of the truths of mind and immortality,— without which, as their foundation, these doctrines have nothing whereupon to rest. Mankind would have found out the inefficiency of their own laws, without the promulgation of a law to any people by God himself; for the fact has been palpably demonstrated in every country having laws, whether those laws have been in themselves better or worse. But still, there was wanted something more than this,—namely, that *no law* could answer the requisite purpose, even although God himself should be the lawgiver. This has been demonstrated in the fullest and most satisfactory manner in the case of the Jews,—in a manner so full and satisfactory, that no one who has paid the requisite attention to it can have any need or any desire again to raise the question.

The illustration—perhaps we may without impropriety call it the experiment—afforded to us in the case of the Jewish nation, goes much farther than the inefficiency of mere laws for the keeping of mankind in the right path. From the first calling of Abraham out of the land of the East, to the final capture of the city of Jerusalem and dispersion of the Jews among the other nations, they were under almost every kind of government that can be named or imagined; and though the new form worked tolerably well for a short time, they all became corrupted, and required to be changed; and here, again, we have demonstration

that human government, whatever may be its name or form, is no more adequate to the purpose of keeping mankind in the right path, than human or even divine legislation.

We have preferred this historical argument to any one of a merely philosophic nature, for these two reasons, among others: first, the facts are established by evidence which no candid man can resist; and, secondly, the book in which these facts are recorded is, or should be, in the hands of every body, and the appeal can be made to it by any one who chooses, without the least difficulty or expence, beyond that "library in one volume," which those who can afford it may purchase at a very small price, and those who cannot may obtain freely without money.

It may be said that the historical demonstration which is afforded by the case of the Jews, and which is confirmed by the history of every other nation whose history is recorded, as well as by the observation of those tribes who are too low in civilization for having any history, is derived from the case of a nation, and is, therefore, not quite applicable to the case of an individual man. This, however, is no valid objection; for though the position which we wish to establish is certainly one which concerns every man in his individual capacity, in a manner so intimately personal as that his best and dearest friend cannot in any way participate with him in it; yet the demonstration could not have been in the case of any single individual, or of any very limited number of individuals. Individuals vary so much in their dispositions, habits,

and propensities, arising out of the physical and social circumstances in which they are placed, and in part, also—though probably in much smaller part than many are apt to suppose—from differences in the acuteness of one or more of their senses, or other physiological properties of the body, that no one could be made a standard of comparison for all the rest. No argument drawn from a savage could be made applicable to the case of a man in a high degree of civilization; and, in a civilized country, no parallel, upon which a satisfactory analogy can be grounded, holds between the rude and the refined, the learned and the ignorant, the man of labour and the man of ease, or a thousand others, to each and all of whom it is desirable that the doctrine should equally apply.

Therefore, the demonstration which the Bible affords upon this most important of all truths, is exactly what we might have expected, when we consider from whom it emanated,—the best, fullest, and most perfect that could possibly be given—minute enough to apply to the particulars of every individual case, and comprehensive enough to include them all. It was also continued through a period of years, sufficient to satisfy the scruples of the most captious, and through a vast variety of changes in the condition of man and of society. From the time of the call of Abraham to that of the final demolition of the temple at Jerusalem, there elapsed about two thousand years. During this period, too, the Jews appear to have partaken in the general character of the world in its progress, in passing through many stages and degrees

of culture. All that relates to the early patriarchs is simplicity itself, very analogous to the impassioned but unadorned style which is still to be found among the pastoral Bedouins, in those remote parts of the desert where travellers rarely pass, and where there are of course none of those temptations to plunder which the same people meet with near the lines where the caravans pass. No contrast can be more striking than that of the simplicity of these early records with the refined logic and masterly arguments of Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles, especially in his Epistle to the Romans,—then, in so far as the subtilties of eloquence and reasoning were concerned, the most finished people on the face of the earth. The extraordinary powers of this apostle can be best seen and judged of by the different lines of argument which he adopts when he addresses men whose modes of thinking, and consequently whose prejudices, differ widely from each other. The full contrast is best seen by comparing the Epistle to the Romans with that to the Hebrews. The former were heathens in their nominal religion, but in reality they were philosophical sceptics, or free-thinkers, who, despising the gods of the Pantheon for the gross immorality of their reputed characters, and the absurdity of the rites which were performed professedly to their honour, had become the enemies of all formal religion. The latter were bigots in the mere formal observances of a religion, the spirit of which had evaporated long before,—who had lost its morality, but who were yet sticklers for its mere forms and ceremonies. The apostle deals with each

of these parties in the same way; and though their ways differ widely from each other, it is by no means easy to say which of them is addressed in the most masterly manner. To the philosophic Romans, his arguments are all grounded upon principles of the most profound philosophy, and supported by logic more clear and close than is to be found in almost any writer of that or of any other age. To the Hebrews, again, he addresses himself, in arguments derived from their own histories and traditions, and shows, in a very conclusive manner, that He who was crucified on Calvary is the very Messiah of whom so many of their own prophets had foretold. In fact, if any thing were wanting to prove the divine inspiration of the sacred volume, other than the general tenor of the rest of that volume, it would be found in the admirable tact with which the apostle of the Gentiles suits the strain of his epistles to the very different characters of those to whom they were addressed.

Thus, the whole tenor of the volume of inspiration, both in its matter and its mode, shows that there is something indispensable for the proper guidance and direction of Man to honour and to usefulness in life, which Man cannot find out for himself, by means of his ordinary powers of observation, as we term them; and we have an exemplification of the importance of this gift of the goodness of God to Man, in the extraordinary developement of every thing connected with the mental and moral nature and improvement of Man, which has taken place since the formal part of Christianity was delivered from the chains of super-

stition and intolerance, and Christian man became, in a great measure, a rational and reflective being. There was, it is true, a preparation for the dawn of the day of Reformation — the grand day, upon which the chains of the human mind were broken for ever, though not at the same time to all men or all nations, nor will they ever be completely done away while men are born in total ignorance, which they must be while the race exists. The invention, or rather the discovery, of THE ART OF PRINTING took place seventy-seven years before Luther unfurled the standard of mind against mummery, though nearly a century and a half before the invention, Wickliffe had maintained nearly the same doctrines.

The advances which have since then been made in the knowledge of the heavens, the earth, plants, animals, powers, engines, and all that is useful or pleasurable to Man, are proofs of the advantages which fail not to result from the unchained exercise of mind.

But, notwithstanding the great things that have been accomplished since that happy deliverance, human beings still continue to be born in the same state of utter ignorance as they were when the night of superstition and mental slavery was upon them in the very thickest of its darkness; and though the results of the working of mind are now thickly spread around us on every side, there is not, in these things, any more revealment of mind itself, in its existence, or its functions and attributes, than there was in the thickest darkness of the night of ignorance and its concomitant superstition. All that is, or that can be, palpable to

our senses, even in the most splendid of these matters, is still only physical, and could never of itself make any revelation of the nature or even of the existence of that mind to which the whole is in reality owing.

Accordingly, we find that, with the increase of all the comforts of life, and the substitution of mechanical power for the labour of Man, in many of the heaviest parts of drudgery—with great advances in every science and every art—with the establishment of an institution for literary or learned purposes, in almost every considerable town in the country—with an increase of the number and circulation of books, and a reduction of their price, which are truly wonderful—with the almost total disappearance of the silly or immoral tracts which used to be hawked about in such quantities, and the substitution of more rational ones in their stead;—we find that, with all these improvements, and with many more which we might enumerate and would rejoice in the enumeration, the doctrines of mind and immortality have not partaken in the general improvement; and the effect has been, that the moral character of the people has not improved in the same ratio as the active.

In proof of this, we appeal to the calendar at the criminal courts, and to the pulpit and the publications of the religious press,—matters which are widely different in themselves, certainly, but they both afford pretty strong evidence upon this subject—a subject which, although it is much overlooked, is really the subject of importance, both to individuals and to the public.

The complexion of crimes has, no doubt, very much changed, and the change has been, upon the whole, to crimes of a milder character—although there have been, within these few years, perpetrations of the most horrible, and, as it should seem, of the most gratuitous barbarity, — crimes which cannot be accounted for but upon grounds of the most inherent and unannealed cruelty — the sinking of the man altogether into the worst aspect of the very brute. Nay, tenfold more degraded and disgusting than this; for the most ravenous beast in the forest merely obeys the law of its being, and kills some in order that the rest may live. A lion is no more to be *blamed* for killing and rending his prey, even if that prey is a human being, than a swallow is for catching flies, or a lamb for browsing on the down. It is the lion's appointed place in nature; and when Man comes with his art, as the arch-destroyer, the wild beast is vanquished in the unequal battle, and disappears. The cruelties which man perpetrates upon man—or upon beast either—are, however, of a different complexion, as they are breaches of the law of nature, whether they happen to be breaches of the laws of human society or no.

Atrocious crimes — crimes of ferocity, are certainly not so numerous now as they were formerly; but the difference is probably far more owing to the vigilance of the law, and the constant occupation of the great bulk of the people in some employment or other, than to any increase of what is called moral feeling. This is proved indeed by the extensive practice of petty larceny, to which vast numbers of the young in

all our great towns are trained as if to a trade; and they often show a degree of ingenuity and dexterity in this nefarious trade, which, honestly applied, would render them most useful members of society. These remarks no doubt touch on the subjects of Moral and Social Man, to each of which we purpose to devote a volume: but as it is impossible to reason usefully about Man in any other state than as a member of society, and as the best way of showing the necessity and advantage of the doctrines of mind and immortality, is by pointing out the effects which result from the want of them, we cannot consider these slight anticipations as in any very great degree irrelevant.

The other branch of the practical evidence of want of due attention to the grand doctrines of mind and immortality, as the only sure foundations of good moral conduct in Man, is not so painful certainly as that positive depravity of which we have given a slight outline. But, though not so revolting to one's common feelings of propriety, it is even more painful in the contemplation. Among the people, even in the most advanced stage of society, and the more so perhaps as the temptations of property and enjoyment multiply around them, we may find a tendency to the increase of offences against property, which still require not only a vigilant police, but a constant watchfulness over the morality of that police itself, least it should be corrupted into an engine of plunder, as was sometimes alleged of the watchmen of the olden times —so often indeed that there must have been some truth in it. While men are men, there will be breaches

of the law among them, not merely if left to the law without the vigilance of the executive, but even in spite of that vigilance; and though it is not so set down in Holy Writ, the experience of all ages and nations has shown that mankind have the criminal with them as well as the poor.

It cannot indeed be otherwise; for the son of the purest moralist or foremost philosopher in England is at the moment of his birth in precisely in the same situation as the son of the most atrocious brigand upon earth; and whether he shall turn out to be the one or the other, depends exactly upon circumstances —upon the lessons which are given him, and especially upon the examples which are set. So powerful indeed is this example, that many a well-intentioned parent ruins, in one luckless hour, that moral character which he has taught, or paid for teaching, through several laborious years. These matters are perfectly inseparable from human nature, and he who pretends or predicts that human beings upon earth shall ever be wholly without either misery or crime, is certainly much better fitted for the next nearest planet than for our earth.

But when we turn our attention to those whose office is to preach Christianity, which cannot be preached as it ought to be, "in demonstration of the spirit and with power," unless it is grounded upon a thorough knowledge and full conviction of the truth of the doctrines of mind and immortality,—when we turn our attention to them, and find that, instead of being founded upon this rock—this eternal adamant

fashioned and laid by the hand of the Almighty himself, nothing meets our investigation but the shifting sand of human opinions or dogmas, incomprehensible in themselves, and backed only by human authority, —we feel somewhat different,—we feel that here is an evil that might be removed, and, therefore, it is an abomination; that here, there is a stone given in place of the bread of life, and the sting of a scorpion instead of the germ of eternal happiness.

We allude to no individual, no sect, no church, no sept of opinionists, for we are not a set of censors over any one of these. We look at the whole; and though there are very great diversities of forms and phases, that which forms the essence of the whole is very much the same. If any one doubts upon this subject, we appeal to the present facts, and the faithful record of the past,—not the report of an historian, which might be warped by the prejudices of the author, as most histories are. Not to multiply instances —for one nail in the right place is worth a thousand where they are not wanted—we would just ask, where is the Isaac Barrow of the Church of England, and where the Philip Doddridge of the dissenters? Some may think that we might have chosen greater names than these; but we are satisfied with them; and though they agree in the character of greatness, they are in other respects wide as the poles asunder — Barrow being at once the most transparent and the most profound and irresistible preacher that ever mounted a pulpit, and Doddridge all meekness and simplicity,— the former was calculated for taking the

stronghold of the enemy by storm, the other for winning men over by the sweetness of persuasion.

These men lived before the commencement of what has been termed "the march of intellect." The terrible energy of Barrow's mind dissolved its connexion with the body, in 1677, at the early age of 47; and the gentle spirit of Doddridge went to the place of its rest in 1759, when he was only two years older. But, young as these men were when they left the world to lament their departure, and professionally as they had been active during the whole of their lives, they have left monuments which will be green and flourishing when thousands of others, who have made more bustle and pretence in their time, shall be clean forgotten.

These men, if we may so speak, shone out in their day; and though the character of Barrow ranked high as a mathematician, yet his prominent and superlative character was certainly that of a divine. This happened in an era of comparative darkness; and despite the anarchy of the civil war, and the moral taint given to the country by the return of the Stuarts, divinity was, and continued for a long time to be, the brightest gem in the casket of English literature. Why is it not so now? Because physical science, and the arts dependent upon physical science, have advanced, was it necessary that the science in which every man has the deepest interest should retrograde? Is not the foundation of morality in the present world, and of immortal hope when our days in the present world are numbered, as dear to us as it was to our fathers? Have the enjoyments of this world become so numerous and

so valuable, that they are of themselves an adequate compensation for eternity? Will it be full consolation to a man, when, "in hell, he lifts up his eyes, being in torments," that, in this world, "he was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day?" We doubt it; for, without directly alluding to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, we have all along observed that former enjoyment is no balm to present misery, even in this world, but quite the reverse. The sensibility which a high state of civilization always brings, fails not to add another barb to every arrow of affliction.

We do not say that the ministers of religion, taken as a body, either in the establishment or among the dissenters, are either worse or better private men than they were in the days of Barrow or of Doddridge; but we do ask, where are the master spirits?—why has the fine gold of religion become dim, amid the rapid brightening of all physical and material things?

At present there are (as, indeed, there will be at all times) *popular* preachers,—men who are run after in the day of their fashionableness, sometimes because they have pleasant faces and sonorous voices, and sometimes simply because they are out of the common way; but these are, for the most part, meteoric: one knows not exactly either the cause of their rise or of their fall. They belong to that unsubstantial category of things called fashions, which somebody sets, everybody follows as much as they can, until a new fashion is set, and then the old one always appears unseemly, and not unfrequently ugly. But these co-

ruscations are, in themselves, really nothing; for there are idols of the day in all trades and professions, as well as in the sacred profession; and celebrity in all waxes and wanes very nearly in the same way. What we desiderate is, that religion—vital and essential religion—should take the lead in oration and in book, and be to mankind, generally, habitually, and without any parade or fashion about it, what it really is in its own essence,—the most precious heritage of man upon earth, the rule of all conduct, the zest of prosperity, the balm of sorrow, the constant enjoyment, the eternal hope,—that which keeps brightening and blessing us as the eye waxes dim, and all the senses dull to the enjoyments of the body.

Furthermore, while we are upon this part of the subject, we may remark that there is no lack of partnerships, societies, or associations of some kind or other, calling themselves by religious names, and dealing in wares which they consider to be religious. These are sometimes simple devices for earning a penny which the parties are doubtful whether they could earn upon mere worldly grounds — that is, grounds professing to be such; and in other cases they are a sort of indulgence offices, into which persons pay certain sums of money as a fancied expiation for sins they have heretofore committed, and haply for some they mean thereafter to commit, much in the same manner as was so largely done upon the continent of Europe, ere Martin Luther—somewhat affected by worldly motives too—drew the sword of the spirit upon the lady arrayed in purple and scarlet,

who then sat upon the waters of all the fairer lands in Europe. But truly those matters have not much to do with religion, especially with that essential doctrine upon which all the rest hinges; and therefore we pass them by as briefly and as tenderly as possible.

In order to show that we are actuated by no captious spirit, by no offence given, and by no aversion or dislike to a single human being, or to one church or sect in the multifarious vocabulary, we are willing to rest the whole question upon its literary merits, as these have been and are set forth to the world by the parties themselves. How many religious books—sermons, and others professedly such—have been written within the last dozen years, that are worth anybody's reading? and where is there one among them that tends, even in the slightest degree, to throw a bridge over that gulf which, to men habitually occupied with the affairs of life and the experiences of the physical world, lies between that world and the very rudiments of religion? We must suppose that the authors of those works called the Bridgewater Treatises were the foremost men of their time for pointing out the real connexion of creation and revelation,—the fact of their being produced by one Author, and parts of the same system, so that the one without the other is incomplete. We are bound to suppose this, because they were fairly chosen and adequately rewarded. But what is the result?—Why, the men have all shown that they are clever men in their way—men whom we should be very glad to see more of in the country; and their books are withal pleasant, and by no means

unprofitable books to read; but, as one man (and one would almost imagine as by common consent) they have blinked the grand question at issue,—the very question which would have given substantial value to their labours. We do not require a set book upon the subject to inform us that the works of the Almighty surpass, in every point of view in which they can be taken, all the works of man; for the two are not comparable quantities.

The working of God is originating, calling all the worlds, and all their inhabitants, out of nothing, and implanting a law in each, in virtue of which it runs its appointed course in a manner which is beautiful and perfect. Man, on the other hand, can effect a few trifling changes in a few trifling things, and he may dream and guess about a good many more, but he can originally produce nothing, not even a thought, unless the materials of which to form it are given.

But we did not require a book to tell us these things, for we feel the truth of them in our own experience every day. The book especially wanted, and the one which has not been hitherto furnished, is one which shall demonstrate that which some know, and many more feel, to be a truth; but yet which has not been so set forth in writing, with anything like the force and perspicuity which its paramount importance deserves. What we require is a demonstration, plain and clear as can be had upon any intellectual subject—any subject upon which there are no data which we can see with our eyes, handle with our hands, or scrutinize by any of those senses of the body which bring material subjects within our ken—that the God of the

Creation, and the God of the Revealed Word, is one and the same being,—that He who offered himself on Mount Calvary, an oblation for the sins of the world, is, in very deed, "the Eternal Word of the living God,"—the manifestation of the divine essence by whom all worlds, and all their inhabitants, were made, and by whose goodness they are all sustained and upheld. This is the grand desideratum, for without this all else is as thistle-down blown to and fro by every wind of doctrine; and really, without this, religion—even the profession of the Christian religion—is no better than a new edition of the old idolatry under another name. Without this, men may attend churches and say prayers, and break into fits of holy fervour or frenzy; but without it, they cannot worship God in the purity of holiness, as "the God of the spirits of all flesh." Without this, men may venerate the church, or the service book, or the preacher, or the consecrated ground, and they may bless and take merit to themselves for so venerating; but in very deed one sees but little philosophic difference between them and those who bow down to stocks and stones; for if the object of worship is any thing else than the God of Heaven, as he is spiritually discovered by the mind awakened to the full conviction of its own immortality, and its relationship to him, independent of the world and of all its blandishments, it boots little what the idol is, whether it is an idol of material substance, moulded and fashioned by the hand of an artificer, or whether it is an ideal idol, framed by man out of the imagination of his own heart.

If this matter were brought fully and properly home to those who are in the habit of writing the addition "reverend" to their names, and who, from the great talent which they display in other matters, are certainly competent to the task, it would effect more for the happiness—the present and the eternal happiness—of their fellow men, than all the laurels which they can win in the field of physical science, green and glorious as we admit some of these laurels to be.

Why, we would ask, though there may be none that will answer us,—why are the foremost spirits of the present time, while they set "reverend" to their names, sent to the physical sciences to get themselves glory? Where are the *sermons* of the profound Whewell, the gentle Kirby, the kind-hearted Buckland, or of that scarcely embodied spirit, Adam Sedgwick, who, upon other subjects, is eloquence itself? Why should these men be so great, one in physical science generally, two in geology, and the fourth in the philosophy of small insects—we may almost say the small philosophy of insects; and yet we do not find any of their works enhancing the value of the Christian library, or making the divine rise in splendour, as he ought to rise, above the mere philosopher of material things?

We by no means quarrel with these men for their love of physical science, for we are fully convinced, that, without considerable scientific knowledge, and an ardent love of nature in all its departments, a clergyman cannot discharge his professional duties in the way that they ought to be performed; but still, if

the fame of him who adds "reverend" to his name is to be rested wholly upon physical subjects, it does not say much for the cause of divinity; for it seems as if that were put aside as a matter worthy only of men of inferior talent, and that the works—even the most obscure works—of the Creator, had more attraction for men of sterling ability than the Creator himself.

And, whatever the parties themselves may think about the matter, an unfavourable impression, upon the subject of religion, is caused by such; for as long as people find that men of high talents, and churchmen in name, whether they hold cures of souls or no, go to other subjects in quest of their literary renown, there is no barring the inference that religion is unworthy of the talents of these highly-cultivated and keenly-inquiring individuals, and fitted only for minds of an inferior order. This is an erroneous view of the subject of religion, no doubt; but it is one which men do take, and, under the circumstances, cannot avoid taking; and the injury done to religion on the one hand, far exceeds, in its effects upon the happiness and welfare, and even the substantial information of society, all the good they do to those sciences, to the furtherance of which their talents are so assiduously and successfully applied.

But the argument which may be grounded upon the example now quoted goes much further than this, —much farther than the parties themselves are probably aware of. It proves, as clearly as indirect demonstration can prove, that Divinity, *as it is now*

studied, has not sufficient attraction for the master spirits of the profession. Now, surely this is not as it ought to be. Religion, in its full and proper extent, is the science of Man — of Man in all his characters and relations, Physical, Intellectual, Moral, and Social; and if this be not matter extensive and attractive enough for the very highest talents that any individual of the human race can possibly possess, truly we know not what can be regarded as such. Physical Man, considered merely in his organization, growth, maturity, and decay, as a mere animal, and nothing but an animal, is, no doubt, part and parcel of the material creation. But this is not the way in which even Physical Man ought to be considered,—inasmuch as it is not the way in which Man presents himself to our consideration.

We know Man only as body and mind in union with each other,— the body, as the original receiver of information, by the impressions of external objects upon the senses; the eye as the receiver of this information from the body, the retainer of it as knowledge, and the turner of that knowledge to account for plans and purposes which the mind forms according to its desires, and for making the body execute those plans, in as far as it is able in itself, or can command the assistance of other men, of animals, of tools, or of machines or instruments of some kind or other. It is here that the grand difference between Man and the other animals lies. The action of their bodies follows immediately upon the bodily sensation, without that intermediate process of comparing, deliberating, and deciding,

which the mind can be occupied at all times and in all places, without library, without apparatus, and with little or no interruption of the avocations of the most busy life in other matters.

A single moment's consideration will suffice to convince any one who is in the habit of thinking correctly upon any one subject, that this must be the case; for such will not fail to discover that there is an element in it, superior in its kind to any element to be found in any other science whatever. It must not be supposed that because, after we have made certain advances in the study of nature, whether in the more mighty, as displayed in the heavens, or in the more minute, as displayed in the earth and the waters,— there is a feeling of God in the contemplation of his works,— we must not for this reason suppose that the study of any one department of material nature, or of all the fruits of it, taken together, is superior or even equal to the study of Man; for, admitting, which we do not admit, that this feeling of God in his works could arise from the study of those works, without the assistance of revelation; yet the contemplation of God as the Creator of mind is far more pure and sublime, more exalted above earthly things, and therefore more safe against every species of idolatrous pollution, whether of the mental thought or the material image, than can be obtained where the thing created is, in its very nature, subject to physical laws, and exposed to the reverses of change and dissolution, sooner or later, according to the

difference of its nature, and the function which it is ordained to perform in the material system.

It is no doubt delightful to contemplate one who has the wisdom and the power to make the beams of one sun at one and the same time fall upon numbers of surrounding planets, and so adapt themselves to all that may grow and live, upon each and all of those planets, as to produce the result which is the most favourable to every single one of countless myriads, to the tale of which arithmetic is wholly inadequate. It is unquestionably delightful to enter upon this mighty consideration, or even upon any of those numerous items of which it is the sum. But still the view given of God here, is only given of God as a worker of materials; and therefore the god deducible from such an investigation, be it as living and as thorough as it might, never could come up to the proper conception of the Living God, who is a Spirit, and who, to be worshipped aright, must be worshipped in spirit and in truth.

Not only this; but it is exceedingly doubtful that any effort of the human mind could so generalize all the varied phenomena and operations of nature, so as to have a clear perception that they are, and necessarily are, the works of one Almighty Being. We have a kind of historical proof of this in the more profound philosophers of antiquity, who, though they succeeded in deriding the worship, and shaking the altars of the gods of credulity and imposture, made but very faint and imperfect guesses as to the Author of the system of nature. We shall not pause to quote

or analyze any of those doctrines, because their day has gone by, and the world would never be a bit the wiser for the revival of them; but we may say thus much generally, that, when they are subjected to anything like a thorough and scrutinizing analysis, they all have a tendency to converge toward the doctrine of the eternity of matter, and of its eternally possessing in itself all the means by which the motions and changes of it are brought about.

In all these matters, there is not a single allusion to the creation of intelligence; or of any means by which one part of nature can have a knowledge of the other parts, further than the mere perceptions of animal sense in animated beings, is at once endowing matter with the attribute of mind,—the old doctrine of the *Anima Mundi*—the breath or enlivening spirit of the world, under what name soever it may be described. And, when the studies of men go no further than this,—and no physical study can of itself go further,—there is a gulf fixed between physical and religious knowledge, which no power of Man can overleap; and this seems to be the real reason why our reverend philosophers of the present day are so mighty on physics and so minute on religion.

The knowledge of Intellectual Man—of mind in Man, as an immaterial, immortal, and indestructible essence, which exists in supplement to the whole material creation, observing that creation, but not being part of it, nor subject to any of its contingencies or its fates; the knowledge of Man in this point of view, is the bridge over the gulf—the vinculum, by

means of which, to our mental perception, time and space are linked to eternity and infinitude; and the regulated workings, each trammelled in by its peculiar circumstances, which we see around us, lead us on to the contemplation of One whose working has neither end nor beginning, pause nor limit; but who is, from eternity to eternity, the Creator, the Preserver, the Guide, the Governor, the All-wise, the All-good, the All-bountiful.

But, though this is a most sublime and all-ecstatic conclusion, and one which raises the intellectual part of Man high in enjoyment and in bliss above all worldly possessions and all worlds, and though, as the plant of renown, the tree of eternal life, it may be watered by the dew of philosophy, until the top thereof shall reach the heavens, and its branches overshadow and adorn the whole earth, yet it is originally "the planting of the Lord," and the original germ of it is nowhere to be found but in the book of inspiration. Therefore, it is the bounden duty of all those who minister at the altar, or name the name of being entitled to so doing, to see to the planting of this germ, to foster it by every attention, and cause all the genial winds of the wide horizon of knowledge to breathe upon it, and make it grow up and be the grand ornament and honour of the earth, and the shelter and refuge of all the children of men.

This is not to be done by the mere formulary of any church, by the saying or the singing of any number of mere words, how powerful soever they may be in their meaning, how logical and graceful soever they

may be in their concatenation, or how melodious and charming soever they may be to the ear in their sound. Such matters may be highly gratifying to the sense, but for the mere purpose of religion, the only purpose indeed which can be called religious,—they are in reality what it is written that the words of inspiration were made of old, by the indifference of the people to whom they were addressed—"as a pleasant song, or as one who playeth skillfully upon an instrument;" but, as was complained of these, "straightway they are forgotten."

The express declaration is that, in order that the words of religious instruction may come "with power" —power to effect that good which they are intended to effect, they must come "in demonstration of the Spirit." We quote these words a second time; because, although they are few in number, they are redolent of instruction. It is not said that they are to come "*in* power," but "*with* power," that is, a power in addition to the words, as they are delivered from the mouth or read in the volume, must accompany the words, otherwise they cannot come in "demonstration of the Spirit." Now, the words, whether spoken or written, are all that can be addressed to the senses; and consequently the accompanying power must go directly to something which is not of the body or the senses, and make its impression there. How it goes we cannot describe in words; for there is no substantive matter which we can embody to the sense; but we can understand inwardly that there is a direct communication of the instructing

spirit and the instructed spirit, without the intervention of the senses of the body, and therefore free from any taint or bias, which the mind may, in common matters, have received from the peculiar circumstances, observations, and associations of the individual.

This is, from its very nature, a subject of extreme nicety, one, of the process or fact of which, in his own case or that of any other, no man has a right to say a word. Whether it is so or no, will tell in the temper and conduct, with far more truth than any man can utter upon any one proposition. This is enough—all that is to be desired—all that can be had; and if any man attempt to embody it in words, he belies the truth, and is a hypocrite—one who puts on the semblance of religion to hide the reality of an infidel.

It is this feeling that makes Man what is not inaptly termed "a *new* creature,"—although the positive declaration that any one has become such, at any time, in any manner, or by any means, is one of the most audacious pieces of human impudence, practised for selfish and worldly purposes, that can be named, and it is this, operating in its own spiritual and unseen way, but demonstrated in the general tenor of the character and conduct, which it is the grand duty of those who profess to minister in religious matters, to bring about. If this is once accomplished, the axe is laid to the root of all that is mentally and morally bad in Man, not only without the restraining of one of his powers and enjoyments, as regards the present life, but with increased aptness and success in the one,

and increased zest and pleasure in the other. It is this which enables Man to see "good in every thing," and to find sources of gratitude and thankfulness when under the most severe of those calamities which must befal a being of finite capacity, who comes in utter ignorance into a world in which there is so much to be known. But amid all these, and the severest of them will, and do, sometimes overtake the very best of men, the man who has once been imbued with this feeling "holds fast his integrity," in the day of calamity, as well as in that of the brightest prosperity. When once the conviction is fully established, and Man feels as convinced that he is not wholly for this world as he does of the fact of his own existence, but that, in addition to the connection which he has with the physical creation by means of his body, he has a higher and more enduring connection with the Creator by means of his mind, there is a governing power upon him, a self-governing power which is constant at all times and under all circumstances, and compared to which, all the legislative and fiscal restrictions of the society of which he is a member are in themselves weak as cobwebs.

The grand advantage of this mental restraint over all the external restraints of society, consists in the intimacy and the continuality of its operation. Human laws merely restrain the actions of men, and even only a limited number of those actions; and the custom of the age,—that which is called public opinion, though it may operate in many minor matters to which no statutory law can or should apply, is yet only an

external matter as well as the other. A man may be obedient to the law from merely slavish fear of the punishment which that law can inflict; and thus he may be in his heart,—that is, in his desires and wishes, a much worse, or at all events a more contemptible character than the open violater of the law. The real iniquity is in the purpose, not in the mere act; and he who purposes crime, and fears to perpetrate that crime because of the law, is as much a villain as the law-breaker, and a coward in supplement. Public opinion stands much in the same category as enacted law; it is, indeed, the enactment of a much larger portion of the society in which it holds, than the statute, which used sometimes—though of course in times far remote from the present—to be originated in caprice, debated and elaborated without wisdom, and sanctioned by the authority of those who knew nothing whatever about its probable bearing and effects. But still public opinion does not extend farther, at least directly, than the doings, or at most the sayings of men; and thus, though it may be in some respects a more wholesome and efficient restraint than that of statute law, it is at best only an external restraint, having little influence on the deliberations, desires, and wishes of Man, upon the formation of which the eye of society can never be turned.

The only power which can have a control here, is that which a man would feel and be influenced by, though there were no statute in existence, and no human being in the world but himself. This operates not only in a different manner from enacted law, and

the customs and opinions of society, for it acts upon a different principle. Fear of punishment or of degradation in the estimation of men, is the leading principle of obedience, both to the laws of the government of society, and to the opinion of its members; and this may be the result of cowardice or of craft, as well as of any better principle. With the man whose primary thoughts and inward desires,—those monuments upon which no eye of another can possibly look,—with the man who has them under constant discipline and control, the case is widely different. He feels the high station which he occupies among created beings, simply from his being Man, endowed with an immortal spirit, which belongs not to any other creature upon earth, and altogether independently of and indifferent to his connexions, possessions, or acquirements, as an individual: he also feels grateful to the Almighty Being who has been pleased to confer this high distinction upon him; and thus feeling, his constant desire is neither to degrade himself nor to be ungrateful for the goodness of his God. His life is thus, in the very springs of it, a life of order and obedience; but it is a willing and cheerful obedience, without fear and without reproach; and, as no part of his attention ever requires to be occupied in hiding his purposes from his fellow men, he has the whole of his time and his powers for use and enjoyment, and can be more hearty and successful in both, than the miserable creature who is always in terror lest somebody should discover what he really is.

This constant, ready, and cheerful regulation of the

desires and habitual government of Man by himself, is of course wholly a mental matter, in which the body, considered simply as animal, has no farther concerns than in so far as its appetites are regulated for its own good, and for that of the whole man; and consequently the perfection of it cannot be obtained by any man who is not fully convinced of the existence of mind, and who understands at least the great outlines of its nature, its functions, and its proper training.

CHAPTER IV.

ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE AND IMMORTALITY OF MIND.

THE subject enunciated in the title of this chapter is one of no ordinary difficulty, though it is, at the same time, one of such deep interest, that an excuse may be pleaded for the attempt at its popular illustration, even though that illustration should be a failure. The primary, or fundamental idea of mind in Man, as immortal, distinct from the physical creation, forming no part of that creation, and not affected, in nature or in essence, by its contingencies or its fate, is no doubt to be obtained from the Volume of Revelation only—from that inestimable and sacred book, in which, and in which alone, "life and immortality are brought to light;" and without which, all is uncertainty and doubt upon this most interesting of all questions. But still, we must read the sacred volume with the understanding of men, otherwise we are in danger of converting even it into a means of superstition, and the confirmation of ignorance. It is not the object of that book to teach us any one truth which we are capable of arriving at without its aid, but to furnish us with data upon those points where our natural means of observation

are inadequate to the task. Thus, it furnishes no positive information on the principles of any of the physical sciences, although the greater number of the illustrations are drawn from physical subjects, and subjects which, though they differ in some of their characters in different countries, do not vary from age to age like the manners and customs of men, and the modes of human philosophy; but still the expressions in the Bible, when we interpret them according to the spirit of the language in which they were written, are not at variance with any one established truth in any one of the sciences; and it is only when ignorant or inconsiderate men take the peculiar expressions of a highly figurative language, as literally as if they had been common conversations in low Dutch, that they quarrel with the discoveries and conclusions of philosophers for being in contradiction of what is said in the Bible.

Not only this, but we must go through the common process of learning to read, or, at all events, to understand language, both of which are purely human operations, without the least admixture of inspiration in it; and the words of the Bible must be understood by the reader or the hearer of them upon the same principles as the words of any other book, and not otherwise. Farther, the Bible does not furnish us with a treatise, or even the outline of a treatise, upon the science of mind, any more than it does upon mechanics, chemistry, the theory of language, or any thing else, the principles of which can be made a science. All sciences, whether of the properties of matter, of the

action of matter, of our own bodies, or of our minds, are left for our own study; and although the doctrines of revealed religion, which are always such as we could not possibly have arrived at by our own powers, may give us encouragement, and great encouragement, in the prosecution of those branches of knowledge of which our own observation furnishes us with the elements, it does not furnish us with one single element, or enable us directly to advance one step. The object of revealed religion is not to make men lazy, or to forbid them the cultivation of any one branch of knowledge, or the practice of any one useful or ornamental art, but rather to encourage them in all these, to hinder them from injuring themselves or each other, to support them under reverses, and to open up the prospect of immortality to them, as a ground of consolation and confidence, by which they may be resigned, and strengthened, and made happy. But, because we have received, of the free goodness of our Creator, this insight into spiritual things, in addition to the wonderful organization of our bodies, and the still more wonderful energy and activity of our minds, are we to neglect the other parts of our being? We are still in the physical world for the whole term of our natural lives; and we are called upon to know and to do more in this world, since the introduction of the Christian religion, and the revelation of the Christian hope, than men were before these things were made known; and therefore we are unwise, unjust, and ungrateful—morally criminal in the highest degree—if we are not

constantly up and doing, knowing all that we can know, and performing all that we can perform.

Of this knowledge—all knowledge at which we can by any means arrive, the knowledge of the mind, as an immaterial or intellectual principle, which can never die, of the modes of its action, and the means of its improvement, is by far the most valuable, inasmuch as it is the real foundation of all the rest. But it will be necessary to repeat the general enunciation of the subject, with some remarks, before we proceed to the outlines of what may be called the popular argument for the existence and immortality of mind in Man, as, in its essence, totally unconnected with the physical or material creation, and not the result of any action or organization of that creation, in the same way as heat, light, vegetable or animal life, or any of those displays of physical agency which are all what we may call emanations of physical causes, are real matter, or indeed any thing that can have physical existence in themselves, but which are nothing more than mere displays, made by certain substances when in certain combinations and states; and when the substances cease to be in those combinations and states, the display, or, as we call it, the physical action, utterly ceases, and is as though it had never been. The causes of these physical displays are the properties of matter, which are mere modifications, and not substances; and therefore they have no existence apart from the substances in which the displays appear. These actions, or displays of action among the phy-

sical substances, change the states and combinations of these substances, but they do not destroy one single particle of the matter: they are merely "signs of changes," and the change is always great, or difficult to be performed, in proportion to the intensity of the sign. Thus, to take a familiar illustration, the *ignes fatui* which play over the surfaces of marshes, at those seasons of the year when animal and vegetable remains are in a state of putrid decomposition, are occasioned by the ignition of phosphuretted hydrogen and others the most inflammable gases; and hence their light is pale and blue, and their action is so gentle that it hurts nothing; but the lightning of a severe storm, which is, in all probability, the display made by the combustion of oxygen and hydrogen, in that proportion in which they form liquid water, is very terrific as a display, and it is often powerful as a means of destruction.

In all physical displays, indeed, whether they take place in dead nature or in living, and whether they are brought about by natural or by artificial means, the display is always in proportion to the extent and intensity of the change produced, and the quantity of matter which is rendered unfit for the same display, until it has, by some means or other, been brought back to the state in which it was previously to the change having been made in or upon it. Plants of very slow growth subsist in barren places, while those that grow rapidly require the means of a large supply of matter of some kind or other. Active animals require the greatest and most frequent supply of food;

and they have also the most rapid circulation, and require the most air for their respiration; and, in our own case, we find that violent exertion quickens the pulse, increases the temperature of the body, and makes the respiration panting and laborious; and a topical resistance of the fluids, in any part of the body, causes heat, pain, and inflammation in that part; and if it be a vital part, or the body in an unsound state, or the case an extreme one, it may bring on disease and death.

We might go over the whole catalogue of the actions of physical matter, in all their varieties and modifications, as displayed in nature and in art, and we should find one general principle running through the whole,—the action modified by the kind and the quantity of matter, changing as these change, and ceasing when they are exhausted in their state fit for the display of that kind of action. Therefore, it is impossible for us not to refer the whole of those physical displays, whatever they may be, to that physical matter in which they are shown, and to that alone; nor could we so much as imagine the possibility of the occurrence or the return of any one of these displays, in the absence of any one of the kinds or qualities of matter which we know, from observation, to be essential to the production of it. They are the phenomena of matter; and if that matter were to be destroyed, or the properties of it changed, not a jot of the phenomena would remain to meet the ken of any future observer, how acute and how experienced soever he might be. In none of these cases is there

ever any deliberation; for, in them all, the action follows the impulse without any pause other than that which is necessary for overcoming the inertia of the active organs or properties, and bringing them into play; and if an action of this purely physical nature, whether displayed in dead matter or in living, fails in being completed, the cause of the failure is never any deliberate abstaining from the act, but merely an indication that the state and circumstances at the time have not been suited to its performance. Such are the outlines of the view of physical action, which should be taken as fully as possible by every one who wishes to enter upon the question of Intellectual Man, with that preparation which its importance demands.

The mind, in its nature or essence, is not, and cannot be, an object of the senses, because it has, and can have, none of those qualities, and display none of those phenomena, which render matter apparent to the senses. As little can we borrow any analogy from the material world by means of which to shadow it forth, even in the most dark and imperfect manner in which one subject of thought can be shadowed forth by another. We dare not even make the attempt; for, as the material subject which we attempted to use in illustration, would be, either directly or indirectly, an object of the senses, while the mind is not such an object in any respect, it would take the stronger hold upon us, and the resulting idea which we derived from it would be simply an idea of matter, and not in any respect an idea of mind. If "the unknown thing" were mentioned to me, and if I, totally ignorant of

the nature and properties of the said unknown thing, were gratuitously to take up my analogy that the unknown thing were like an apple, then the resulting idea would necessarily be that of an apple, and of nothing else, save the addition that it were an apple which I had never seen. When we attempt to arrive at any knowledge of mind, by means of physical analogies, we are exactly in this predicament; and this is one of the fertile sources of materialism in its most insidious form,—not the gross materialism of the ancients and the vulgar, who imagined and imagine the mind to be a shade or ghost—a filmy sort of body, consisting of form without substance; but an idea more refined, though equally erroneous,—namely, that what we call mind is merely a peculiar power of action resulting from the organization and living functions of the body, and from these only; and, of course, ceasing to be when death puts an end to the functions, and prepares the organic structure for the decomposition of the grave. They who believe in the actual appearance of spiritual beings *in propriâ personâ*, to the bodily senses of men, are entangled in the error of the ancient and vulgar belief upon all spiritual subjects; and the more refined and insidious form of materialism belongs more to such of the learned and inquiring as have not brought their minds to bear properly upon the question. Both are, of course, errors; and the former is the more fertile of superstition and absurdity, but the latter is by far the most inveterate.

The proper doctrine—at least the only one which

can be maintained, without in some way opening the door for the admission of absurd superstition, or withering infidelity—seems to be this:—The mind of Man, though a creation by the same Being, is a totally different act of the creative fiat than the material creation, either in its substantive existence, or in any kind or degree of its action. This is hinted at, and only hinted at, in the brief sketch of the creation, as given in the Book of Genesis; but as it is a subject which cannot be explained to the comprehension of even the most reflective of mankind, in any language, far less in the flowery language of a people in so early a stage of civilization as the Jews were at the time when this book was addressed to them, in its substance, if not in its present form, it is not dwelt upon at any length.

It is stated, however, that Man was the last of the works of creation; and that the earth underwent various preparations, after it was first commanded to exist, and before it was a fit habitation for Man, or even for those animals which are most useful to Man. Other than what can be gathered from this outline, we have no account on any written record of the state of our globe in the very early times; but the researches of geologists show, in a manner which cannot be mistaken, that there have been many states, even of the same locality, following each other at very long intervals, before these localities became fit for the habitation of the common Mammalia, or of Man. Now, we are acquainted with no means or power in physical nature, by which any one single species of animal or even of plant can be originated,—brought out of the

mass of mere matter, without a parent; and we know of no instance of a germ of the Mammalia being preserved in a separate state, so as to be awakened into activity after the parent race had become extinct. From this we may conclude, that, independently of Man altogether, our earth has been the subject of a series of acts of creative power,—power by means of which every successive renovation of the land, after having been submerged in the water during its appointed time, and again raised above the mean level of the ocean waters, by forces of which there are abundance contained in the vast and ponderous volume of our globe, was clothed with plants, and peopled with animals, suited to its new, and, as we may suppose, improved condition.

Now, those changes and new creations, of which the evidences are numerous and indubitable—so plain and palpable that the dullest cannot fail to understand them, and the boldest sceptic dares not deny them—though they may not amount to even an analogical proof of two creations of Man, yet they show that this would not be at variance with the working of the Almighty in other matters; and this is all that we can desire upon the subject.

The matter for our consideration, therefore, reduces itself to this:—Man is a compound being, consisting of two parts, body and mind, which are altogether different in their natures. The body is material, made up of many organs, and liable to disease and death. Its economy, in its origin, growth, nourishment, decay, and dissolution, and also in the kinds of matter of

which it is composed, does not differ in kind, though it may differ in degree and mode, from the other warm-blooded animals that bring forth their young alive, and suckle them with milk. Therefore we must assign the same origin to the human body, and to all its animal functions, as we do to the bodies and functions of the other Mammalia. Thus far forth, but no farther, Man is an animal, and nothing but an animal.

Let us now turn our attention to the other part of Man's compound nature—the mind; and, though we cannot positively describe it in words, or represent it in pictures as we can do in the case of the body, yet we can understand that it is so totally different from the body in its nature and its functions, that it cannot possibly have a physical origin, as the body has. The mind is not material. It is simple, undergoes no waste, stands in need of no nourishment, is not subject to death or decomposition; and its essence cannot be in the least affected by any physical cause or contingency whatsoever. Therefore, the unavoidable, the irresistible conclusion is, that the mind cannot have the same physical origin as the body—that it cannot have a physical origin in any sense of the word whatever. The body descends from parents, by ordinary physical generation, in the same manner as the Mammalia; the mind does not—cannot descend from any physical parent, by any process of generation whatsoever.

This is worthy of a little consideration; and it is the more so, inasmuch as the words of Revelation, in so far as they are express upon the point, are in

perfect accordance with the conclusion to which we are brought by the fair mode of deduction in our ordinary philosophy. Adam was *made* in "the image of God;" the son of Adam was *born* "in Adam's own image." To think of the *body* of Man being in any way whatever "the image of God" is either gross idolatry or downright absurdity,—or rather it is a mixture of the two. Considered as mind, however, there is a resemblance—in as far as a finite and created being can resemble an infinite and uncreated one. Both are spiritual, both are free from the contingencies of the material or physical creation. Here the parallel ends; and it must be admitted that it holds only for a very little way; and yet for this little way, perhaps, "the image of God" is the best short expression for mind, as distinguished from matter and organization. "The image of man," again, as evidently alludes to the body,—the part of the compound man, which, as we have said, and which did not require saying, it would be absurd to imagine to be the image of God, in any other way than all the rest of the physical creation is entitled to the same epithet. The same distinction is, if possible, more clearly expressed in Solomon's sermon against vanity, and in favour of obedience to the law of God: "The dust shall return to the earth *as it was*, and the spirit shall return unto God *who* gave it." Can any words express more clearly the totally different origin of the body and the mind of every human being? — the one descending from parents, in the ordinary physical way, the other the immediate "gift of God" to the individual. So

much for the Scripture authority, which every one must admit is plain and explicit enough : and now for a few words on the common philosophic view of the matter.

It is matter of observation, to which there is not a single exception, that organized beings which are continued by generation, be the peculiar mode what it may, are true, not only to the larger divisions of the naturalists — the kingdom, the class, the order, and the tribe, family, or group, but they are true also to the species. But admitting that a whale should produce a swarm of bees, or an animalcule a herd of elephants, the anomaly would not be so great as that of a material and mortal body producing an immaterial and immortal spirit. The veriest madman among the abettors of equivocal generation, or the most rampant among their "modern type," the Developementists, would not and could not hazard any thing so much at variance with everything observable in nature and every dictate of common sense. To suppose that one spirit could beget another, is not, at first sight, quite so outrageous, because it is not mortality begetting immortality. But when we come to examine it closely, it is no better, if indeed it is not a good deal worse. Bodies do beget bodies, though in that there is a mystery which we can never understand ; but that spirits should beget spirits, is either utter nonsense, or most audacious profanation of the office of the Almighty, or both.

Wherefore, we may state as a demonstrated truth— as clearly demonstrated as any truth of the kind can

be,—that the body of every individual of the human race descends from human parents by ordinary generation; but that the intellectual part—the mind —the spirit—the soul, or whatever it may be called, is the immediate gift of the Creator to each individual, without descent from parent to child, or connexion of any kind whatsoever with any human being, saving the one to whom it is given, and of whom it forms the essential part, the only part which raises Man above the beasts that perish.

This investigation and enunciation of the doctrine of the immateriality and immortality of the human mind will, if attentively considered, be found, to no inconsiderable extent, to involve its own demonstration; but there are many supplementary proofs which tend to strengthen the argument; and therefore it may not be amiss to give a short outline of a few of the leading ones,—it being understood that when by any means the doctrine of immateriality is established, that of immortality follows as a necessary consequence; for if mind is subject to none of the contingencies of matter, there is no death to which it can be obnoxious, save final annihilation by the same Almighty Being who gave it its existence.

In the first place, fatuity is a proof of the existence of mind in Man as distinct and different from the body. At page 244 of our volume on PHYSICAL MAN, there will be found a brief picture of the extreme of this most dreadful of all privations, as we have attempted to sketch it from the *subject*—we dare not say from the *life*: and so we need not again return to

that. But there is a stage far short of this, in which the external form of the body is tolerably perfect, and all the animal functions carried on in such a manner as to give no positive offence, and yet the party is utterly incapable of learning one useful lesson, doing one useful action, or keeping himself out of the way of harm. Such unfortunates are rarely to be seen about the streets of large towns, though even there, their relatives obtrude them most cruelly and unwisely upon visiting friends; but in the villages of some of the remote parts of the country, especially where the more wealthy have been in the habit of inter-marrying "in and in" for several generations, there is, or there used not many years ago to be, one of those simple and harmless idiots in almost every family, that is to say, in one or another of the cross combinations of cousinships.

That there are imperfections of the body only, we are well aware; and also that they are produced by the very same means which cause deterioration in animals and plants. But the effects are different. The animal or the plant is deteriorated in its value and character certainly; but the instincts of the animal and the habits of the plant are not the parts of it which suffer most by the deterioration. The degenerated ox does not eat poisonous plants, neither does the degenerated horse wander into ponds and ditches. There is no sign of fatuity in them, under any circumstances whatever; and though the whole animal degenerates, the degeneracy is chiefly in the organization. With men it is different; and though

from incapacity in taking care of the body, and the want of the impress of mind upon the features, and the bearing and gestures, all of which tell tales of the nature of their ruler, the body of the idiot does not improve like the bodies of other men, yet it may, at the first, be more perfect in all its parts, and more symmetrical in its form. The action of the deteriorated animal may be different from that of an animal in the first style of breeding; but it follows just as certainly and as closely the impression of the senses. The case of degeneracy among animals is, however, hardly a fair one, inasmuch as all the animals to which it applies are in an artificial state, and have been brought into that state by human art in the training of them; and what we call their deterioration or degeneracy is, in truth, nothing else than the tendency which they have to return back to their natural state, as adapted to the nature of the country or the district in which they live; and it is the same in the case of most, if not all, of the plants which we say degenerate. Not only this; for in these degenerations, as we call them, there is really an increase in the natural instincts and qualities of the animal, and in the natural habits of the plant. The wild horses, wild cattle, and other animals, left in a great measure to nature and their natural instincts, some of which are to be met with in the parks, forests, and moors of different parts of Britain, far excel, in strength, in spirit, and in resource, the tame animals of the same species which are so much more admired by Man; and the same may be said of those plants which have passed from

an artificial state to what may be termed a state of nature. All these are, therefore, to be regarded only as repairs of the animal and the vegetable systems, after inroads that have been made upon them by the artificial operations of Man, whose art leads him to work one part of the system of the animal or the vegetable to his own advantage, but to the injury of the other parts, and consequently to the deterioration of the animal or the vegetable as a whole.

In the case of partial fatuity or idiotcy among human beings, it is evidently different; for when there is a deterioration there, it always tells in a derangement of the connexion between the initial perception of the senses, and the final action which is the ultimate result of the perceptions. It is clear from this, that there is something more than a deterioration of the merely animal system—of which deterioration, however, there is not a trace to be found among the animals themselves. Among them, even in those instances of which we complain the most, there is not a single connexion broken, or any one part of the instinctive train, between the stimulated sensation and the stimulation to action, in the least diminished, but rather the reverse. In the case of human idiotcy, or partial fatuity, to which we have alluded, it is widely different. In them there is a something completely decayed or broken asunder, which never takes place where the whole process is animal; and what can this be but an imperfection of that most delicate part of the compound nature of

Man, in which the animal has to communicate information to the immortal in the initiatory part of the process, and receive impulses to action from it in the final. Of the nature—the abstract nature of this—we can know nothing, because it is too fine for observation, and there are no data discoverable by any of the ordinary methods upon which we can ground any process of reasoning; but this does not overturn or controvert the facts, which are palpable to any one's reflection, who chooses to reflect calmly and philosophically upon this very interesting and important matter. Thus, those imperfections of the organization of the human body, which unfit it for acting in accordance with the mind, are in themselves proofs that the mind is not material, or in any sense of the word a quality or emanation of matter; and that, consequently, it is immortal, or not subject to any of the contingencies or casualties of matter.

In the second place, a proof of the immateriality, and consequent immortality of the mind, may be drawn from the fact of the differences of the human race in different states of society, and under different degrees of mental culture. The Dingo, or wild dog of Australia, is not, for instance, an animal of less animal sagacity and resource than the best bred dogs which are found among men; and perhaps, in both stratagem and artifice in the finding of its food,—the chief occupation of an animal of this species in a state of nature, it is superior to any of the high-bred ones, which receive their food regularly from their keepers, and render up to those keepers the use of their in-

stincts in return. We grant that it does not hunt so well for its savage master as the hound, the beagle, or the pointer does in our part of the world; but it does not this, because its instinctive wants are not so well or so regularly supplied; but in the matter of supplying itself by means of its own instincts, it will be found to be greatly superior. It will not starve if there is food for it to be had in any part of the country; and in failure of wild game in the "bush," it will not hesitate a moment ere it attacks the flock of the settler with all the energy wherewithal Nature has endowed it. We shall not here enter upon the zoological question as to whether these wild dogs of Australia are aboriginal animals, or imported into the country by the Malays, who have visited the shores from very remote times, for the purpose of their fishery; though, from the physiological differences between these dogs and the native marsupial mammalia, the probability is that they were imported. From their numbers, however, they must have been a long time in the country; and thus they must have fallen back to what may be called a state of nature, long before the British made any settlement there.

Still, though they displayed, and continue to display, all the ferocity of savage animals, such as we find in the fox, and especially in the wolf, their perfection of character and resource formed, and still forms, a wonderful contrast to the native human beings of the same extensive and singular island. These were at first, and are still, in a very low state of mental development; and, although that may be in part

the fault of the class of persons by whom the country has been in great part civilized, yet the native Australians have given evidence that they are a people that cannot be civilized. Not that they are destitute of mind, or of mental resource,—for they are exceedingly cunning; they knew the use of fire long before we were aware of the existence of any such people; and they are remarkably dexterous in the use of their weapons of war and of the chase. No European, even after years of practice, could throw the spear or the boomerang with so much force and effect as these savages; and their expertness is acquired; for they practise both from very early youth, and thus learn the necessary force and certainty in the use of these murderous weapons, much in the same way as our most ingenious mechanics acquire proficiency in their respective trades. There is even a good deal of what may be called science in the management of these weapons. The head of the spear, which was of course originally of stone, is so heavy in proportion to the shaft or staff, that all the impetus given by the throw is concentrated in it, and the shaft acts much in the same way as the feathers of an arrow, in preventing it from deviating from the line in which the thrower wishes to send it. The throwing-stick, too, is an application of the power of the lever, though the parties who use it, and who contrived it at the first, do not know a single abstract principle, and never arrived at any thing like the use of one alphabetical or other character, by means of which the ideas of the absent or the dead can be of use to the present and living. In throwing the spear,

in the manner in which it is thrown by these rude men,—these men incorrigible in their rudeness, the whole body no doubt acts in concert, or has its energy concentrated upon the arm which launches the weapon. But we shall suppose that the shoulder-joint, or articulation of the humerus, is the centre of motion; and that the length of the arm thence to the grasp is two feet. The throwing-stick may be more or less than four feet, but we shall call it that; and then, as the art of the spearman consists in delivering the weapon when both arm and stick are at the stretch, the spear is of course sent with three times the velocity which it would have if delivered simply from the hand. But, according to the usual theory, three times the velocity gives nine times the force; and thus, by means of his throwing-stick, the Australian savage arms himself with the power of nine men, and this without any calculation or parade of science upon his part. Yet there is not only mind, but philosophy, in this matter; for the use of the stick could not be arrived at without reasoning upon cause and effect; and dexterity in the use of it could not be obtained without education and experience. The first philosopher in Europe, notwithstanding all his reasonings about projecting forces and projectiles, could not, even after many trials, rival the Australian savage, either in the force or the certainty of throwing the spear.

The boomerang is a still more curious weapon, both in its shape and in the mode of using it. It is formed of very hard and heavy wood, of a peculiar

crescent-like shape, and with a sharp-cutting edge. It is thrown by one of the horns, by which means both a projectile and a rotatory motion are given to it. Thus far it has some resemblance to the bullet of a rifle, which receives a rotatory motion from the screw of the bore, and this guides it with certainty to the point at which the party aims, the force and elevation being adjusted to the distance by careful practice. But he who throws the boomerang does not aim directly at the man or animal that he intends to hit. He aims at a certain imaginary point, at a considerable elevation in the air, and so launches his weapon as that its progressive motion shall carry it to the point but no further. He also contrives, that is, he knows by experience, how to make it arrive there in a particular position—horizontal, or sloping the one way or the other, as he may desire; and, by this means, he gets it to turn, and take effect, either directly from the rear of the object, or obliquely from the right hand or the left. Thus it is exceedingly difficult to avoid the blow of the weapon, because, though it is seen on its flight, that flight is so singular, and ends so differently from the direction in which it is projected at the first, that to know how it is coming requires as much experience and observation as to know how to throw it so as that it shall take effect.

In both of these cases which we have detailed—and we might cite the whole practices of these rude people —there is no little display of mind—of the devising of means for the accomplishing of an end, and perfecting the use of them by experience and practice.

Those which we have noticed are indeed all contrived, learned, and practised for the purposes of destruction, and as readily against human beings as against the kangaroo or the emu; but this is in strict accordance with the history of men of all nations. In the early stages of that history, the whole of their ingenuity is engaged in the framing of instruments of destruction; their whole, or at all events their chief education, consists in learning to use those instruments with the most deadly effect; and daring and success in murder are the first foundations of glory and emulation among the human race. Nor does this apply to the solitary savage and the small horde only, for it seems that the nation, even the most humane nation in other respects to which allusion can be made, has a nonage of what may be called civic barbarity through which it must pass; and even in the brightest period of her scientific and social career, even Britain, whatever may have been the individual feelings of her children as men, could not, as a nation, refrain from imbruing her hands in the blood of almost every people on the face of the earth, and being the gratuitous butcher of more human beings in the course of one year, nay, in a single day, than the most savage horde upon earth are in the lapse of a whole century.

These things furnish evidence of mind in Man, even in what we are in the habit of calling the rudest and most early state of society; because the actions which he performs, even in that state, have all clear indications of plan and purpose, and experimental training or education in them. In those rude states,

where, in the judgment of reason, the animal may be said to lord it over the man, the distinction of the Man is quite as papable, though not quite so pleasant in the contemplation, as when science, art, and refinement have reached the highest degree of which we have any observation or record; and we may add that, although outbreaks of cruelty are not so frequent in what we call the refined ages, they are sometimes to the full as atrocious and revolting as among the veriest savages upon earth. Not only this; for were it not for the positive restraints under which the people of civilized countries are held, we very much suspect that they would as far exceed savages in mischief as they exceed them in the power of doing it. Of this we have such instances, in what are called lawless states of countries, — when order is suspended by the invasion of foreign armies, or by civil broils— more especially in the latter case,—as suffice to show the perfect identity of species between rude man and refined, though the point were not, as it is, establishable and established by physiological means.

In every action that can with propriety and accuracy be called human, whether that action be kindly or cruel, there is an evidence of mind, apart from the body, which cannot be mistaken by even the most loose and careless observer. The mere bodily functions do not come within the category of human actions, because they are, so to speak, performed whether we will or no. No man can, for example, suspend the pulsation of the heart or the arteries by any effort of mind, whatever power cultivation may

have given to that mind; for the more he tried to do so, the effect would only make the pulse beat the faster. In like manner, though the breathing is in so far under mental control,—and this is required from the use both of air and of the breathing apparatus in the voice, which articulated voice, expressive of meaning, belongs solely to Man as an intellectual being, and in no respect to any creature which is destitute of mind—for even among men, those born utterly fatuous are quite incapable of speech, and those labouring under the minor affliction of idiotcy, always articulate badly;—yet in like manner, in so far as breathing is merely conducive to the vital purpose of aerating the blood, the control which man has over it is limited, so that no man, were he ever so willing, could possibly commit suicide by holding his breath till he was strangled; but, in the matter of speech he can hold it, or use it, as he lists, just as he can do in all other matters which are of mental acquirement, though it is doubtful whether he can do even this in the case of those sounds which have no mental interpretation, but which express the merely pleasurable or painful feelings of the body; and in which, and which alone, the sounds uttered by human beings can be said to have a close analogy to those uttered by the mindless animals.

Therefore, in this matter of breathing and of voice, in the compound use of the organs of the element of respiration, we have an illustration and proof of the existence of mind as distinct in its nature and functions from body, and also of the grand characteristic of

each. In as far as the air in respiration serves the same purpose in Man which it does in other animals —and the purpose is the same in all, though the mode and the apparatus differ much with differences of habit, one class breathing the free air of heaven without any other labour in the process than the separation of the oxygen from the nitrogen with which it is mechanically mixed, and returning the resulting carbonic acid gas to the general volume of the atmosphere, and another class having first to separate the air from the water with which it is combined, and then to perform the same operation upon it as the former. Thus far the process is merely animal; and that Man breathes the free air, proves nothing more than that his organization fits him for being a land animal, and not an aquatic one. But in the other, the mental part of the operation, that which enables Man to express his thoughts in words and sentences, and to indicate the mental feelings under which he expresses them by tone and emphasis, has no existence whatever but in Man; for though the animals do express different animal affections by sounds, yet they cannot communicate to each other, even the simple fact of what is the matter with them.

But when we turn our attention to those actions in Man which are properly called human, that is, those actions which Man performs, at such times, and in such ways, according to his capacity, as he lists, we can at once discover that there is something more in them than the mere animal sensation, followed by the animal act, without any pause, or process of delibera-

tion or thought coming between them. No matter whether our attention is directed to the rudest savage, or the most cultivated and refined of civilized men. The action may be different in the object, the means, and the mode of its performance; but in the essential part of it, that which stamps the character of a human action upon it, it is the same in both, and in this very sameness there is an evidence of mind, a sort of intermediate subject between the actor and that which is acted on—a physical representative, as it were, of that mental process which intervenes between the original perception of the senses and the ultimate action, to which the mental deliberation and resolve impel the body, as a servant which must always work when called upon, up to the full extent of its ability.

Man, even in the rudest state in which we find him, always presses some auxiliary or other into his service, takes hold of a property of some kind of matter or other, in order to assist him in the performance of his labour; and the animals never do this, but go directly to the performance of their actions, by means of the instruments which nature has provided them with in their own bodies, and the instincts with which they have been furnished as sure guides to them in the use of these. It may be that the man is so rude, and has his mind so little awakened and excited by things around, that his knowledge of time is confined to his own experience, in which he cannot number years and seasons, or even days, and that his knowledge of space is confined to the little spot of earth which his feet have trodden, and to the canopy of heaven over it,

without the slightest effort, wish, or thought of any kind respecting what is beyond the visible boundaries of the one or the other. Still, no matter; mind will not be hidden, unless by the imperfection of that inscrutable, but necessarily most delicate part of the body, which holds communication with it in giving intelligence, or in receiving commands. If the body is properly organized in this mysterious part of its structure, no darkness of ignorance, and no depth of depravity, can entirely hide the mind. It will break out and show its superiority over the instincts of the wisest animals, even in this its most low and abject condition. It will stand up, as in defence of its mortal servant, to protect and defend the body in its necessity; and thus, when we have been taught to interpret it aright, the yell of the savage in the wild woods, is a demonstration of the truth of that doctrine of immortality which has been revealed to Man by the word of the living God.

The man in this lone state of society may be houseless and naked; his hand may be against every man, and every man's hand may be against him. The feeble or the young, and the decrepid with age may be left to perish or put to death; the war against another tribe may not be what we would call a human war—if humanity could be predicated with any war whatever; it may not be for territory, for property, for revenge, for glory, or for any of those objects that bring men into the battle-field in more advanced states of society;—it may be a war assimilated to that of the wild beast of the field upon those animals which form

its natural prey; it may be assimilated to this in its object, though it is very different in its origin—for Man, considered as animal, is not formed to hunt down and feed upon living creatures of any kind, otherwise he would have had the same natural armature,—the teeth and claws of the lion, the crushing folds of the boa, or the deadly fangs of the crotals; but still the object may be the same, and Man may go forth for the express purpose of eating the flesh and drinking the blood of his fellow-men. Yet even here there is an evidence of mind—mind in sad depravity, and mournful mis-application, we readily admit; but the cannibal prepares the deadly weapon with as much care, and practises the stratagems of his peculiar mode of warfare with as much science, such as it is, as the general who leads ten or hundreds of thousands to the altar of glory, in honoured and honourable war. In one respect, these are the first and the last efforts of mankind; and truly, in the judgment of sober reason, they approximate much more nearly to each other than one would at first thought suppose. Such are a few points of the evidence, which men in the most ignorant and savage state furnish on the grand doctrine of mind and immortality. They might be much farther extended, but the investigation is as painful as it is pertinent.

In the third place, and it is the last illustration we shall formally give,—the length of time, or the distance in space, which may intervene between the information upon which a human action is grounded, and the performing of the action itself, is a proof of the imma-

teriality, and consequently the immortality, of the intellectual principle of Man. This is the grand philosophical illustration, or argument, and if fairly and clearly put, we think it is irresistible proof against every species of scepticism, except that most stubborn of them all, in which the party is fully convinced of the truth, but will not admit that he is so.

We act, not only occasionally, but very often, upon observations which were made thousands of years ago, thousands of miles from the place of our habitation, by men differing much from us in language and in habits, and whose name and memorial as a nation have been all but blotted out. It is well ascertained that the more eminent of the early philosophers among the Greeks did not arrive at their knowledge, even of geometrical truths and astronomical principles, by their own observations and labour, within their native land. They travelled into the east and the south, and there are some reasons for believing that the science which they got even there, was not wholly of native growth in these localities. In some parts of the fragments of science that still remain among the Hindus, in spite of the ravages of the sword of conquest, which has so often gleamed destruction upon their native land, there are faint and shadowy traces of an elder-born science having existed, and been brought to considerable perfection in some part of Central Asia, which is haply now a desert, or fast losing the remnant of its fertility in that character,—and this in all probability at a time when there was probably not even one human savage in Europe, but when all those parts of it which

consist of the freshwater formation, and perhaps much more than these, was submerged to the depth of many fathoms. We know not of course what the observations and the reasonings were, by the help of which those men of the olden time arrived at that scientific knowledge of which the fragments appear remaining at the present day; but we do know that any one of these fragments, even though as many millions of years as there have been moments had elapsed since this discovery, is just as fit for our purposes, now, as if we ourselves had discovered it the very instant before turning it to use.

Now we will ask what there is in merely physical nature which can link events in the order of present cause and effect, though the times and places of their happening should be thousands of years and miles asunder. These are all trammelled to time and place, so that if the smallest pause ensues, or the one is ever so little without the range of the other, they are completely dissevered, and the one has no more influence on the other, than if they were millions of years or of miles apart.

Thus we need not trouble ourselves with long periods of time, great distance of place, or the fact of the observation of one man being available to excite and to regulate the actions of another; for we have the demonstration as fully and as clearly within ourselves, and wholly of our own experience, any day, and every day of our lives, if we would but attend to it. Those who have acquired the habit of regularly observing and understanding everything that presents

itself to their senses—and it must be understood that this is, in the essential part, a mental process, and not a mere exercise of the senses—those who have acquired this habit often find, when the necessity for it comes, that they are in possession of knowledge of which they were not aware until the present desire of applying such knowledge brought it back to the mind, or the memory, as it is called, in suggestion. Not only this; but, when such knowledge is of former experience, it always comes ready for use, much more so than if the application were to follow immediately upon the acquisition. The reason of this is, that this recalling of former experience by the mind is far more pure and mental, than knowledge which is the result of observation at the time. In cases of direct and immediate observation, whatever the subject may be, and the purpose to which it is to be instantly applied, there is always a mixture of bodily feeling and of emotion, which in so far occupy the attention of the mind, and disturb its process in the thought. If the body is in great pain or uneasiness of any kind, or even if it is under the strong influence of pleasurable sensations, or if the mind itself is under the influence of any strong emotion, we can scarcely think at all, and if we do, we seldom or ever think correctly. This is especially the case in every thing which deeply concerns our own personal interests, or any interests which are especially dear to us, either for weal or for woe. Taking the average of mankind, or rather the mass of them, with but few exceptions, and those men of peculiar character and habits, it is never safe

to act upon the first impulse in these cases of deep interest, because, from the strength of the emotion, the view of the case which first presents itself is far too bright in favourable cases, and far too dark in those of an opposite character. "Second thoughts are best," says the adage; and, being the result of observation and experience, this adage is not only as true to the fact as if it were the dictum of the most profound philosopher, but it belongs to a species of philosophy which has been put practically to the test again and again; and therefore it is, in truth, much more to be relied on, than if it were backed by all the authority of the schools.

This is not only a strong proof of the existence of the mind, as different in its nature from the body, for it is also a proof that the affections of the body, and the emotions of the mind, but more especially the former, may disturb the mind in its intellectual process of thinking, and thus render knowledge less perfect, action less correct, and the whole life and conduct of Man less valuable than they should be. Indeed, the constant solicitude which we are mentally in respecting the body, is a main cause of very much both of our ignorance and our error. No doubt, our bodily affections are the original inlets of the elements of all our knowledge; but if, after this, our whole or our chief attention be occupied about the body, that knowledge never gets beyond the threshold or the portico; and we have no wisdom in our thoughts or words, and no fixed principle of order and propriety in our conduct. But the main conclusion to be drawn from this view

of the point is of a moral nature, and therefore it can be worked out to greater advantage in another volume of the series,—that in which we purpose to consider Man in his moral relations.

Meantime, however, we may follow out the purely intellectual view of the matter a little farther. We have stated that it is the result of reasoning; and every one capable of judging of the states of his own mind and body, and how they reciprocally interfere with and affect each other, may verify the truth from his own repeated experience, that the current of thought never flows smoothly along the channels of wisdom, while there is disturbance in any part of the system at home, any more than it does in the din and dissipation of the world around us. Strong mental excitement—that which, in the common, but not very correct phraseology of society, "raises the spirits," if it raises them to any considerable degree—is actually more exhausting to the body than double the length of time spent in the severest mechanical drudgery which the human frame can bear. The delivery of one hour's extemporary speech, upon a subject into which the speaker enters with all his soul, as we say, actually wears out the speaker more than the wielding of a sledge hammer, for the live-long day, does the man who is accustomed to that kind of labour. Nor need we wonder that such should be the case; for if we admit, as we dare not refuse to admit, that the immortal must have the mastery of the mortal at all times, how must the body be under the rod of power when the majesty of the mind is up, and it is too mighty in its own strength

for heeding the intelligence brought in by any one sense. Every limb of it is agitated, every muscle is in alternate contraction and relaxation, every tendon starts, every vessel throbs; and the poor physical body, which has really nothing to do but to find voice and utterance for some mighty manifestation of mind, really labours more in one single hour than it would require to do in its own humble avocation in twelve months. Hence the more brilliant spirits of the human race are never the longest-lived, even though they require not to put their hand to the drudgery either of labour or of business. The mortal body is consumed by the immortal fire of the spirit; and there have been instances in which death—almost instant death—has been the catastrophe of some giant effort, and men have been left to mourn the premature departure of that which they felt themselves all unable to reproduce, or to approximate nearly in imitation.

So, also, every other emotion of the mind brings distress upon the body; and the distress is far more in proportion to the intensity and the frequency of the emotion than to the kind of it, as exalting, depressing, or anything else. Anxiety and grief eat the flesh off the bones, while in persons of even disposition there is a repose about the whole body. It does not follow from this that there is more either of bodily or of mental activity in the self-gnawn man of bone, than there is in him who has all the breadth and blandness of repose about him. It is not action, taken in the general sense, which wears men to the bones: it is the ever-gnawing worm in the temper—the mortal

type of that everlasting tormentor which such parties are in a fair way of securing to themselves, as their well-merited heritage for ever.

No matter what may be the cause of the canker, for the effect from all causes is much the same, only the grief is deepened if the shaft of this restless anxiety is envenomed with the poison of remorse, for cruelty and wrong committed in concealment from the world, but never from the wretched perpetrator himself. You shall see him in the streets, wearing a death's head on the top of a shapeless column of shrinking bones; his teeth are set fast together, as if he were attempting to bite at the worm which gnaws him; the corners of his mouth are drawn outward and downward, till the colour and apparent texture of the lips are those of the untanned leather of the tire of a South American carriage-wheel, after it has made the tour of the Pampas; his ears stick out thin and hard, like those of an ourang-outang, and seem as tense as drums, in order to hear and to shun the curse which some passer-by whom he has injured may utter, and which may be caught and avoided ere it is yet heard and responded to by the public; his eyes are like those of the hyæna, glancing fearfully from the den, when the voice of the lion is shaking the wilds, and the unclean beast of night dares no longer prowl for his carrion. But we amplify him not: you shall know him if you meet him. There is a Cain's mark upon him; and although no man ought to slay him, yet every man will do well to avoid all connexion with him. It boots not what may be the success that he has had in the world, the extent

of his possessions, or the name and place which these may have won for him among men. His grief lies too deep for the balm of the world; and in whatever abundance its wealth may flow in upon him, or with however little effort on his part, merit he can have none—the canker of his temper turns all into a curse; and even, as is not unfrequently the case with such miserable wretches, he seeks intoxicating liquors to hide him from himself—he takes them in his own company only; and thus he has not even the turbulent but heartless worth of the social *bon vivant*, but sinks, through the frenzy of extreme irritation, into the oblivious stupor of the hidden and hopeless drunkard. But this also assumes a moral "type," if we pursue it beyond a certain length, and therefore we must close it for the present.

Such, indeed, is the power of the mind over, at least, all the moveable parts of the body, that those who are observant may read any very confirmed character of Man in all or in any part of his figure. We know not whether it reaches the shape of the bones, as these are more stubborn in their texture, and less frequently renewed in their substance, than the soft parts of the body; but it may produce some alterations even in the forms of these, and it certainly has much effect upon the positions in which they are borne. There is thus much in physiognomy, which, be it remembered, means the tale told by the whole aspect of the body, or physical part of Man, and not the mere forms and expressions of the features of the face; and though it is not very likely, it is not absolutely im-

possible, that there may be something in phrenology, or craniology, which is the elder and better name for that fashionable but most hypothetical department of human disport. In both cases, however, it has been, and is, the practice,—we may say the unavoidable practice, to make the cause and effect change places; for assuredly, if the expression of the body is to be in any way an index to the mental propensities, the body has been fashioned and moulded by the mind, and not the mind by the body. If differences of mere bodily structure were to be in any way the causes of mental differences, surely those among them which are most conspicuous would take the lead, and a hunchback, or a club-foot, or, at all events, a half-paralyzed side of the body, would have far more effect upon the character and propensities of the mind, than a slight difference in the contour of the nose, or in the shape of some small portion of the cranium. Now, instead of this being the fact, some of the best and ablest men whose names are in the record of history laboured under those natural defects of their bodily form, without any apparent lessening of the value of their intellectual or their moral characters. But such matters, though a little dangerous in the hands of the ignorant, do not come within the scope of legitimate philosophy, nor are they of much consequence one way or another to those who are well-grounded in the wholesome and solid principles of that.

But notwithstanding the errors, or rather perhaps we should say the absurdities,—for nonsense is not error, it is simply the absence of truth;—notwith-

standing then these absurdities, there is no question that if any one mental habit is strong, constant, and fully confirmed, it will tell in the whole air and deportment of his body. Thus the man who is brave in the consciousness of an upright and manly life, shows himself, not only by the *vultus in hostem*, but by every lineament of his body, and every attitude and gesture which it assumes. It does this upon the very same principle that an eloquent speaker is eloquent in every limb, and to his finger ends, as well as in voice and in features; and that a skilful actor looks the character in its perfection before speaking a single word.

But it is not the esteemed, the admired, and the praiseworthy characters of men as mental beings, which are thus shadowed forth by their personal appearances, and it is well for society that it is not so. The villain is a villain in his gait, in the swing of his arm, and the turn of his shoulder, as well as in his sinister look, his Judas' smile—which no dissimulation can turn into anything but a grin—and his glozing words, of which he makes use for the express purpose of deceiving. In like manner, any one who chooses to study the gait and bearing, with a full knowledge of any habitually-predominating character, will find such an agreement between them as will enable them to make the appearance a very good general index to the character in other cases. We do not say that it will reach the minutiæ, for there are many shades of most of our named denominations of characters; but still, it will be a very tolerable

"guessing-guide" in seeking a knowledge of the world—a line on which to string our observations, if nothing better.

Thus, in whatever light we view the matter, in what condition of Man, or of society, or in what disposition soever of the individual, or whether we reason upon the subject, the whole, though perhaps the bearing may not be thought of without the hint given by revelation, tends to confirm the doctrine of mind and immortality as they are there set forth. Nor is there a single action of Man, in which we cannot trace an intermediate stage between sensation and action; we feel this in our own individual case, and if we do not make this pause, and exercise this deliberation, we pay the penalty by falling into error, and suffering for it. Common expression is lenient, perhaps too lenient, in this case; for mankind are in the habit of speaking of "thoughtlessness" as if it were a harmless misfortune, and not a crime. But if we look to the consequences, we fail not to perceive that it is a crime—a crime against ourselves, independently altogether of its consequences to others; and that, if we persist in the use of it, it gets confirmed into a habit, which greatly impairs our usefulness, both to ourselves and to every one with whom we are connected. We have already pointed out the miserable effects of that cankering care which entirely destroys the peace of the mind; and the chief difference between it and carelessness, consists in the former being a perversion of God's best bounty, and the latter a neglect of the same. Yet again, however, this trenches on the moral

conduct and condition of Man, and therefore it does not properly form part of our present subject, though it points out very clearly to what that subject leads. Indeed, after we have established and illustrated the immaterial and immortal nature of Man, and shown, in the course of doing so, that mind is a special gift to each individual for himself, and for none other, we have only one single step to take, in order to arrive at the foundation of morality,—namely, that Man is an accountable being.

CHAPTER V.

THE PHENOMENA OR FUNCTIONS OF MIND.

After the existence and the immortality of mind, that is, of Intellectual Man, are fully understood, and firmly believed, there remain three principal branches of the subject to be considered, in order to complete the epitome of Man regarded in this point of view. The first of these is the Functions of Mind, or rather the Phenomena of Mind; because, as mind is not in any way palpable to sense, as the things which make up the material creation are, and as, for this reason, no man can receive, through the medium of the senses —the original inlets of knowledge—any direct communication either respecting the minds of others or his own mind, there can be nothing of mind excepting its phenomena, as these are told in the bodily conduct, which can be the subjects of philosophical investigation. In supplement to these we can no doubt frame gratuitous and visionary hypotheses, which hypotheses we can build to any height, and make as ridiculous as egregious assumptions are in any branch of science; but we cannot give them such foundations as can enable them to bear the test of even a very restrained and unsearching analysis.

The leading phenomena of mind being understood, the second branch of the general subject is that which relates to the education of the mind,—the exciting of it not so much to the actual acquiring of knowledge, which is always most valuable when acquired by the individual himself, as to the producing of a disposition and aptitude for the receiving of knowledge, and not merely for the receiving it, but for judging whether it is worth receiving or not, from what source or in what manner soever it may present itself. This is a portion of the subject attended with no inconsiderable difficulty, inasmuch as different men take very different views of it; but still it is a portion of such vital importance to the intelligence and usefulness of Man, and consequently to his well-being, that we shall venture to offer a few plain remarks, in perfect indifference to the conflicting opinions which exist, though without the slightest hostile tendency towards those that appeared to us the most absurd and injudicious of those opinions, some of which are held by parties who have made, or are making, no small noise —though it is sound and not bullet—upon this same subject of education.

The third grand division of this branch of the subject is that which relates to the manner in which the mind, presumed to be previously educated, addresses itself to the task of the acquisition and management of further knowledge, of its own self-directed efforts, and without the assistance of any teacher or guide. In all cases this is an important matter; but it is a comparatively easy one to those whom we are in the

habit of characterizing as the self-educated. They have no transition to make, as what they are required to do is simply a continuation of what they are already in the habit of doing; and therefore we should say that, if their self-education is of the right kind, which of course depends very much upon the lines of association into which they have fallen, and the trains of subjects which have engaged their thoughts, are among the best fitted for meeting the world, and making their way in it with honour and success, in what place soever it may present itself. Those who have had their mental training or education in leading-strings, as it were, who have been wheedled or whipt on by hireling tutors, and not allowed the free scope and exercise of their own minds, stand of course in a very different predicament. They have a transition to make,—a bark to conduct them in the voyage of life, of the trim and management of which they know nothing; and therefore they are much more at the mercy of the winds of chance, or of the turnings-up of the events of unknown causes, than those who have been left to guide their own little wherry from the cradle. Hence it is, that we not unfrequently find the darling and dux of the school, or the senior wrangler of the college, to turn out a very dunderhead in all that makes Man happy in himself, or useful and honourable in society. Upon such subjects, however, we shall be very tender; for we are not set as censors upon mankind, but as simple spectators of them; and therefore it behoves us to take them just as they are, and deal with them as a subject of that calm observing

and contemplation by which not a single individual is found fault with, or one curl raised on the surface of a single passion—to say nothing of the dregs which are accumulated below.

The three divisions now enumerated will with propriety form the subjects of the remaining chapters, and we shall dedicate the rest of this chapter to the consideration of the first of them, namely, the Phenomena of Mind, or, as it is sometimes termed, Mental Physiology. This, however, is a distinct science, and a very important science in itself, and therefore all that we can devote to it in the incidental way in which we must treat it, can be only a few desultory hints.

We must enter upon it with a precaution, namely, that we know and can know nothing of the nature of mind as a substance or essence. That which we call our clear or demonstrable knowledge of existence, and of existing substances, refers to matter, and to matter alone, and even there it is shadowy and imperfect; because, what we are in the habit of calling kinds of matter, are only particular modifications of the properties of that matter, of the essence of which, apart from those properties, and the phenomena which appear to originate in them, and be dependent upon them, we in reality know nothing. Therefore, if we come to the question of abstract natures, our knowledge of matter and of mind falls nearly within the same category,—both being reduced to the mere phenomena, while we are in perfect ignorance about the essence. There is this difference, however,—that,

in the case of matter, we have the evidence of the senses directly to assist the mental consideration, and we can appeal to this as a test in cases of difficulty and doubt; whereas, in the case of mind, we have no such assistance, and no such appeal, when we fear or feel that we are in error. Probably it is this which renders the study of mind so unpalatable, even to the majority of men who are learned enough in the knowledge of matter; and we must confess that it is a species of prejudice not easily convertible into a liking.

As we have, or can have, no positive knowledge of the human mind, or intellectual part of Man, in its essence, we can give no positive definition of it; but, if we attempt to define and describe it at all, we must do this wholly by negatives,—we must say what it is not, for we are unable to say, directly, what it is, though the proofs of its existence are equally plain and palpable to our understanding—to the mind itself—as the most substantial and familiar body in the material or physical universe is to the senses of the body. Indeed, it is far more so; for without the mind, we have no reason to believe, and every reason not to believe, that any one subject in the material world would be known to us—even the simple fact of the existence of the body itself. Indeed, it is doubtful whether, without the aid of the mind, we could know the existence of any one thing—even that of our own bodies as pieces of matter. Mind and all, we have no direct knowledge of the internal parts, structure, and functions of our bodies; and even when we feel in

them the most excruciating pain, it is very probable that this feeling is wholly mental; and it is certain that, with all the aid of the mind, we are not able to fix with precision the seat of one pain that grieves the body. Even if it is a toothache, a pain with which but few sympathise, we cannot always bring it home to the diseased tooth, in which we have every reason to suppose that the cause is situated; for we find it shooting, not only through the whole head, but through the whole body, and absolutely tingling in the extremities of the fingers and the toes.

Thus, in Man, we must refer all knowledge, even of the feelings, state, and condition of the body, to the mind, and regard that as the only part of the compound nature of Man which has the capacity of knowing. But Man, being without the instincts—the implanted, and therefore unerring instincts of the other animals, which are, in them, certain guides from the original sensation to the ultimate action consequent upon that sensation, is thrown wholly upon his mental knowledge — the only knowledge that he can possess. Therefore to him a proper understanding of the functions, or, as we may with more propriety term them, the phenomena of mind, is a matter of the very first importance—of far more importance than any thing else that can be named.

At what period the mind is created, or when, or how, it is associated with the body, are mysteries which we can never hope to solve, and therefore we need not trouble ourselves about them. We have already endeavoured to show that, from the difference

of their nature, and the different periods of their duration, the mind cannot be an emanation of the body, neither can the body be a production of the mind. Each of the two must have its own origin, and its own means and mode of living originated; but still, while the body lasts, they are inseparable, and the one can be of no earthly use, in the present world, without the other, whatever may be the state of the immortal mind after it is severed from its connexion with the mortal body.

The immateriality and consequent immortality of the mind, are conclusive evidence that it has not one quality in common with the body, or indeed any thing connected with it which we, in the way that we speak and understand of matter and its qualities, can at all comprehend. The mind has no gravitation,—the only property or phenomenon which is common to all matter, which remains constant amid all the changes to which matter is subject, by any means, mechanical or chemical, natural or artificial. It has no extension, no form, no natural consistency, colour, odour, or any one quality or circumstance which we can predicate of matter, or of any thing material. It can feel no physical pain, and enjoy no physical pleasure, neither can it be in the least affected by any of those agents or casualties which affect the condition and the stability of material things. Water cannot drown it, fire cannot change it; and although the whole frame of material or physical nature were to go to wreck around it, it would suffer no change, nor feel the slightest inconvenience. Even when it is, in its mysterious con-

nexion with the body, receiving all the intelligence which the senses bring in, and governing every action which results from, or is founded upon, this intelligence, we cannot say that it occupies any locality or place, either out of the body or in the body, neither can we, when the functions of the body are ended by death, and the matter of which it is then composed goes to the general store which contains the substantial element of physical things, tell where the mind goes, any more than we can tell whence it comes at the first, or how, where, or in what manner it inhabits, during the period of time when the body is fit for the very curious but incomprehensible connexion that subsists between the two parts of the compound creature Man, which are so dissimilar in themselves, and yet which, acting in concert, form so harmonious and efficient a being.

That this is a beautiful matter—a matter far exceeding all the combinations of elements which we meet with in physical nature, wonderfully beauteous as some, indeed all of these, are,—we have no reason to doubt, nay, we may be, and must be, well assured. All of these are unions of elements which have something in common; for however dissimilar they may be in their peculiar natures and properties, they all agree in their general character of being physical or material, and in the evidence or test of that character, that of having gravitation or weight, proportional to their quantities of matter, without the slightest regard to the differences of its quality. This is one common quality, or phenomenon, or tendency, or whatever

else it may be called, in which all the component parts of every physical body agree with each other, however they may differ in other respects, or however the compound which results from their union may differ from each and all of the parts which enter into its composition. The physical compound may be mechanical, without any change of the parts compounded, or it may be chemical, with a change of them all; it may be performed in silence, without any apparent violence or effort, as when the vapour of water steals upward and blends itself with the general mass of the atmosphere; or it may be attended with the most intense action of light and heat, as when oxygen and hydrogen gases are chemically combined, and form liquid water; but whatever it may be, and with whatever action or display of action it may be accompanied, there is still one point of resemblance among the elements, by means of which we can at least in so far understand them.

But, when we come to think of the connexion between mind and body, between the physical and the intellectual parts of the compound being called Man, there is not one single point of similarity, even one phenomenon in common, upon which our contemplation can rest. The one is made up of what we may call mechanical organs, and these again of chemical parts, which occupy space, and have all the properties of ordinary matter, only that matter is during the life of the body under the controul of the principle of animal life, which principle, though it is a mortal one—and we must on that account refer it to the

physical creation—is not a substance, and has none of the properties or attributes of substantial matter. Such is the one part of the singular compound—Man. It comes into the world in the same manner as many of the purely animated beings which have no mind in their composition come; it grows and is nourished in the same manner, and by much the same means, as they are; and, as is the case with them, so after an appointed number of years have passed over it, its self-sustaining power against the ordinary laws of matter become worn out; and thus it yields to the final decay of death in the same manner as the other animals, some of which are organized for a longer endurance than it is, and some for a shorter.

The other, more mysterious, and far more interesting part of Man, is peculiar to him among all the inhabitants of the physical world—of all the productions of physical law or action. It has not one point of resemblance to the body by means of which any kind of intelligible connexion can be instituted between the two. It comes we know not whence, and when the lifeless and no longer available body becomes fit only for food to the worms, it goes we know not where. Until it is in connexion with the body, and the bodily senses are so far expanded or matured as that they can act, we have no reason to believe that it has the means of acquiring any knowledge, even of the simple fact of its own existence; and when the sensation of the body ceases, by the hand and power of the angel of death, we have no reason or analogy to lead us to suppose that the intellectual part can know or learn

any more of the physical world, or of what shall go on there. But still, with the exception of a few vital functions, in which Man differs nothing in kind, and not very much in degree, from many of the mindless or merely physical animals, this mysterious part of the compound being, of whose essence we can acquire no knowledge, either by the observation of our fellows, or by the study of ourselves, bears by far the most important part, and is itself, and raises even the mortal body along with it, high above every other creature upon earth, both in knowing and in doing.

The union of two parts so perfectly dissimilar is the especial wonder of creation—a matter which we must always admire, but which we never can by possibility understand; and yet, by the mutual and reciprocal assistance which the one of these dissimilar parts affords to the other, a being is produced, which is far superior to what any of them could be singly, even if we could suppose it to exist in greater perfection than it does in the compound being Man. From all that we can gather from the phenomena, and these are the only data that we have, the mind could have no knowledge of the natural creation, and probably not of itself or its Maker, if it were not for the body; and, on the other hand, the body without the mind, caterer of knowledge for the compound being as it is, could not turn that which it collects to the slightest account, even for its own merely animal preservation.

Then, in order to adapt it for the more perfect exercise and development of the intellectual part, the

physical body of Man is differently organized, and differently endowed, from that of any of the other living creatures upon earth. They are all what may be termed complete organizations, although each and all of them are fitted for some one single purpose, which has reference to the physical world only. In one or other of these species, they are adapted to every zone and region on the face of the earth, where there is sufficient action of the all-enlivening sun for enabling them to maintain their existence; and this adaptation is pushed to the extremest limits, so that the earth, the water, and the air are redolent of life—the surplus production of each life being appropriated, reasonably or habitually, to the support of some other life, generally of a different species. But, notwithstanding their numbers, and the perfection of their adaptations, they are all trammeled to some locality, and fitted for some peculiar mode of life. For these they are simply furnished by nature with every organ and every instinct for which they can ever have any occasion; and thus they do not require either to know or to learn. The new generation of them perform, of themselves, and without the slightest instruction, all the operations which their place in nature requires of them, just as well as the old; and though they all perform actions, and many of them very curious actions, all with far more unerring certainty than Man does, we have no reason to suppose that any one of them follows any plan for the present, upon any experience of the past, or has any *knowledge* of its own existence or of any thing else. They, with all

their curious organizations and habits, are merely part and parcel of the physical world; and as the physical condition of the globe has been changed, again and again, in the lapse of many revolving ages, of which we cannot tell the number, the organization and characters of these living creatures have been changed, so that they have been always the very best adapted to the state of things during the period of their having existence. The fossil remains which human industry and research have found in the different strata of the globe, which, from their position with regard to each other, and the effect of violent and long-continued action, which are visible upon the whole or the greater number of them, must have followed each other at long periods of time—longer perhaps than any which we can name in the annals of Man,—furnish ample evidence of this, and lead us irresistibly to the conclusion that the earth had to undergo many changes before it became fit for being the appropriate habitation of the human race.

As no remains of Man have been found in the fossil state, except in situations where the character of the strata shows that an incrustation of stony matter could have been formed upon them in not a great number of years, we have no reason to believe that human beings were in any way affected by those catastrophes of which the strata of the earth furnish such obvious evidence, and of the actual occurrence of which no rational man, who is even imperfectly in possession of the facts, can doubt; and therefore we can say with confidence, that there has been a pre-

paring of the earth for Man, to a greater extent, and in a different way, than for any other of its living inhabitants.

It must be admitted that these considerations throw no light upon mind or its phenomena,—the subjects which it was our purpose to consider in this chapter; but, when calmly considered, they are not irrelevant to this purpose; for whatever we may feel upon the subject of our own mind, after we have succeeded in convincing that mind of the fact of its own existence, we can have no observation of the mind of others; and thus all we can know of that must be by inference from what they say and what they do.

To some, the necessity of convincing the mind of *its own existence*, may seem strange;—for, as the mind is the only part of our compound nature which can either acquire or retain knowledge, one who has not reflected upon the matter would at once say that the very first step which the mind of every human being makes in knowledge, must be the knowledge of itself.

Now, that the mind of any man, of every man, even of the absolutely fatuous, has the *capacity* of receiving this knowledge, we are ready to admit; and, indeed, we are aware of no knowledge for which any ordinary human mind has not the capacity, if the evidence is brought before it in the proper manner. The capacity of the mind is as great as the range of its thoughts, and to that we can assign no limits whatsoever. But the mind has no self-knowledge, and no means of acquiring knowledge except through the medium of the body. The body of the utterly fatuous can convey

no information; and even the most perfectly formed and best disciplined body can convey to the mind no information or original evidence of the mind's existence, as that is not palpable to any or to all of the senses, which are the only instruments for acquiring the elements of knowledge that the body possesses, and the only means by which the mind can acquire knowledge in the first instance, whatever use it may make of this knowledge afterwards.

Thus the existence of the mind, instead of being an original and simple fact which every body knows, without any thought or care about the matter, is really the most difficult part of the whole. Hence, as we have hinted again and again,—but it cannot be too often repeated, the great majority of mankind —the very great majority both of the ignorant and of the learned in other matters, remain through life in utter ignorance of this fact, though many of them repeat, and not a few preach, words about it, and assent to those words by simple credulity. A little information, or rather thought,—for it is thought that is wanted, makes men sceptical upon the subject; for they see enough to enable them to come to the conclusion that the simple credulity of the multitude has no rational foundation whatever, and they have not advanced to that position of the study in which the true foundation is laid. It is this which makes the study of the mind a very hard study to begin with; but, in the end, it brings us an ample reward in mental power and mental pleasure—the former of which is always weak in parties who know not of mind's ex-

istence, and the latter is utterly wanting. Hence, whatever they may say to the contrary, the whole tenor of their lives is altogether for the present world, and they are meanly selfish or grossly sensual, just as circumstances and associations may turn out; for it is an axiomatic truth, that they who have no minds of their own—and having mind means, of course, having a knowledge of its existence, if nothing more—must be just what this world makes them.

Until the conviction of mind's existence is thoroughly established, there is no use of entering into any disquisition about the functions which mind performs in the economy of life, or the phenomena which it displays in the performance of those functions: for without this, the most learned disquisition, that is, the disquisition concerning the most numerous and the least comprehensible words, would be a structure without a foundation, a mere castle in the air, an idle waste of that mind of which it professed to explain the philosophy.

It deserves to be mentioned, that real knowledge—knowledge of which the use shall be known, and which shall always be ready for use, cannot be fully acquired by mere teaching, or verbal explanation, however laboured that explanation may be. The senses, to which alone the speech, the writing, the example, or whatever else may be the means, cannot think, and without thought there can be no knowledge. This is, in so far, anticipating what will require to be stated at greater length in a future chapter, but the subject of mind is so very subtle, that we require some little

knowledge of all the elements before we can enter upon it with even a chance of success. If the explanations which we have given in the preceding chapters shall draw the reader's attention to the subject of mind, there is every reason to hope and to believe that he will very soon convince himself of the truth of its existence and its immortality, with a firmness which nothing can shake; but still our words—or any words—cannot of themselves do this; for the convincing of the mind upon this subject—indeed upon every subject, is the work of the mind itself; and there is not a being in the whole creation that can be thoroughly convinced of the existence of one single mind, except that mind itself and Him who created it. Still, expatiation is necessary to awaken the mind, and put it in the way of this conviction; and in order to make our brief expatiation the more generally applicable, we have made that as simple and as common-place as possible: perhaps the best key-note to be borne in mind, as a reminiscence of the whole, is the fact that the savage, in the rudest state, always contrives some sort of tool or weapon to assist him in doing what he desires, while the wisest animal, notwithstanding a little romancing on the part of fabulous naturalists, who in their zeal for the glory of their subject—or themselves, magnify that subject above the truth, and so make nonsense of it, never makes use of anything that can be regarded as an artificial weapon, tool, or instrument, chosen for a purpose.

This naturally brings us back to the point at which it is most advisable to begin, in taking a short glance

of the part which the mind takes in human actions, and the phenomena it displays in so doing. When, however, we speak of either of these, we do not speak directly of that which in itself can be known and judged of,—as the functions and phenomena of the mind are not the mind itself, neither do they tell mentally except to that mind, and therefore the only way that we can judge of them is that in which we judge of all causes even in the physical world, namely, in the effects which they produce, and the way and manner in which we can perceive these to be produced.

In this view of the case, and we believe it is the only one which can steer us clear through between the sheer credulity of the dotard, and the erroneous conclusion of the sceptic, the mind in Man introduces into the chain of cause and effect, a link which is not found in any single instance in physical nature. There the sequence is immediate, both in succession and in time; and it is just as absurd to suppose that this sequence can be *broken*, by an interpolated time of no action, as it would be to suppose that the force resulting from the exploding of a certain quantity of gunpowder, could begin to give motion to a cannon ball, an hour, or even a minute after the explosion had taken place. It is true that if, in physical action, there is a certain quantity of matter to be put in motion from a state of rest, brought to rest from a state of motion, or otherwise changed, there is an apparent pause, as, for instance, when a piece of ordnance hangs fire. But this pause, which is an exceedingly useful one in the economy of nature,

merely shows that the agent has some resistance to overcome before it can have the action all its own way; and there are many instances in which this resistance is found too powerful for the agent, and the effect is not produced at all: as, for instance, a moderate charge of powder will drive a cannon shot through a deal board or a thin wall; but no charge that we are aware of will drive it through a mountain.

This physical pause occurs in every case in which the mind, as the immediate cause, puts any part of the body in motion as the effect of that cause. As, for instance, if the effect is even so small as the pointing of a finger or the twinkling of an eye, some time elapses before the new position of the organ is brought about; though, in the case of the eye especially, the pause is so brief, from the beautiful mechanism of the eye, that "the twinkling of an eye" is made use of as a figurative term for the shortest expressible portion of time. This pause is physical, however, and owing to the body and not to the mind; for, though the mind can make its own pause of any length, according to circumstances, there is no pause whatever in its action,—no resistance to be overcome if it is once in full possession of its object. But still, if that knowledge has been acquired long ago, not been reverted to since, and if much thought, especially thought of a different kind, or much indolence or want of thinking, or much sacrificing of the mind to the appetites of the body has intervened, the desired knowledge may not come immediately when desired, or it may not come at all. But in no case is it utterly

lost, and if, when it was first obtained, or when it occurred, it was blended with strong emotion, we frequently cannot get rid of it, and the agonizing thought will dog us, amid all our changes of subject, and all our worldly indulgences, unless we drug the body to stupor with opiates, and thus for the time sever the connexion between it and the mind. This, however, though certainly a very important mental phenomenon, belongs to the training and use of the mind, rather than to the mere elementary knowledge of it; and therefore we shall delay it in the meantime, and proceed directly to a simple statement of the leading functions and phenomena. As, in every case of observation, and acting upon that observation, the mind holds an intermediate part between the two bodily functions of perceiving and doing, the mind has, even in the simplest case that we can imagine, a double duty to perform; and there are very few cases in which there are not many inward acts or states of the mind between the primary observation and the ultimate action. Were it not for these intermediate actions and states, mind would be a comparatively feeble and useless endowment, and Man would be a creature governed by impulses—very little superior to the mindless animals. Indeed, in as far as his safety, usefulness, and happiness are concerned, he would be in a far worse condition than even the humblest of them. In them the bodily action follows immediately consequent upon the bodily sensation, in unbroken sequence, according to the general law of physical cause and effect. This is the reason why the instincts

of animals are upon the whole so much more unerring than the judgments of men; for, what we call the instincts of animals are nothing but instances of this unbroken chain of physical cause and effect, differently modified according to the different animals and the different offices that are assigned them in the economy of nature.

With Man it is very different. He cannot act—beyond those vital functions of the body, which cannot be considered as actions—without his mind coming in and severing the physical connexion, and therefore there is not in him, as there is in the mindless animals, any physical, and therefore necessary and invariable, connexion between the physical perception and the physical action of the body. No matter whether the pause,—the mental interruption, be of long or of short duration; it is the simple fact of mind invariably breaking the physical connexion, and not the extent to which the parts are separated, which takes human action out of the category of physical matters, and makes it depend on laws totally different and altogether its own. It is in this mental pause, that all the wisdom or the folly, the good or the evil, is to be found; for there is no more moral quality in the merely physical functions of the human body, than there is in the functions of an animal, in the rotation of the earth, or in any other action or phenomenon of physical nature.

Therefore it is to this mental pause that all education, all law, all religion, and all instructives or correctives, by what names soever they may be called,

and whether they originate in one's self, or are imposed by any authority from without, must be addressed, otherwise they are of no value or avail whatsoever.

What we have now stated respecting the actions of Man and in animals, and of the mental part of the process in Man being the only one to which good or evil, in any sense of either word, can be attributed, is strictly and literally true: and it is equally true that the actions of animals are certain and necessary. But while we make this distinction, we must guard against what may be, and sometimes has been, a source of error on the subject of the animals. In denying to them any degree of mental deliberation or reasoning, how low soever it might be reckoned in the human scale, which they certainly do not possess, we must beware not to deny to them what they as certainly do possess. Animals have no mental or intellectual principle in their nature; but still they are not machines which can be put in motion or action by applied forces only. They are sentient and self-acting creatures; and although their actions are consequent, and necessarily consequent, upon sensation, those actions are produced by their own impulses and powers. They are not necessitated to act in the same way, in consequence of the same perception of the sense, unless that sensation takes place under the same circumstances; and from the almost endless variety of circumstances in which the same sensation may present itself to the same animal, we must necessarily look for corresponding variations in its action. But this is

only an incidental hint, interpolated to shut the door against, not a certain but a possible mistake.

The proper function of the mind in Man is threefold, or consists of three parts, in each of which the mind itself is differently affected. Those three parts are absolutely necessary in the whole process of a deliberate action founded on the perception of the senses; but there are instances in which any one, or even any two of them, may be omitted. It is necessary, however, that we should consider the whole in their regular order.

A particular case may perhaps be more satisfactory here than a merely abstract statement, and so we shall take a very simple one:—"I see a beautiful moss-rose on the tree immediately before the window of my study, and it is the first that I have seen this season." This is the perceptive, or first part of the process. Then for the second:—"My first impulse is to pull it, and lay it on my desk while I write, in order that I may at once see its beauty and smell its fragrance." Some time elapses, however, before I can get to the tree, and put this impulsive purpose in execution. I have to get down stairs, and out to the lawn where the rose-tree is; and while I am doing this, there rises a suggestion in my mind,—the memory of the pleasure I have formerly felt in contemplating the beauty of moss-roses, enjoying nature after their own fashion upon their own stems. This shakes the force of my impulse, and indeed overcomes it altogether. My mental conclusion is, "I will not, for the sake of a very brief gratification of my senses, pull that pretty

rose, which has not yet half opened its petals, so that it will remain for a week, and I can enjoy it during that time whenever I have a mind." This concludes the purely mental part of the process; and the third, or active part, takes a different turn from what it promised to do at the first:—"I return to my study, resume my labours, and feel myself happy in telling the story of the rose, and not having pulled it."

This is, as we premised, an exceedingly simple instance, but yet it contains the whole of the process: sensation, and a desire immediately consequent upon sensation; a suggestion, or revival in the mind, of former knowledge; a deliberation, or comparison of the relation of two thoughts; and a decision, with the carrying of that decision into effect.

The first of these may be considered as an external affection, and this affection may or may not be accompanied by desire; for one may notice roses fifty times, and pass them by without a single thought of pulling them or not. This is called an external affection of the mind, because it originates, not in the mind itself, but from the influence of an external object upon the sense of the body. If the affection had been one of the body itself—as, for instance, a twinge of pain felt in any part—it would still have been external as regards the mind, though not as regards the compound Man.

The second or middle part of the process is compound, and consists of two distinct states of the mind, though they are both purely mental. First, there is a suggestion which, I can hardly tell why, arises out of

the memory of the past, and dares me to put my desire in execution. This is what is sometimes termed simple suggestion: it is the bringing of a witness into court from the mind itself, to confront that witness which the senses have sent in from without. Then comes the most important part of the whole business,—the weighing of the evidence upon which the future stage or stages of the matter are to be regulated. This is the means whereby we arrive at the decision or judgment; and according as that is wise or foolish, just or unjust, such will be the complexion and the consequences of all that comes after. The whole of this middle part of the process, which may be made up of a great number of smaller parts, is an internal affection of the mind, or, as it is sometimes called, a process of reasoning.

This process of reasoning may originate entirely from external affections, entirely from internal suggestions, or it may be a union of the two, as in the instance which we have given. The object of it may be either the knowledge—that is, the discovery of truth; or it may be action—that is, the possibility or propriety of action; and in either case our interests all conspire in demanding that it should be done well.

The decision, or resolution, or conclusion to which we come, is a part of the reasoning process, and the only part which gives that process its value, farther than that the other parts are a mental exercise, and all mental exercises are useful.

When the decision is that something shall be done, we come to the last part of the whole process, which

is again a desire, and a desire which, if strong enough, leads directly to the external action which may have been resolved upon in the decision. In its nature—that is, its physiological nature—a desire which is the result of the most careful and well-conducted deliberation, does not differ greatly from one which is instant upon sensation. In its effects, however, it is very different; for though we often err, notwithstanding all our reasoning and deliberation, we are almost sure to err if we act upon the compulsive desire of the moment. Desires are, as it were, the "agitators" of the mind,—the particular states of it by means of which the man is roused to action; and they are on this account called emotions, which is a term nearly synonymous with "outgoings."

These emotions, being the most energetic states of the mind, are the ones which it is most difficult to keep under proper regulation; and therefore, in studying the conduct of the mind, so as to be able at all times to turn it to the best account, we must pay particular attention to them. The details will come after; but we may now mention that the best short caution respecting the emotions is, "Beware of impulses." This, however, may—as indeed may every other class of mental states—be restrained within less than the due limits; and thus as much injury may be done to the character in the one way as is done by over-hastiness in the other. Indeed, if it were not for the danger that he runs of doing injury to himself and others, the man of impulses is the more valuable man of the two, because he is the more energetic. He is,

however, an unsafe character; and there is an element wanting which, supplied, would put him right, and make him become one of the most valuable of men—a man of great undertakings and enterprises. This is quick and accurate conception, and prompt decision in the middle part of the process; and such as have brought up their mental discipline to a high degree of expedition and accuracy in this matter, are men of decision of character,—men fitted for carrying the high places of society by storm.

The external affections of the mind, arising from the immediate use of our own organs of sense, in observing the objects of nature around us, and all their phenomena, together with what we are informed of by other men, and by books, are the only means by which we can obtain the first elements of knowledge; and if we neglect these, or attend to them only as the impelling stimuli to immediate action, we cannot choose but remain in the ignorance to which we thus trammel and confine ourselves. Such parties have no alternative in the world, but to remain for life as "hewers of wood and drawers of water" to the better informed portion of mankind. What is worse for themselves, and also for the society of which they happen to be members, they have no capacity for regulating their minds, and no clear perceptions of right and wrong, as regards either nature or society. They have not perception enough to see evil, until they are actually overtaken by it; and they have no strength to resist temptation. Thus their lives are passed in misery to themselves; and when they die,

their memories perish,—no, not "perish," for they never have any. Of the means of escape from this degraded state, which are now in the power of every one, and much easier in the performance than many are aware of, we shall have occasion to speak afterwards, but we notice the subject here as the foundation, without which no structure of mental greatness, or even of human usefulness, can be erected. It is not the number of subjects which pass under the review of the senses which give value to this part of the mental process; it is the attention which is paid to them, and the care and skill with which that attention is directed. The man who pauses, and stands in wide-mouthed wonder, with "brute unconscious gaze," at every thing he meets, is never in the way of getting much useful information. The idler stares, the man of observation never does; he takes his glances quietly, with pauses of reflection between, which pauses are essential to the remembrance of all that is seen.

This part of the process, that which turns simple observation into useful knowledge, or at all events into elements out of which such knowledge may be formed, is worthy of a little further consideration,—inasmuch as it is the means whereby facts which are not to be used immediately when they are observed, can be stored up and brought forward for use when they are wanted. This is most valuable as a supply of materials, which are our own, and not liable to be taken from us by any contingency that may happen; which is always a danger in the case of knowledge

which we may want, and may not be able to obtain it when we do want it. If an observant man takes a ramble only for a single day, and takes it, not for the purpose of acquiring information of any kind, but merely as a relaxation from labour, from business, or from study, a thousand things will present themselves to his notice, for which he neither has, nor fancies that he shall have, any use, at the time when he notices them; and yet he finds the knowledge of them to return in suggestion, at the very time when he wants them, even although they have remained in perfect oblivion during the whole of the intervening period.

The question is, how is this to be done, and done in such a manner as not to interfere with that present current of thought and action, which is the most important of every man. For, if a man shall devote his attention to subjects which do not immediately bear upon his present occupation, that occupation never can be conducted as it ought to be. There are, indeed, some minds of great acquirement and high culture, that can bound from subject to subject with a celerity far more rapid than the wing of the lightning, and thus appear to carry on two trains of thought at the same time, attending to both equally and well. But though this be an acquirement, and a splendid and valuable acquirement, of the few, and might of course be an acquirement of the many, yet this is more to be desired than expected; and, therefore, it is not quite the thing to lay down as a general mode of procedure.

There is a means, however, which any one may put

in practice, after due preparation, and that without any interference with the plans or other occupations of the time. The preparation is the essential part of it; and that belongs to the second stage of the process,—that is, to the internal affections of the mind. The mind, to turn the incidental acts of observation into a store of the elements of knowledge, must be practised or exercised in a particular way; and fortunately it so happens that the mode of doing this is the very one by which the mind is rendered most valuable, and therefore most efficient in every other respect.

It consists in a constant attention to the *relations* of things, or of the mental conceptions or ideas of things, so as to be able to see at once in what they agree and in what they differ. This is the most essential part of the whole mental process, because it makes us to perceive, without the labour and loss of time attendant upon experiment, or the practical labour of trial and error, which is a great waste of time in small matters, and often of no value after all—it enables us to see pretty clearly what purposes any thing is or is not good for, and what actions ought or ought not to be performed for the accomplishment of any particular purpose, which, as every one must admit, is an exceedingly valuable quality in the whole occupation of human life, be the character of that occupation what it may.

But this, though much, is not all; for in the tracing of these relations, the relations themselves become elements of knowledge as well as the things

related; and thus, those matters which have relations to each other are, as it were, linked together in chains or trains, and the store of knowledge of which the mind is in possession, is quite orderly, so that any one part of it returns in suggestion, the very instant that it is desired. But every new object, phenomenon, or event, which comes, be it ever so casually, under the notice of the senses, must, in a mind moderately stored with knowledge, have, generally speaking, more relation to some one of these trains of the elements of knowledge, than to any of the others; and it will be united or associated with that train, every link of which will become the means of suggesting, or calling up, the new acquirement whenever it shall be wanted.

This is what is called having a "good memory," which memory used to be described as a particular gift or faculty of the mind, though, in truth, it is nothing more than a little judicious application of science in our observing and thinking. As is the case with all mental acquirements, there are various modes and modifications of this same memory, and these are far better indications of the character of mind than all the external appearances that can be named. The minds of some are converted into vocabularies, chronological tables, and scrap-books, from which words, dates, and small facts can be instantly suggested in any quantity, but without any concatenation or train of relationship the one to the other, by means of which the party who has them so ready can turn them to any useful purpose. Such mnemoniacs

are generally if not invariably what are called "small men," little versant with the higher operations of the mind, and incapable of any thing profound in thought or great in action. A man of profound thought or great purposes very often cannot tell you the day of the month, or of the week; but these men, who are really good for little else, will be able to tell you what kind of weather it was on the first day of every month during the last year. The reason of this is obvious: the constant and equal attention which they pay to these small matters, prevents them from forming any train of reasoning, or maturing any plan.

The greatest prodigy that I ever knew in this way was an idiot, incapable of attending regularly even to the humblest occupation, by the practice of which a man can earn his bread. If it were possible, which we fear it is not, to combine the memory of masses and their connexions and relations with this memory of atoms, the mind would be one of high order.

The memory of simple and unconnected facts, or simple suggestion, as it is sometimes termed, is thus but a sorry matter, if the relative suggestion of the applications and uses of these facts does not return along with the facts themselves; and even when they do return together, there is a moderation in the use of them, so that they may not interfere with present observation or with action. That the mind should be constantly occupied in thought of some kind or other—and the more generally useful that thought is in all its bearings the better, is a truth which no

one can deny. But still, we have present objects to see, and present duties to perform; and we must not neglect these for the sake of considering and reconsidering the knowledge with which the mind is already stored, and which is to be really useful to us only as present circumstances and emergencies may demand it. For these it should be always ready—available without perplexity or loss of time; but still, we live, and enjoy, and are useful, in the present day; and therefore the present day ought to employ the foremost place in our thoughts. If this is not the case, our stored knowledge, however full, abundant, and carefully elaborated it may be, cannot be applied to use, unless the use to which we wish to apply it is as fully understood and as well prepared as that which we may have occasion to apply. If both parts which are to be adapted to each other so as to form one harmonious and valuable whole, are not equally prepared for the union, we cannot expect that union to take place in a harmonious and useful manner—a manner which shall be the most easily and the most efficiently conducive to the purpose intended. The man who mopes over the knowledge which he has already acquired, to the neglect of what is presently passing around him, is as culpable—as unworthy of the mind that has been given him, as the mere thing of the day, which has not an idea of older time than when it crawled from off its couch in the morning.

These things are not the most pleasant in the recital, certainly, but they are true; they lie in our way, and therefore we must take some notice of them,

otherwise we should not do our duty to the public generally, or to the objects themselves in particular. The whole of the past is, no doubt, given to us for the purpose of guidance, and the whole of the present is given to us to make the best use of it that we can; but though both of these are thus given, they are given in conjunction, so that the one of them cannot be turned to the purpose to which it is our duty and our interest—for duty and interest go together, in all we think and all we do, and cannot be separated without immediate and positive injury to us—without the other being in the same state of preparation and readiness. He who occupies the whole of his thoughts about that which is past, is a dreamy dotard; and he who devotes the whole to the passing moment, without any knowledge of, or regard to, the past, is a headlong fool. The man who has no ambition to merit either of these epithets, will take care to blend the two together in such a manner, and with such a balance of attention to each, as shall secure the greatest advantage which can result from the combination of the two being worked on together.

After we have fully understood the nature of the relations which subsist between thought and thought, in calling up the past for our assistance and guidance under present circumstances, there is still much to be learned before we can come to the perfect knowledge of that conduct of the mind which is best fitted for adapting all the elements for the active purposes to which we wish to apply them. This, too, is the new part of the business; for thought, while it con-

times merely thought, how much soever it may contaminate the mind, and give a wrong bias to the whole of the character and conduct, has yet no bearing upon the external world, or upon our good or bad success, or our weal or our woe there. Therefore, the deliberative process of the mind—that which makes it decide one way rather than in another, is the fact which claims the chief attention of those who study the intellectual part of Man, either for their own guidance, or as a portion of the philosophy of the race.

The grand principle upon which we come to a decision upon these matters, is the same which guides us in all matters in which experience is our guide and governor. It is this—that, "in like circumstances, like causes will produce like or the same effects." This, taken in the abstract, is strictly, legitimately, and generally true; but there is, in each practical case, some difficulty in ascertaining whether the likeness, either of cause or of circumstances, is complete and perfect. When the strong Israelite of old had been spoiled of his strength while he slept upon the knees of Delilah, he was not aware of what had befallen him, and therefore he said, "I will go forth as at other times before, and shake myself;" but when he came, in his altered condition, to contend with those Philistines to whom he had aforetime been a scourge and a terror, they "took him and put out his eyes, and brought him down to Gaza, and bound him with fetters of brass; and he did grind in the prison-house." There are many mental Delilahs in

the world, against which Man has but small protection in any of the precautions which a finite creature like him can use; and thus he not unfrequently finds that when, according to the judgment of what he flatters himself is the soundest way or working, he says to himself, as Samson is said to have done, "I will go forth as I have done at other times before," he finds himself with the eyes of his understanding gone, his powers bound in the brazen fetters of impossibility, and he himself grinding in the prison house of disappointment. Man changes, physical circumstances change, and the manners, customs, feelings, and opinions change, so that after the lapse of no very long time, the man fails in a case which, to his perceptions, is exactly the same as that in which he had formerly succeeded, even again and again.

There is no doubt that, when there is a perfect similarity in the cause, the instruments employed, and all the circumstances, there will be a corresponding similarity in the effect, for the laws of nature, whether physical or mental, are perfectly uniform and consistent in their operation. But there is a difficulty in ascertaining whether we have the knowledge of all the circumstances, even in physical cases,—and in mental cases it is still more difficult; and this uncertainty unhinges all our proceedings, and unsettles all our conclusions. We ourselves change, and do not in reality bring the same character of mind to bear upon any subject this year which we brought to bear upon the same subject last year. Physical circumstances change, society changes, and all things change, so that without

a perfect knowledge of all these changes, both in their nature and their extent, we are quite at sea in the very best of our reasonings; and thus when we make most sure of the conclusion, we are in danger of being deceived and disappointed the most. Hence, if we wish to act well, and live comfortably in the day, we must, in addition to all our accumulated knowledge, study attentively the characters of the day, as they are set forth both in physical nature and human society. Up to a certain time of our lives, which varies much with the character and the habits and associations of the individual, we are enabled to do this; and there are to be found here and there in society, men who have got considerably beyond the avarage limits of human life, and who are yet mentally young, and alive to all that is going on in society. This is a happy phase of human life, wherever it arrives; but it is one, the causes of which are not the most easy of investigation; and, besides, it is one of such rare occurrence, that scarcely one man of ten thousand can have, in earlier life, any rational grounds for predicating that this refreshing greenness of extreme old age shall be his. The case of the majority is widely different; and, all circumstances considered, it may perhaps be found, as well as said, that the difference is a wise one, — that mental unfitness for the world, and new men and new modes and manners "pushing us off our stools," are among the most efficient circumstances that co-operate in weaning us from a world which is but the temporary, and not the lasting, abode of the immortal spirit.

All the portions of the mental functions or process, of which we have endeavoured to give an outline, or rather a few points through which the reader may draw an outline for himself, admit of and require very considerable breadth of detail before they can take the form of a regular science. To attempt those details, or any portion of them, here, would be equally inconsistent with the extent and the purpose of the work. Any reader who wishes to prosecute them a little more, may find some assistance in a volume on MENTAL PHILOSOPHY, written by the same author, and published by the same booksellers as the present one; and then he will be prepared for studying the more systematic and technical works of the learned. In the perusal of most, if not all, of these, he will require to use a little caution, however; as there are thories in most of them which are not quite correct; and besides this, they are, generally speaking, of somewhat too technical a character. The doctrine of mind, though in itself as beautifully simple as it is deeply interesting, has been particularly unfortunate in its professors—at least in the majority of those who have written upon it. While yet in ignorance, not only of the subject itself, but of the means and mode of removing this ignorance, they went about establishing theories, the bases of which were all gratuitous assumptions, answering to which there was nothing real, either in human nature or any where else. Men who fight for their all, never fail to fight desperately; and the consequence has been that, upon this science, the express object of which is to show men how they may

restrain their bad passions, there has been more angry words, and even bloodshed, than upon any other subject except religion and politics. As all these are in the same predicament in respect of the "phenomena" they produce in the language of those who treat of them, we cannot, upon the common doctrine of cause and effect, as founded in experience, refrain from inferring that the parties themselves are also in the same predicament — totally ignorant of the nature of that about which they speak and write with so much sound and fury. These matters have, however, nothing to do with a plain common-sense view of any of the subjects.

Before proceeding to give some hints on the education, and the use or conduct of the mind, which we purpose to do in the following chapter, there is one point —a sort of intermediate one, to which we would call a little attention. This point is, the great superiority of our own observations over the teaching of others. There is a curious "sympathy," as we may call it, between the body and the mind, in consequence of which neither of them will act, at least to any efficient purpose, without the *attendance* of the other. If the connexion is permanently or periodically injured by physical causes, as it is in those who are fatuous, or subject to fits of derangement, then both are comparatively useless, both to the unfortunate patient and to society. If the mind is withdrawn, all the functions of the body cease, and it is no longer a body, but a corpse, which we must hide in the grave, or otherwise remove from the sight and the sense of the

living. So also, if the body is quite withdrawn from the mind, and performing no functions save those which are essential to its vital existence, as it is when we are in profound and balmy sleep, then the mind is, for the time, in as total oblivion as though it had no existence. But upon the slumbering confines of the refreshing sleep, there is a troubled and incoherent action and reaction of the two parts of Man upon each other; and the slumberer is "scared with dreams, and terrified with visions." In ordinary cases, these dreams are usually of short duration; and though, generally speaking, absurd enough, they are seldom terrifying to the mind or exhausting to the body. But if people will indulge the body beyond the due and healthy measure, the mind makes them pay the penalty on their pillows. The gourmand who retires to his chamber, heavy with the infarction of the supper-table, and the sluggard who lolls in bed after both nature and duty call him up, is in agony while he remains, rolling and moaning on his couch; and when he gets up he is yawning and listless, has his loins full of pains, and can neither act nor think in any proper manner. It may seem paradoxical, but still it is true, that one who has over-indulged in sleep, is never rightly awake, never of much use, until he sleeps again; and if the indulgence is repeated, it becomes a habit, and, whatever the party might otherwise have been, he then becomes comparatively useless. The devotee of sleep is as much a sot as he who habitually indulges in opium, or intoxicating liquors; and the nearest comparison which we have for the demented and degraded pair,

are the idiot and the madman; and these are innocent, while those are guilty.

We may further remark on the subject of the injury which people bring upon themselves by those indulgences which are productive of a dreaming habit, that there is not only a sort of suggestion of dreams, in sleep as well as after the sleeper has awakened, but there is a species of intellectual dreaming, during which discoveries are made which had not been previously made, and probably never would have been made, by the party in his waking hours. The dreamer may be awakened, or he may be terrified from his slumber, by the onset of a mad bull, a beast of prey, or some phantom thing of horrors, which rushes upon him, and from which he is unable to escape,—as a dreamer never can run away, though the terror of the dreamed attack be ever so great. He may be awakened by these or by other means; and according to the continuous character of the dream, and its approximation to what could be real, he may resume it, and carry it on, even though it shall be broken again and again by brief and temporary awakenings. During a course of intense study, more especially when in early life, and while body and mind are both in the vigour of youthful excitability,—more especially still, when the student is in earnest, grappling with the subject in his own voluntary strength, and the subject of that intellectual class, the truths of which would remain the same although the whole physical creation were annihilated — such as the science of figured space or of general quantity. When such is the case, the body

of the student shall be in refreshing sleep—in all but balmy repose; but with the mind, not in dreamy mood, but in the full energy of its powers, the case is different:—"I sleep, but my heart waketh: it is the voice of my beloved that knocketh." The diagram or the formula with which he has wrestled for days or for months, and which he "will not let go unless it blesses him" with the knowledge of which he is in quest, shall come before his mental vision, as bright and clear as if the beams of the noon-day sun were shining forth from it; and he shall draw his lines or perform his calculations; and the result shall be arrived at with all the transparency of demonstration; and then the triumphant and delighted mind shall drop the curtain, and the body shall enjoy its unbroken repose, until the student awakes, refreshed by his sleep, and instructed and encouraged by his dream. We have very intimately known at least one, to whom this has happened more than once.

Such being the case, we need not wonder, though a supernatural importance were attached to dreams in the days of the world's dark days, and that it still lingers on the margin of the shadow; for certainly a dream is the closest approximation which we can have to the process of thinking and knowing in a disembodied mind. For this, if it does not exactly demonstrate, makes as near an approach to demonstration as possible, that the mind can work its knowledge into new forms, and arrive at, and be delighted with, new truths, without any assistance from the body, or from

any department or portion of physical nature. But, as the knowledge of material things can be retained and elaborated by the mind in the absence of the things themselves, and during the almost total dormancy of the body, may there not—nay, must there not be a higher, more pure, more intellectual, and more delightful knowledge, prepared for the enjoyment of the intellect or spirit after death? This is one of the grand Ethical Questions which we shall have to consider in our volume on Moral Man; but we name it here in order to show how naturally the successive points in the analytical study of Man arise out of each other.

Besides their own importance, and their direct bearing upon the great question now named, the subjects contained in the paragraphs immediately preceding afford very strong collateral proofs of that superiority of personal observation over oral or written instruction, the name of which led us to the notice of them; and they show the reason. The memory is never perfect to any physical or mixed impression, or to any thing which is not purely intellectual, unless the body is at the same time awake. This being the case, it follows as a matter of course that there must be some action of the body—that though the process is thought, and the object of that process the acquiring of knowledge, yet that the body co-operates, first and especially, no doubt, in that delicate and indescribable part of its frame where body ends and mind begins in the mysterious union. But though it no doubt begins

here, it gradually extends over the whole frame; and higher pleasure or keener anguish, even to the body itself,—for the expression of the body shows that it is alive to both, when it is under the influence of no physical action, either for good or for evil,—are produced from mental emotion, than from any physical causes whatsoever. There may be an uplifting of the mind which may elevate the body immeasurably above all the gratifications of the animal senses, and mental anguish may shake it with more fearful terrors, than if the whole frame of material nature were bursting to pieces around it.

In consequence of this, if we have once trained ourselves to that habitual, but ready and rapid observation of nature, which hurts or hinders not our main purpose and occupation, we derive a vast deal of profit as well as of pleasure, from the simple fact of going about our ordinary business. Every thing that meets the sense, if it is but for an instant, tells upon the mind, vibrates back upon the body, occasioning excitement, and generally pleasurable excitement, there, and being, in virtue of this very excitement, fixed in the memory in the way that we have explained. This indeed is the true way to enjoy life—the only way in which life is worth enjoying. He whose whole thoughts are trammelled to the wheel which he turns, the ledger which he posts, the rental which he sums up, or any other department of the merely perishable trash of the present world—and compared with mind the best of it is more worthless

than mire and rubbish—he who is thus trammelled, slaves and drudges like an animal, has no enjoyment but in his animal appetites, and is animal after all, cut off from the heritage, and unworthy the name of Man.

CHAPTER VI.

EDUCATION AND CONDUCT OF THE MIND.

ALL EDUCATION is, even to the meaning or proper application and use of the name, mental or intellectual, and can be nothing else; and, therefore, after the grand doctrine of the Immateriality, and consequently Immortality of the mind of Man, this is the most important question to which human inquiry can be directed. It may, indeed, be considered as a part of the former; for upon the education of the mind must depend the weal or the woe, not only of the compound man in the present life, but of the mind itself through the eternal ages of its duration. This question, like many others which have arisen in the course of the present volume, merges in an ethical question; but the foundations of all ethical questions must be laid in the physiology of Man, otherwise they are baseless, —mere matters of expediency, like many, perhaps most of the enactments of human legislation, and not established and everlasting truths.

The name "Education" must have been well understood when it was first used—or rather the subject must have been well understood when the name was given to it. It indicates that the active and efficient

principle is in that which is educated. *Educo*, the theme or act, of which Education is the abstract name, means to "lead on," or to "call forth" that, the existence of which within is of course taken for granted,—and taken for granted as an active power or principle of some kind or other, the exertion of which is its own, and wants only direction from others.

It does not even apply to the body, or to the first part of the mental process, the knowledge which the senses communicate to the mind. That is not education,—that is instruction; and though these are not unfrequently confounded, there is a very wide difference between the kinds of action of which they are the names, and also between the agents which perform those actions. *Instruction* is the art of building-in, or piling up materials, and the theme of it is *struo*, "I build,"—in which operation both the materials and the foundation upon which these are built, are given, and all the active part only is performed by the builder. This is an easier business than educating; and for this reason it has, to a very great extent, usurped its place. One who will humble himself to take the charitable kind of it—all cold as it is, may have it; and he who has money can purchase instruction as readily as he can purchase any other marketable commodity; and no small portion of it agrees with many other marketable commodities which are vended for the *un*benefit of those who are not very good judges. It is made "to sell," and not "for use." Upon this, and indeed upon the subject generally, it is our intention, if life will hold out, some day to

write a separate volume, under the title of POPULAR EDUCATION, as we have no scope for going into the subject here.

This "instruction" is properly enough applied to the mere beginning of the process of education—to that which is addressed to the senses of the body; but the real education consists in the preparation of the mind for the turning the materials of the instructor to account; and if this can be done, the mere instruction is a very secondary matter, as an educated mind can find abundance of materials for itself. Education is, therefore, the grand *quæsitum*, and in the present state of things, one has some difficulty in stating where it is to be found; for so great a majority of those who attend places of instruction leave them without any thing that can be called education, that a doubt is raised in one's mind whether there can, in truth and verity, be any education there. In this, we are finding fault with nobody,—we are only stating a truth, which is as palpable to every one who chooses to observe it, as the sun is at the noon-tide of a cloudless day.

If the act is to be performed upon that which is wholly passive in the matter, and does not of its own effort contribute any thing to the action which results, then, the proper word is "*Training*," from the theme *Traho*, "to draw." In some parts at least of what is called "education," it is questionable whether "training" would not be the more appropriate and descriptive term; for there are many parts of it in which, instead of the mind going along with the materials

and the mode of the instruction, it goes as much the other way as it possibly can. "Training" always implies a forcible deviation from the course of nature, —as we "train" a tree, when we nail it against a wall, with its branches spread out like a fan, or in any other form that may suit the purposes of the trainer; we "train" a horse for the road, the field, or the turf; and we "train" a boxer for inglorious, and a common soldier for glorious war. We should never think of applying the term "education," or even "instruction," to any of these or any similar case. In the case of human beings, we *educate* them in *science*, we *instruct* them in *art*, and we *train* them in athletic and other exercises of *the body*;—in other words, we train the working structures of the body, we instruct the senses, that is, we deliver our own instructions to them, and, if we can, we educate the mind.

Though these are certainly distinctions of words, it must not be supposed that they are mere verbal distinctions; for they are not; and the indiscriminate use of any or all of them for expressing the same subject has often led, and cannot fail to continue to lead, to much confusion and many mistakes. Besides, when we speak about educating the mind, we speak about a certain something which is done; and before we can ascertain whether it can be done or not, and if it can, how it is to be done, we must at least understand, as well as we are able, what it is. It is for these reasons that we have entered into the meanings and proper applications of these words with some minuteness of detail.

There is another matter requiring explanation:—Though we have assigned to education the highest place—a place high above instruction, as that again is high above training, we have done so in consequence of the subject only,—simply because the mind of Man is far more important than the senses, as the senses are far more important than the organs of motion. But while we would thus assign to each of them the place which we believe it ought to hold, we respect them all equally in their proper places. Although a man has the quickest apprehension of the merits of every subject that comes before him, we would not wish that his eyes were dim or his ears dull; for the better the use that he can make of his organs of sense, he is the more entitled to have them of the very best kind, and in the very best order; and, for the very same reason, the man who has the mind most enlightened, and the senses most acute, is the best deserving of a healthy, active, and vigorous body.

Therefore, in order to do justice to a man to the fullest extent that it can be done, to make him the best fitted for performing all the duties of the world, enjoying all the pleasures, and standing manfully in the majesty of his mind and the strength of his integrity, he should be well endowed, or disciplined, or whatever else it may be called, in all the three. While there are differences of rank and means,—differences which no society is ever likely to be without, but up to the highest point that they can be carried—up, if possible, to that at which he can continue them if

necessary, every man should be schooled or tutored in some way or other, in all the three.

As our proper business respects Intellectual Man only, it is to education, rather than to instruction or to training, that our attention must be directed. Still, however, instruction, though not in itself education, is the auxiliary of education—the means and instrument, the only means and instrument, by which one individual of the human race can educate another. Instruction stands nearly in the same relation with regard to education, that the words of a book stand to the meaning intended to be conveyed by that book. The words themselves are nothing but spots upon the paper, and to those who are ignorant of even the alphabet of language they appear only as such; but to those who can read them with understanding, they have a most talismanic effect; and if they are of the right kind, and put together in the proper manner, they can conjure up any place, any subject, or any event, however remote in time or in place, in much less time, and with not much less effect, than if the reality were before his eyes — unless, indeed, he has been well trained in the use of these organs. There is this farther advantage in the book, that it can be made available at any time, and more especially at those times and under those circumstances, when observation, or even oral instruction, is not to be had; and if it is not mastered at first sight, one can revert to it again and again, until it is thoroughly understood; and these reperusals fix the subject in the mind, and have, in part at least, the same mnemonical effect,

which we have already described as being of so much advantage in personal observation. This is a fact worth attending to by all who wish to derive the greatest advantage possible from what they read; and it enables us to draw the line of distinction between the mere devourer of books and the treasurer-up of their meaning — two characters of whom the degrees of usefulness are wide as the poles asunder. The first class comprehends the great "whales" of the circulating libraries, that, like their namesakes of the northern main, have a mighty mouth and a small swallow; and, therefore, the food of both consists of the little brainless things which float in the current of the green water of the day, the moral devourer, like the whale, feeding as it floats along; and if by accident the current should bring within its gape any matter of size and substance, that matter is sent away as it comes. Sentiments are generally *molluscous* in the green waters, and therefore they glide down; and moral reflections are much in the same category; so that there is nothing to hinder the rapid passage of the book, of which passage not a trace remains, and the gape is every jot as wide and ready for the next. In such cases there is no return to the book; and, saving and excepting an intrigue, an article which always has the bump of adhesiveness amply developed, not a jot of the thousand and one tales which have been devoured does or can return to the vacant and suggestionless mind. This is proved by the fact that no inveterate novel-reader can tell a bearable story, either taken from a novel or from anything else; and

as for such a party's saying, far less doing, anything useful or instructive, the very supposition is an absurdity. So much for those who read for the sake of reading, and they form a class as large as it is lamentable, and literally benumb, if they do not break, the legs of the march of intellect. One of the most serious wrongs which these parties perpetrate upon the age which is afflicted by their existence is, that they deprive the club, lounge, and the drawing-room of some of their most appropriate flowers—or *cryptogamia*, or by what name soever they may be named; and furthermore, they spoil the drive and the promenade of some of the most bewitching of their things, and the ride of some of the most fascinating of its nothings. They who, by kindly nature, are intended to outcolour the butterflies, and outglitter the beetles, doff their garniture and their charms, plunge their quills to the feather in ink,—and anon, forth comes the delectable new novel from the pen of Lady Buzz or Sir Boom; but that is *sub rosâ*, and so are certain piquant inuendoes about "Persons of Quality"— names unknown, but easily guessed at. Thus fines off the lesser horn of the literary dilemma. Even here, however, we are not only very ready but very delighted that we meet with something now and then which is refreshing—the more refreshing from its rarity and the sterile character of the region in which it is found—just as a water-melon is not so refreshing upon any spot of the earth as upon that wilderness of sand and salt which drinks up the periodical rains upon the southern margin of the

Indian Punjaŭb, and dribbles them again into the stagnant pestilence of the Runn of Cutch. But, for all its water-melons, one would not dwell for life in the desert of Adjmeer.

From this, it is delightful to turn to the "reader for meaning," and to the book which he selects; and to see how often and how well he applies this book, as a live coal from the altar of truth and inspiration, to arouse and to enlighten his own mind. The Bible, Shakspeare, Hudibras,—we take them of three "types," all very dissimilar from each other, but still, in their several ways and characters, they are *the* three books, of which no reader, "who *can* read," can possibly take the last reading. The progress of a novice, from noviciate to maturity of reading, in such books as these, is worthy of a few words. Of course we do not put the three, or any two of them, upon the same level; for who could think of levels, or anything but altitudes—sublime heights, each in its own way—when alluding to such books as these? But, at first, they are read for the story,—that being the most humble part of the matter; for they who are incapable of doing anything else read stories,—and write them. Then there is another reading: a deeper chord is made to vibrate, and the characters of those who have the conducting of the story come out. After this, the successive readings rise, one above another, till we are rapt with inspiration, elevated by sublimity, or shaking our sides with wit, as we step by turns into those inimitable refreshers of the mind.

Nor is the delight merely that of instruction; for

there is something in such works, which, without our being at all able to take note of the fact of what it is, turns our instruction into education, and into education of the very first-rate class and character; and this would bring us very near to the understanding of that peculiar quality of certain *modes* of instruction, which converts them into education. But we have still a few words to say on some preliminary points. After the vital book, whatever may be its subject, has been read again and again, and new sources of pleasure and instruction—for in all cases of this kind, the pleasure must precede the instruction—have been derived from the successive perusals, it becomes, in some manner, the reader's own; and the mind works upon it something in the same way as though the whole had been the man's own gathering and storing up. It enters into the trains of his thought; and all its beauties become as fertile seeds sown in a good soil, all flowering and fruiting as if they were indigenous there. When some advance has been made, and some pleasurable experience obtained in this way, the book is changed from a mere instructor to an instrument of education,—just as, on the second perusal, it begins to be changed from a book of mere pastime to a book of instruction. First, it is read for its facts,—its simple narrative; secondly, it is read for its information,—the characters of men and their sayings; and, thirdly, it is read for its spirit. Each of these may require one or more readings, according to the previous knowledge and habits of the party; and some may stop at one stage of the progress, and some at another, taking their cha-

racters of lower order in proportion as they stop sooner; but it is only he who gets fondly and cheerfully to the full practice and enjoyment of the third step, that reaps all the advantage — only he who can be said to turn the book into a means of education. It is merely "the brute unconscious gaze" the first time; it is a schoolboy's lesson in the second instance; but it is the inspiring exercise of an intellectual man in the third,—and ever after.

This "approfondissement," so to term it, is required only in the case of one book; for, after that, the student will come at once to the third reading of another book, or throw it aside as a vapid thing, in which there is no third reading, and scarcely a second one. But the experiment is one of difficulty and danger, as respects both the reader and the book; and the villainous practice, which is still followed in some of the schools and other places, of encouraging mere boys and girls to repeat, by rote, some of the choicest passages of the best writers, just in the same manner as a child lisps a nursery rhyme, or a parrot is made to repeat the sounds that it has often heard, without being one jot the wiser or the better for this unnatural and unnecessary infliction, renders the difficulty almost insuperable. This brings us back to the consideration of the preparations which are necessary, in order that instruction may have even a chance of becoming intellectual education.

For this purpose, one essential requisite, and the one which should be first attended to,—as early life is the time, and the only time, for making certain of it,

is a sound, healthy, and vigorous constitution of the body. There have no doubt been men of very feeble and much deformed body, who have become great and estimable in respect of mind; but surely no man would be foolish enough to imagine that these were in any way indebted to their deformity, far less to their disease, for their mental superiority. On the contrary, those who are deformed cannot help feeling it, and feeling that, in one respect at least, it sinks them below their fellows; and surely this is not a feeling calculated to give that buoyancy to the mind, by which it shall, in after-life, rise to eminence. There are no doubt men who, after they have once been properly "thewed and sinewed," both in a physical and an intellectual sense of the words, cannot be put down, or prevented from mentally rising, by any casualty of the physical world, short of death itself; but such men must have had strength, and vigour, and hope, at the time when their characters were receiving their tone, otherwise that tone would have never been theirs.

We do not think that there is much, or perhaps any value in those gymnastic exercises which were introduced into this country several years ago, which were, in the day of their notoriety, adopted in some of the schools, and which had the merit of inflicting hernia, and other topical injuries, upon some of the youths; and we need not say much about them, as their "day" appears now to be over; but the eagerness with which they were received, even by persons who had written on the subject of education, and the speed with which they were abandoned, show that

there is much unsound opinion upon this very important subject. We pass them by, as we do many other ephemeral matters which are introduced from time to time, *ad captandum vulgus;* and they must be *vulgus* to the core who are caught by such matters. We pass them by; but in so doing, we contend that there is a bearing of the body and a management of the limbs which ought to be taught, and taught at as early a time of life as possible, on the ground that it is equally conducive to elegance, to usefulness, and to health. There is a heaviness of the foot, and an awkwardness of the hand, which unfit the body for all its more useful and valuable functions; and which actually prevent the mind from arriving at the best means of acquiring that knowledge which is most necessary and essential for the general welfare of the man, and of that society of which he is a member.

It must be always borne in mind that Man is a being for tuition,—one who comes into the world in a state of utter ignorance and incapacity, without a single instinct save in those vital functions of the body which serve merely to keep that alive when it is attended to, but which, if no attention were to be paid to him by others, would not preserve him alive for a single day. There is much of the primary education of the body, no doubt, which he must acquire for himself, as it is of that kind which nobody can teach him. Language being wholly a human matter—an artificial and conventional matter — Man can know nothing of it at the hour of his birth, or for a good many months afterwards. It would thus be in vain to tell the new-

born infant that its position were uneasy or improper, because it is ignorant, utterly ignorant, not only of us and our words, but of all the limbs and lineaments of its own body. Therefore, we must, whether we will or no, leave it to its own education for a time; and only attend to keep it free from hunger, and those injuries which it would of course feel as painful, without, however, having the slightest knowledge either of the cause or the seat of the pain.

During this stage of its existence—its hapless and all but unconscious existence—the education which the infant is acquiring, and very fast acquiring, for itself, is wholly physical; and though, as it is capable of expressing pain by its cries, and pleasure by those little murmurings which fall so softly sweet on a fond mother's ear; yet, though we may have systems, and sometimes very foolish and injurious systems, upon this matter—as we are very apt to have upon all matters which we do not clearly understand, we have no positive evidence in the individual case, save these very simple indications to which we have alluded; and simple as they are, a close attention to them is better than all the system and theory in the world.

But, if the self-education of the infant is thus wholly physical, consisting of ascertaining the existence, and learning the use, of the several active members of its body which occupy its attention, and, apart from the vital functions, its whole attention, during the period of its nonage, as we not very improperly call it, ought we to break the chain of succession, almost the instant that the little thing

can totter about and lisp a few of the words of its native tongue? The man who would dare to say so is a very fool, a moral infanticide—one who would go about for the sake of some paltry verbiage, all unsuited to the time, for which he has taken a fancy—upon the same principles that dotards are always most partial to the ugly and the useless—would go about to deprive human beings of the proper and vigorous use of their own bodies; and perpetrate this, too, at a time when the sufferer not only can make no defence, but is totally ignorant of the injury done it,—smiles in the face of him or one who thus impairs its future usefulness, in the same way that it would smile in the face of the murderer who had bared a knife to plunge into its little heart. Poor innocent! and yet we are all come from this complexion; and the foot that is now firmest on the hill, and the hand which is most ready and most admired in its working, were once feeble as cobwebs, and all unknown to him who can now turn them to such manly, useful, and admired account.

It will be readily understood that, in the use of the body, there is a wonderful difference between the human infant and the young of any other animals. These latter come into the world in various stages of maturity—some so far advanced as to be capable of performing all the essential functions of their mode of life, and maintaining their place in the world under ordinary circumstances without any assistance or attention; some blind and naked, and incapable of any sort of motion or action; and some, as in the

young of the Marsupialia, after their first or uterine gestation, with few organs of life or traces of the animal form. Yet, even these—even the kangaroos, which, as they are the largest, are probably also the most typical, at all events they are the best understood of the marsupial animals,—are developed in organization and instinct at the same time, and proceed to the full maturity of the animal in so equal a ratio, that, for the purposes of its natural habit, the animal never stands in need of any education; all that it knows of its own body, or of those substances which are fitted for the purposes of its body, comes by nature, without effort and without assistance of any kind; and therefore, in our sense of the word, it has no knowledge of its own body or anything else. It lives, and it has the means of defending its life; but it does not *know* these things.

The human infant, on the other hand, can do nothing without knowledge, except those vital functions of the body which are purely animal, and which require no knowledge on the part of the individual, and the greater part of which remain unknown, even to the best-informed of the human race, during the whole period of their lives; and, though pain is felt when any of these is deranged, it not unfrequently happens that neither patient nor doctor knows any thing about the matter,—though, of course, the latter must *say* something.

As every individual of the race thus begins the business of the world by acquiring the knowledge and the use of its body; as the body really cannot be the

instrument of one *human* action, however simple, without the instruction and direction of the mind; and furthermore, as the body is the universal instrument in all human action—the maker and the user of all tools, implements, instruments, and machines, by what names soever they may be called, and to what purposes or in what manner soever they may be applied;—surely the body ought to receive the earliest attention, and the mind ought to be made thoroughly acquainted with the use of it, before the attention is allowed to be engrossed or distracted by any thing else.

Whatever may be the case in after-stages, this first must be, almost to the whole extent, self-education; and, when we look around us, and see how those who, from their stations and acquirements,—if they had but common sense to guide them, ought to manage these matters the best, yet using every means to prevent their children from acquiring the knowledge and the use of their bodies, we cannot but rejoice in it as a certain and positive blessing of Heaven, that Man comes into the world in such a condition, that he has a few months wherein he can acquire some knowledge and use of his body, before the kindness—Heaven reward such kindness!—of those about him comes in; and they, by their good-intentioned efforts, do what in them lies to make him as helpless and as useless—— as themselves.

It should seem from the facts — the only means which we can have of forming a judgment, that the body of a human being, in the wealthier classes of

society, more especially that part of them whose wealth is their only worth,—it should seem that among them, a human body is accounted and held to be the most useless thing upon the face of the earth,—that, instead of being of any use to the individual, or to any body else, it were not in some cases worthy of being, as Shakspeare says, "a thing to thank God upon;" but a mere likeness, a clay model, good for nothing but being looked at, and not *very* good for that. It is strapped, screwed, pinched, and twisted, in some parts, and puffed and padded in others, to make it look the fright—we beg pardon, the fashion; but no care is taken about its being or not being safe or useful to the owner, for the doctor will look after the safety, and the servant will supersede all usefulness.

Now we admit that natural deformities may be, in so far, corrected, and artificial bad gaits and habits of the body may be prevented, by means which the young cannot bestow upon themselves; and, in as far as these things can be done, those to whom the care of the young is committed ought to do these, and the more early the better. But still these are merely external and mechanical matters, forming no part of the education of the body, though, if they enable any one member to perform its functions better than it would otherwise have done, they are useful as preparations for the education of it.

It must never be lost sight of, that all real education of the body, whether of itself or of others, can reach it only through the mind. To lift a man up does not teach him to rise, nor does driving teach him to walk.

If we are to instruct him at all, we must address ourselves to the intellectual part of his nature—the only part which is capable of receiving instruction. It is very generally said, that "Example is better than precept," and yet the truth of the saying is very doubtful, at least as a general maxim. If mankind had never learned any thing but by example, there never could have been any improvement. The old system of society among the Hindûs, which answered the purpose of keeping men from improvement so well that one is almost tempted to think that that was the very intention of it, was, and where it still holds in its purity is, the most perfect system of example-tracing of which we have any record. According to that system, every man was obliged to follow the trade of his father, whether he was fit and inclined for it or not; and the consequence was, a population that made no advance in any thing, and so feeble that they were the easy prey of any conqueror that chose to make a prey of them. Many years ago, there was an approximation to this, in some of the more remote parts of Britain, where some of the sons at least, if not all of them, followed the trade of the father; and, generally speaking, a pretty trade they made of it, for the shoemaker could not make a shoe after even so handsome a model as a punt-boat, neither could the blacksmith make a hob-nail which did not twist fifty ways before it could be driven. Such are some of the blessings of example, in cases where we may suppose it to have been so complete as not to require the assistance of any pre-

cept: and if it thus put an extinguisher upon improvement in that very trade wherein the party had constant example from the very earliest time that he could observe, much cannot be said of it as a general doctrine, to be held forth, as it is to all the world, as one of the oracles of truth.

The fact is, that, even in the education of the body, where the doctrine should apply best if it apply at all —inasmuch as the bodies of men do not undergo such improvement as stocking-frames, steam-engines, and other mechanical contrivances, but remain much the same in all modes of society,—the fact is, that even in the education of the body, example is of no use whatever, unless the mind of the party addressed has understanding enough for turning it into a precept; and the only advantage which example has over precept, in any case whatsoever, resolves itself into that which direct observing has over verbal information—there is a stimulus in the one case which, generally speaking, is not felt in the other. But why is it not felt? The reason is obvious. The fault is not in the lesson,—it is in the teacher; the drawling, disjointed, incoherent, and often incomprehensible language in which the supposed instruction is communicated, necessarily makes it no instruction at all; and they who thus "sow the wind," have nobody to thank but themselves for the plentiful harvest of "whirlwinds" which they cannot choose but reap. Our own example is always the best one; for we may look on ever so long, but we can never do any

thing properly till we put our hand to it again and again.

We require no enticement to learn the use of the body, either as an observant or an acting instrument; for all children are naturally prone enough to both, and always in a state of motion and observation, until sleep fairly overcomes them. This is exactly as it should be; for these are the means, and the only means, children have of gaining an insight into the nature and use of their own bodies, and also of all the common objects around them. Hence their curiosity ought never to be repressed, nor the questions which they ask left unanswered; neither, at this early age, should any piece of information be forced upon them until they do ask for it, for the mischief done to the mind by the contrary practice can seldom be repaired afterwards.

There is one very common error, arising out of the general ignorance which prevails on the subject of mind, and the absurd and contradictory notions which very many people hold concerning its functions and nature—into which we are very apt to fall. It is one of the countless phases of that doctrine of materialism which meets us at every point of human society, and in which hundreds of persons, and learned persons too, are in truth and in practice staunch believers, though much of their professional time is occupied in railing against this very same idolatry in some other of its manifestations. It matters not a jot as to the real nature of the error, whether the misrepresentation be that of the Almighty Creator by an idol, a con-

correct views, or any thing else, or whether it be that of the human mind or the human body,—for they are both materialists; and if one form is condemned, all are really believed, how much soever they may be called against. It is the foolish analogy of reasoning about mind as if it were body, which is the cause, or rather the essence, of the whole error.

We know that children are born of very small dimensions, very feeble in their structure, and that they have not acquired the use of their organs of observation, and scarcely of those of action. We see them grow up to maturity by a slow and gradual process, which may extend in many cases to half the average of life; and there are some cases in which decay begins almost immediately when maturity is arrived at, and increases as fast as the growth and strength did, until, at the final close of life, the body is quite feeble and demented, and passes out of life as helpless and mindless a thing as the infant was at its birth—indeed more so, for the vital functions are vigorous in the new-born infant, while at the final close of life they are exhausted, and it is in them that life gives way.

That this is, with variations in cases of individuals, the general progress of the human body, no one will deny, because the appeal to the fact can constantly be made. But the inference, or rather the analogy, which is grounded on this fact, is false and mischievous, in practice as well as in principle. We take the capability of the body to display the mind as being a constant and invariable power in the body, and

therefore we say that the mind is feeble in the infant, strong in middle age, and gone when the man becomes a dotard, all of which is the very reverse of the truth. The mind—the unchangeable and immortal principle, varies not a jot in its strength at any two periods of life, or in the lives of any two individuals, let the capacities and the characters at those periods or in those individuals be as different as it is possible to imagine. If one mind could, in any quality, differ from another mind, or if the same mind could differ from itself at any two periods of time, then mind would not be immortal. The state of the mind for the time has nothing to do with any thing that can be called greatness or ability in the mind. The mind of Sir Christopher Wren would have been just as great studying a pin's head as contriving the dome of St. Pauls; and Sir William Herschel peeping into his snuff-box, to see if a pinch remained at the bottom, had just as great a mind as when he looked one thousand eight hundred millions of miles athwart the heavens, and first beheld the planet Uranus. The changes of power, real or apparent, all belong to the body; and though the knowledge of the mind, and the enjoyment which the mind has of that knowledge, may, and probably do, constantly vary, the mind is always the same in its essence; and, other than the body not informing it, or not being able to obey it, we know of no power that controls or can control the mind, except that Power which commanded it into existence, and to which alone it is responsible.

Once disembody it,—set it unincumbered in the

creation of its God,—concentrate the whole solar system—all the material systems in the universe, into one mass,—let that mass career onward with ten-fold ten times ten thousand times the velocity of the swiftest planet,—imagine the mind distant from this mass as far as imagination can range; and yet, in less time than is spent in the twinkling of an eye, the mind shall overtake the moving volume, and pass sheer through the middle of it, far more easily than the eagle cleaves the mountain air.

This is no fanciful hypothesis, but the calm conclusion of sober reason, supported by the testimony of God himself; and therefore it cannot be impressed too often, too strenuously, or too strongly, in order to prevent those who perversely disbelieve in this doctrine from rueing their stubbornness in eternal torment. Our purpose relates to the present life, however, and to that which fools suppose any body can do—the first training of the "infant mind." "Infant mind" is an erroneous expression, for minds have no infancy in capacity, though they of course have in the exercise of that capacity; and we have quoted the words for the purpose of drawing the attention more strongly to the impropriety, the injustice—we may say the cruelty, that results from the use of this most unwise expression, or rather from the impious and abominable error of which it is the embodyment, and which strikes at the root of all education, all morality in Man, and lays him level with —nay, far beneath—the beasts of the field.

The mind of the infant is, in itself, as powerful as

that of the wisest man who lives; and it is far more perfect, for the best educated mind receives many stains in the paths of the world. In the very first judgment that he forms—say the knowledge of the fact of his own existence—there is the very same process performed, and performed as well, as when the man of the most assiduous and successful study adds the topmost cubit to the fabric of the most towering science; and every subsequent step, if not perverted by injudicious interference from without, is just as perfect as the first one. In ninety-nine cases out of every hundred, the child, even the young child, is more truly a philosopher than the unwise teacher who turns a deaf ear to its little inquiry; for the child is simply ignorant, the teacher is always in error, and not unfrequently in ignorance, which he takes this despicable way of concealing from the child. In fact, half the ignorance of the world arises from parents visiting their own sins of omission upon their innocent children, for the sake of maintaining that paternal superiority of which they are quite unworthy; and if there be meanness among mankind, upon which the brand of the blackest ignominy should be set, verily it is here.

The "*infant* mind!" Would to God that the minds of most grown-up persons were half as philosophic, and one-tenth as pure, as those of infants,—as then we should not have the steps of so many turn from the paths of knowledge, of virtue, and of happiness, as there are in the present state of things! But how to effect this—*hic labor—hoc opus est.* Our only

hope is in mothers; for with them, and with them alone, this most important of all matters rests. Long before the child is called upon to know and name a letter of the alphabet, and very long before this ought to be introduced to disturb and destroy the earlier and better part of education, the die is cast, the character and fate are fixed for time—for eternity! Therefore we say to the mothers of the human race:—Think of the burthen of responsibility which lies upon you; and reflect whether you feel it possible that you can escape the vengeance of "the God of all the earth who doeth right," if ye peril the worldly prosperity and honour, and the eternal happiness, of those little ones who are "bone of your bone, and flesh of your flesh," while the little innocents are smiling in the faces of you, their moral murderers, and blessing you in their young hearts while you are turning them to destruction. When He who said, "Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven," shall "stand at the latter day upon the earth," and call all kindreds, and tongues, and nations, in all their ages and in all their generations, from every kingdom of the earth, and from every isle of the sea, to come to the judgment of that all-penetrating Power from whose eye even the darkness of hell itself cannot hide the guilty;—think how your misdirections and neglects will arise, and "sting you like scorpions and bite you like adders;" and how you shall go down to the sides of the pit, and mourn in remediless woe, for years and ages that no man can number, through those paltry trifles of the world, and

its fashions and fancies, for the sake of which you deserted that high and holy charge which has been committed to you by the Almighty himself. It is true that you may be driven to this; that the house in which it is your lot to be unfortunately cast may be under tyrannical government, or be perfectly lawless, and then of course you are not yourselves the guilty, but the unfortunate instruments of the guilt of others. There is, however, no certain drawing of the line here; and, therefore, the utmost circumspection is necessary in all the connexions which you form, in order to avoid even the possibility of failure in this matter, and the fearful consequences which are the necessary results of this failure.

This is no fanciful hypothesis—no plan of the mere manufacturer of a book, for the rounding of a period, or the ekeing out of a page. It is a plain and practical matter,—the result of more than twenty years of careful observation and reflection; and, during that period, with a very considerable number of fresh instances every year, and instances at that stage at which, according to the plan of the schools, the transfer is made from the merely mechanical to the intellectual part of education. In all that time, and in every case in which there was an opportunity of verifying the character of the son by an accurate knowledge of that of the mother, there was not a single instance in which the coincidence between them was not palpably striking. The talent of the father appeared to signify but little; and there were some instances of abandoned worthlessness and dissipation in

him, where the sons were yet all that the fondest and best mother could wish.

Now, we have said,—and to deny the saying is a virtual denial of mind altogether, that the mind does not, and cannot, proceed from any earthly parent. Therefore, we must look to the training—the very early education—of the son, for an explanation of the dependence of what is usually called talent, so much upon the mother, and comparatively so little upon the father. No doubt a bad father may ruin his children, and a judicious father may save them from ruin; but still we must look to the mother for the stamina and general bent of their characters.

This is a matter in which individuals, families, and nations, are all very deeply concerned, inasmuch as there can be no greatness without mental developement; and, according to our observations, no mental developement without talented mothers. When we say "mothers," we of course mean those under whose care children are when their minds are taking the first and important bent which decides the character; and if people will, at this most critical time, trust their offspring to hirelings, or other persons of inferior minds and morals, they must abide the consequences.

We have said that, while the child is acquiring the knowledge of its own body, and of the domestic and other everyday things around it, its attention ought not to be distracted by even the first elements of scholastic knowledge,—even the letters of the alphabet. There is, however, one part of science which it is desirable that it should know, at even this early age,—

namely, the management of the centre of gravity in its body, and the effects of sudden transitions from rest to motion, and from motion to rest. This is a very interesting part of the education of the body; and it is one for want of the knowledge of which, many grown-up persons, as well as those who are young, often suffer very severely by falls, bruises, contusions, and other casualties, all of which they might escape by even a very moderate degree of information upon this, which is really in itself an exceedingly simple matter.

We are now understood to be addressing ourselves to the very young, or the very ignorant; and, therefore, the better informed must not think that the few words which we have to say upon the subject, are, in all respects, a waste of time, though they contain nothing that is new to them. Indeed, as children are born every day, there is always enough of ignorance in society; and, therefore, there is always some part of mankind to whom the very simplest truth is useful information. The centre of gravity—if in the human body, or in any other body—is that point within the volume or mass of it, which, if supported, all the rest would also be supported. No definite locality or place can be assigned to it which will answer to all human bodies, or to all bodies of any class, except regular geometrical solids, composed of matter of uniform weight and consistency throughout, such as globes, cubes, and other solids of the same or similar classes. The general idea of it, however, is, that it is a point within the body, so situated that, if any line whatever

is drawn, or supposed to be drawn, through it, the weight of matter through which this line passes, upon each side of the point, is constantly equal to that on the other side.

In any piece or portion of dead matter, the situation of this point is always the same. In a globe of uniform density, it is always the centre; and in any other regular solid, it is the point at which lines drawn from all the opposite solid angles intersect each other. In such bodies it is easily found; and thus they can always be supported, or prevented from having any more tendency to fall to one side than to another, with very little difficulty. But although a globe of uniform density is the body of which the centre of gravity is most easily found, and the one which can be supported, or will support itself, with equal ease and certainty upon any point of its surface, yet a globe is the least stable in its place of all bodies; and therefore, when very heavy masses of matter have to be removed to considerable distances, the easiest way of doing this is upon cannon bullets, or other globular bodies. A common wheel, such as that of a carriage or wagon, is a section of a globe; and it has an easy motion in the direction of its plane, but in the cross direction it is difficult to move. If the horses that draw a waggon with ease in the ordinary way, were to be yoked to the side of the waggon, so as to pull in the direction across the plane of the wheels, they would not be able to move it a single inch. The wheel has thus free motion in one plane only, but the globe has free motion in every plane; and, therefore, weights

can be moved by means of globes which no ordinary force can move in any other way. One of the most remarkable instances of this kind of motion was the bringing to St. Petersburg of the immense block of granite which forms the pedestal to the equestrian statue of Peter the Great in that city. This mass of granite weighs fifteen hundred tons, so that, upon an ordinary carriage, it would have required the strength of at least two thousand horses. Indeed, no horses could have drawn, or even moved it, and no wheels could have borne it; but by means of cannon shot, rolling between two platforms of wood, this enormous mass was brought from a distance of several miles; and it is the largest mass of matter which, in modern times, has been artificially moved from one place to another, along the surface of land.

The human body is, in form, very different from this; and not only so, but the upper part of it is by much the heavier. Even in its firmest positions, too, it is balanced on two legs only; and in walking it is balanced on the single legs alternately. Birds, when they walk, are also supported on two legs only; but the general line of their body is "fore and aft," and not upright, as in the human body. Besides this, they have the wings—whether wings of flight, as in the majority of birds, or balancers, as in the ostrich family—always ready to aid them in case of unsteadiness. Grebes, divers, and other birds which have their bodies formed more for swimming than for walking, and thus have their legs placed far backwards, and are obliged to carry their bodies erect when they walk, are always bad walkers.

But the position of the human body in walking is more erect than even that of these birds, and the human arms do not, as balancers, take such hold of the air as their wings do—even when the wings are only flaps, as they are in the case of the penguins. Therefore the human body is very delicate to balance on its centre of gravity; and it is rendered more so by the varied motions of the upper part. Some of the balancings upon this centre are, no doubt, in a great measure instinctive, but they are less perfectly so than the balancings of animals; and many of them have to be learned wholly by experience. In the course of this experience, a child gets many falls, and sometimes serious ones; and yet it is necessary that it should, of itself, acquire this use of its body, and the sooner that it does so the better, inasmuch as the child is always the more injured by a fall the older that it is.

The mere balance of the body cannot be communicated by any instructor; and therefore the child should be allowed to find that for itself as early in life as it possibly can; and when it tumbles it should be allowed to get up again of itself, even if it has considerable difficulty in doing so; for, though lifting it may appease its crying for the time, it destroys the confidence of the child in its own powers, and retards its education, in that part where a teacher can be of no use, far more than they who have not attended to the subject would be apt to imagine. There is only one general caution which can be given, at an early age, in this matter; and that is, never to stand or walk

sideways upon any surface that has a considerable slope. Slaters and others who have to work on the sloping roofs of houses, know this very well in practice, and always attend to it, though they may not always be acquainted with the reason. They can walk up a roof of very considerable steepness with ease, and very little danger of falling; though it is much more difficult to walk down, and cannot be done on so steep a surface. But a man accustomed to work on roofs, never walks along the slope facing the end of it, or even stands in that position. Inexperienced labourers sometimes do; and the usual consequence is a fall, generally with broken bones, and sometimes instant death. Children, when learning to walk, have no business upon slopes at all comparable to the roofs of houses, either for steepness or for danger; but still, the sooner they have such dangers and the means of guarding against them explained, the better.

There is always a tendency to fall down a surface, beginning at 0, or an equal chance of falling in any direction, when the surface is level, and increasing as the slope increases, until, upon a surface which stands upright, the fall is an absolute certainty, which no balancing of the body can prevent; and upon a surface that slopes only one way, there is a tendency to fall that way only. From the greater weight of the upper part of a human body, the centre of gravity in it, when in an erect posture, is always, say, about three feet from the surface where it stands, and the whole weight of the body swings upon a rod or lever of this

length. The bending of the body always inclines the centre of gravity in the direction of the head, and lowers it in proportion to the stoop; and this is the grand principle upon which a man is enabled to keep his balance and yet have his hands free. The great power of bending the body is forwards; backwards it is less, and toward any side it is less still. Removing the centre of gravity away from the direction in which the body has a tendency to fall, is the means of stability, and removing it in the direction of the tendency is the cause of the fall. The structure of the feet co-operates with the power of motion in bending; they are more stable forwards than backwards, and more so backwards than sideways.

Hence it is evident that a man has least danger of falling from a slope when his back is turned the way he would fall, and most danger when his side is turned that way. With his face to the rise of even a considerable slope, a man can have nearly the same use of his hands as if he were on a level surface; but with his face down or sideways he can hardly venture to use his hands at all.

There is another point connected with this matter which also deserves to be kept in mind. It is this; though study and practice can bring the human body to a very extraordinary degree of dexterity in balancing itself, and though the *art* of this balancing is of the body—as all arts which appear are, yet the science by means of which it is arrived at, is mental—as all science must be. The human infant, long before it can walk, or even stand, is much stronger than the

young of many other animals are when they can walk safely. But the infant has a fear of falling, and they have none; and it is actually this fear which both causes the infant to fall at the first, and keeps it from falling afterwards. This fear is to be got the better of only by long practice in situations of danger, of which we have remarkable instances in sailors, who not only keep their balance, but perform their work, in situations from which a landsman would instantly tumble. A man who stands with both feet properly placed on level ground, is just as safe on the brink of a precipice as in the middle of the most extensive plain; and yet, if the precipice is lofty, and especially if the sea is foaming and thundering at its base, there are many who could not stand close to the edge even for a moment; and there are some who would shudder at the very thought. So powerful is this feeling that it affects us even when we are asleep. Men often dream of falling from the tops of precipices; but the dream never lasts till they reach the bottom; they always start and awake in great agitation when danger comes to the extreme; and the starting of Richard from his dream of Bosworth field is a master-stroke of human philosophy—the result of close observation and thorough analysis of human character.

Now why should men be in fear of falling in situations where there is no actual danger? "Their heads turn giddy." But, that is no answer, for why should their heads turn more giddy standing on a rock, than if they were standing on a quagmire? Their situation

is one of which they have little or no experience; they *fear* that they are not stable, though they actually are so; this makes them wriggle about in endeavours to adjust the body; in so doing they lose their balance, and down they tumble. It is the body that actually falls, but it is the mind—the ignorance, and consequent fear of the mind, that throws it down. Upon nearly the same principle, the fear of being shot often comes so strongly upon even a brave soldier, that he falls flat on the first fire, and is for the moment as destitute of life as if a bullet had hit him—more so indeed, if it had not destroyed a vital part; and yet, after a pause, the mind-struck soldier revives, and finds that he has not sustained the slightest injury.

These remarks will show how necessary it is to instruct the mind in the use of the body, and the knowledge of when it is safe and when it is not; and the alarming danger and actual suffering that might be avoided by means of a due attention to this mode of education, are incalculable. The obligation to do it is also very strong. The body is the best possession which the mind has, the one without which it not only could have no other, but actually could not at the first know even its own existence.

Changes of rest and motion, when the alternation is sudden, are also matters which require attention. When, indeed, the body itself is the thing moved, it is, in ordinary cases, tolerably safe; but not so if the body is to be carried upon any thing else that moves. A man on horseback is as stable, has the

point of principal support as near the centre of gravity, as is perhaps possible. But if he lean far backwards, and at the same time start his horse to a rapid pace, he will be left behind; and if he suddenly pull up, and at the same time lean forwards, he will be projected over the ears of the horse as rapidly as if he were shot from a bow. The reason is obvious; in the starting, the horse is carried forward before the motion is communicated to the centre of gravity of the man; and in the case of stopping, the horse stops before the centre of gravity in the man has had time to stop also. The safe plan is, to lean forward in starting, and backward in pulling up; because, in the first instance, the rider's centre of gravity has the motion communicated to it by the time that it arrives at the seat; and in the second instance, the motion of it ceases before it has carried the rider too much in advance of the saddle.

The same principle holds with respect to boats and carriages, in which it is always dangerous to stand up, either when starting or when stopping. In starting, the tendency is to carry the feet forward from under the body; and in the latter, to tumble the body forward over the feet. It does not follow, however, that in the case of an actual fall, that fall shall be in the direction of the impulse given; for at the instant the instability is felt, there may be an over-effort the other way produced by the fear, and this, as in the case of the man on the precipice, may increase the danger, or produce it where there is naturally none. One of the greatest perplexities to a person who has

not learned to manage the centre of gravity, is the pitching of a boat or other vessel in a tumbling sea, and there is no way of getting the better of it but by practice.

It is as well, too, that something should, at an early period of life, be known of the nature of circular motions. If the curve has but little bending, and the motion is slow, then little difference is felt from motion along a straight line; but where the curvature is great and the motion rapid, then it is a different matter. All motion produced by a single cause, such as that which a man derives from a horse or a carriage, is, in itself, motion in a straight line, and would be such if some other cause did not prevent it. Thus, suppose a coach in rapid motion has to turn a corner sharply, the tendency is to throw off the outside passengers on the side from which the coach turns, and throw those on the other side upon the top of the coach. Leaning toward the corner which the coach turns round, is the position of most stability in both these cases, but they are cases which those who have the planning and management of roads should render as little necessary as possible.

Such are a few of those practically-useful points in the education and management of the body, which it is very useful for every human being to know; and the ignorance of which is always attended with alarm, and sometimes with accidents and loss of life. We might have added cases of collision, in which one carriage runs against another, coming in rapid motion and in the contrary direction. In such cases, the

blow is always struck with the full momentum of the two; and therefore, in case of equality of weight and speed, each of them suffers twice as much as it would by running against a fixed body. When the velocities are different, the more rapid one always strikes the severer blow; but the lighter one is generally the one overturned, and the weaker one the most injured by the collision. When one carriage overtakes and runs foul of another going the same way, the injury is not so great, as the impulse there is given by the difference of the velocities only, and not by the sum.

We of course do not recommend that these matters should be explained to every young person on the principles of dynamics and statics. That is not practicable, and though it were, it would not be desirable. But they are very necessary parts of education for the safety of the human body, they must be learned by pretty long experience, and therefore they should be set about it as soon as possible—as soon, indeed, as the child can walk, and understand what is said to it. The sooner that a child can keep itself out of harm the better for all concerned; and little hints, with short reasons, are the only means of doing this. To tell a child what to do, and not why, does it more injury than can well be expressed; whereas, by following the opposite course, the child may actually have its mental education in an advanced state before it begins to learn the letters of the alphabet; and there is surely not any way of doing this more useful than that which at the same time teaches it a habit of observation and the means of safety.

Alphabets and books do not, of themselves, give understanding; and they do not attract the attention or win the regard of those who are not prepared for them. Children have their inquiries neglected, are left in ignorance of all that goes on around them, and have nonsense spoken to them at home; and when they have been duly demented by this absurd practice, they are sent to school; and the parents blame the school-master, that those who were "sweet intelligent babies when they began to notice," do not "come on at all" in their learning. But how can they? for they have been already spoiled, and all their desires and means of intellectual superiority have been most cruelly withered in the bud.—In the next and concluding chapter, we shall offer a few remarks on Intellectual Education, properly so called.

CHAPTER VII.

INTELLECTUAL EDUCATION.

THE remarks which we made in the chapter immediately preceding this one, related chiefly to the infant state of Man,—to that state in which all human beings in the same country are nearly upon an equality with each other,—to that period of life in which, although it is really the most important of the whole, human beings are not usually regarded as objects of education at all. This is the period during which the foundation of the character, as intellectual, as moral, and as practically useful, must be laid, if it is to be laid at all; for, if it is not, the individual will be unstable and characterless for life.

This education must, in all cases, be in great part acquired by the spontaneous efforts of the child itself; and when the child is in proper society, and surrounded by proper subjects of attention, this part of education will seldom fail. It may be asked, "What is proper society, and what are proper subjects, during this important stage of human life?"—and the answer to these questions is easily given. The proper society is, persons of the child's own rank in life, who conduct

themselves in a reasonable, rational, and orderly manner; who are not only regular in the performance of every work and every duty, but perform all cheerfully, and in the best manner; and who preserve the dignity and equanimity of their minds, amid all the vicissitudes of life,—not being too much elated by success, too much cast down by misfortune and failure, or ever under the dominion of the turbulent passions. Such persons are "proper society" for children during the self-educating age; and all others are improper, in proportion as they deviate from this. If you will have a child to grow up with an independent character of its own,—a character which will keep it stable, and give it the choice and the power of learning and excelling, then you must have persons of this character about it when it is young; for though example is not better than precept in any one single matter in which the mind has to be taken along with the mere bodily act, yet it is more powerful in that species of generalization on which character is founded.

Then, as to the other branch of the question,—the "proper subjects," that is just as simple, and as easy to be understood, as the former. The subjects which are of most frequent occurrence, and are in ordinary domestic locality of the persons who are about the child, are those to which its attention will naturally be directed; and, at the outset, this natural direction is far better than any artificial one. They are accessible at all times, without any trouble or any cost; and they are, or should be, subjects of practical usefulness in that very station of life for which, according

to the then present circumstances, the child is and ought to be trained. All mere toys are mischievous, in as far as they waste time, and begin life with trifles. They have even a worse tendency—not a mere tendency, indeed, but a positive effect—than this: they render the child covetous before it has a clear understanding of right and wrong in matters of property; and, as the first impression upon any subject is always the deepest one, this treatment is sure to make the child grow up mean and selfish, if not dishonest.

The mischief done in this way, and also by the use of nursery rhymes, and silly language of all kinds, is far greater than many people suppose,—so great, indeed, that the majority of persons, in all ranks of life, are in a great measure spoiled before what is usually termed education is begun. The trifling practices in which they are not only allowed to occupy their time, but to which they are actually bribed, prevent them from learning those useful matters which they would of themselves acquire without any trouble, if they were only allowed. We ought never to lose sight of the fact that, except in extent of information, their minds are as perfect then as they are ever to become in after-life; that their perceptions are just as keen, and their conclusions as logical, as those of the most observant and profound of learned men. Hence, if we direct their attention to trifles, we cannot prevent them from drawing the conclusion that trifles are really the most important things in the world; and if this conclusion is once established in the mind as a principle, the eradication of it afterwards is no easy

matter. It is this false impression made upon the young mind that is the real cause of an injury which, with but few exceptions, runs through the whole of society. Let any one carefully examine the portion of society which comes within his own personal knowledge, and he will find that, even of those who are most diligent in their occupations, the number to whom the business of life is the pleasure of life is not very great. He will find the opposite of this the case, not merely among the idle and the dissipated, where it might be naturally expected, but among those who are regular, and diligent, and laborious. They do not follow the occupation because they love it, but as the means of attaining the gratification of some desire, or some hope, which is far dearer to them than their occupation. If society were polled, and all the unwilling workers struck out of the list, the number that remained would be but few.

The mischief which this does, both to the individuals themselves and to society, is incalculable,—far more than results from the whole of the positive crime which is in it. It is human nature, that that which is a man's chief pleasure shall at all times occupy the foremost place in his thoughts, to the exclusion of all other subjects, be these what they may; but that upon which a man does not set his mind, with all the fondness and attention of which it is capable, is never performed as it ought to be, and would be, performed, if the man took delight in it; and of course it will not be improved up to that extent of which the same man would be capable of improving it, if the whole streng

and willingness of his mind were brought to bear upon it as their principal and favourite subject.

We know no means of estimating the loss which is sustained, either by individuals or by the public, in consequence of this general estrangement of the minds of men from their proper occupations; though no one who can reason upon the subject of cause and effect, can help feeling that it must be very great. We often find excuses for the failures and miseries to which it gives rise, in saying that the man has chosen, or has been put to, the wrong profession; but this is nonsense—the mere subterfuge of ignorance,—ignorance which would be contemptible, if the consequences of it were not mischievous. If there is no physical obstacle in the way—no bodily malformation or defect—any man is equally fit for all occupations of which men are capable, provided that he is rightly prepared for their performance; and when it is said of any man that he has not a genius for any occupation or profession, be it what it may, the real meaning of the saying is, that he does not like it,—that his mind is set upon some other occupation, or upon sheer idleness, or dissipation, as the case may be. The adage says, "Where there is a will, there is a way;" and the truth of the adage is universal.

But, though we have no direct means of estimating the mischief that results from this very common dislike of occupations by those engaged in them, we have an indirect proof in the success of those who go heartily, and in the strength of their affections, to the performance of that which they have to do. How

the fondness of these men for the pursuits and professions to which they betake themselves, and in which they always succeed, and often triumphantly,—how their fondness is brought about, is a matter of which we have no knowledge, and of the origin of which they themselves can rarely give a very clear or satisfactory account. Our ignorance of it, and their inability to help us out of the perplexity of this ignorance, is the real cause of our attributing it to the inspiration of original genius. This "genius," be it remembered, is nothing more than a modification of the old doctrine of dæmonology, which supposed that there was a "genius," or spiritual being, intermediate between God and man, which presided and directed in all matters of this kind. In fact this is false, and in application it is mischievous, because it throws upon a mere creature of the imagination, the merit or the demerit of that which belongs solely to the man himself; and all these fancied imputations tend to no purpose whatever, but that of spoiling the reality. It cannot be too often repeated, or too clearly understood, that there is, and there can be, no original difference between one human mind and another; and to say, or to suppose, that there is, is a direct accusation of injustice against Him to whom man owes his being. If God originally so formed the mind of another man as that he can give effect to all the enchantments of art, and all the sublimities of science, and so formed me as that I can only drudge as a common pioneer in the world, then I say—and I dare contradiction while I say it—that justice has not been fairly done between

that man and me. If, however, we discharge from our minds the merely fanciful, we may say the idolatrous, part, and attribute his genius and my want of genius to the difference of circumstances, opportunities, and habits of original training, to which, and to nothing else, the disparity between him and me is in truth owing, we at once get rid of all charge against our Maker for injustice, and are enabled to view the matter in its proper light. The notion that the superior success of some men, under circumstances which appear to us to be inferior to those of other men who make no figure at all, is owing to difference of genius, is an error of the same kind, or rather a modification of the same error, as that which, among the illiterate, imputes to supernatural agency of some kind or other, everything of which it does not see the cause; whereas the only real genius that is in the matter, is the greater affection which the individual has for that particular occupation or pursuit for which we suppose he has a natural genius; and the want of genius for any one subject, be it what it may, is really nothing more than the want of will to enter, with all our vigour and capacity, upon the study or the performance of it.

Mere shifting from one thing to another, because we have a dislike of that from which we shift, is not the same as this supposed genius for any one thing; for our mere dislike of any one matter does not, of itself, imply our love of the contrary of that, or indeed of any matter whatsoever. It is very often found by experience, that they who, in this way, shift from one subject to another, not in consequence of any love for

the new subject, but merely from dislike of the old one, are not one jot better pleased with that which they have adopted than they were with that which they have abandoned; and the consequence is that, as the novelty wears off, they shift from subject to subject until they lose all feeling of stability, either with one thing or with another; and thus, in a very brief space, become actually pleased with nothing and good for nothing. That which we consider as genius, without knowing very well what we mean by the term, does not, in any way, arise from hatred or dislike of any one subject, but purely and simply from love of that particular subject for which they are supposed to have a genius; and the want of genius for any thing great or useful is merely a love of trifles and trifling—a genius for idleness, as one might say. When the Frenchman, who had exhausted all the eloquence of his flattery upon the taciturn gentleman without effect, concluded by exclaiming, "Sir, you have a great genius for silence," he stated a sound philosophic truth, without any intention of doing so; for genius is nothing but the love of its object, which makes it a pleasure to attend to that objeet, and then perseverance accomplishes all the rest.

Seeing, then, that genius of some kind or other, or rather an original aptitude for genius of every kind, may, if the body can afford it the information, and obey its emotions, be predicated of every human mind, we are at once brought to the grand fundamental principle of intellectual education—of all education whatsoever. We ought, by every means in our power

—and we all have the means, if we will use them—to encourage the love of every thing noble and useful, and restrain and repress that of idleness and trifles, in the very early stages,—those in which the greater part of the good or the evil is always done. We should do very nearly the reverse of what the majority of the people actually do, and then we should have a great chance of being right.

We of course by no means recommend that any attempt should be made to give little masters the air of philosophers, or little misses the air of blue-stockings; for this would be running to absolute shipwreck upon Charybdis, from simple fear of Scylla. There is an evil genius that lies in this way—a genius far worse than the simple one for idleness and play-things—the genius of self-conceit; and if anybody has the misfortune to find out that this is their genius, they become so fond of it that they never give it up.

We ought never to lose sight of the fact, that a child has every thing to learn; and that, in the early stages of its existence, it is impossible for any one to say what is to be most useful to it in after-life. We have said that the average of the rank in society, in which it is placed by its birth and social expectations, is the natural, and therefore the only safe guide to the class of subjects that should occupy its attention; and though this is unquestionably the best means of preparing it for success and respectability in this particular class of society, it has not the slightest tendency to prevent rising in life afterwards, but quite the reverse.

There is one point of especial importance; and that is, the preventing of the child from fixing its exclusive attention upon any one subject at too early a period. It sometimes happens that, when an infant's selection can be properly made, some advantages may be gained in a particular branch of the arts, especially if that branch is one which requires much manual dexterity before perfection in it can be acquired—such, for instance, as the profession of a painter or a musician; but it must be borne in mind that the professional dexterity thus acquired, is acquired by compromising the character of the man; and the infant prodigy in drawing or in music is never anything else but a mere painter or a mere fiddler, and rarely, if ever, attains to first-rate eminence even in these. Infant prodigies—that is, infants whose minds are wholly concentrated upon a single subject, and who, by petting and praise, acquire a precocious degree of acquaintance with that subject, or rather a precocious dexterity of execution, for it is in execution chiefly that these prodigies differ from ordinary and more useful children—generally pass the meridian of their fame long before they arrive at manhood; and generally the public entirely loses sight of them long before they have reached that age at which ordinary men display the maximum of their ability and usefulness, more especially if their pursuits are of an intellectual nature, and such as require much of observation and experience.

That the abilities of children should meet with encouragement, and their juvenile successes with praise,

we readily admit; because encouragement, in some way or other, is the stimulus to exertion in both young and old, and more especially in the young. But we ought to beware of the rock of exclusive devotion to one subject, upon which so many have been wrecked, whose attention to that very subject shows how well they might have acted their part in the general business of life, if their minds had not been so bent and stunted in their early years. The only means, short of absolute coercion,—which ought never to be so much as thought of in matters of this kind, or, indeed, in any other matter, except positive vice—and there the parent generally deserves whipping more than the child,—the only means that can be resorted to for keeping alive the attention with that energy which it should possess, and at the same time of preventing it from prematurely engrossing itself with any one subject, is to make every thing which comes within the range of the child's observation as interesting to it as possible; and if we can succeed in making things interesting, the child will find out the information they contain at very little expense of instruction from us. Indeed, if we begin too early to school and lecture, and have a long story to tell upon every subject that attracts the youthful attention, we choke and destroy the capacity instead of encouraging it. What would the rest of the profession think of a gardener who in his zeal for the beauty and vigour of his flowers should cover his beds with a new coating of manure every time that the bourgeons of those flowers appeared above the surface? Is it not

perfectly clear, that he would more certainly and effectually destroy them by this over-attention, than if he were to leave them in the poorest and most neglected quarter of his ground, or throw their roots in the rubbish-heap under the hedge? There are, thus, evils of over-attempts to educate, as well as evils of neglect; and though the morals, or rather the manners, may be a little better attended to in the former case, there are great doubts whether, in as far as intellect and capacity are concerned, the over-education is not the more injurious of the two. They are the extremes, and the wholesome path, of course, lies between them; but as the extremes vary with the variation of society, both in its distributions of ranks and in its progress from time to time, the medium of necessity varies along with them, and cannot be expressed by any constant or definite formula of words. The approximate maxim is this:—Up to a certain period of life, namely, that at which the permanent occupation or profession is to be chosen, keep the mind equally alive to all subjects which are in accordance with the station and rational expectations of the party, and which are at the same time entertaining, instructive, and useful. This maxim admits of a very considerable leaning in the direction of more intelligence, more intellectual power, than is required from the average performance of the duties of that station in which the party is born; and it does so for a very obvious reason,—namely, that every one should have the desire of rising in the world by fair and honourable means, if planted in their minds, not only as a part of

their mere education, but as a principle of their character, in as far as it can be so rendered. This is a most wholesome, as well as a most honourable ambition, and there is such a thing as a man in humble life abstaining from improper acts, and doing better than he otherwise would do, from a wish not to disgrace the more exalted character which he is at some future time to assume. It is true that this more exalted character may never be arrived at, and indeed, if a man is imbued with a proper feeling, he will never rest with the attainment he has made, how much soever he may be satisfied with it; but still the honest ambition is the vital, and therefore the valued principle, and consequently it ought in all cases to be cherished.

The several parts which human beings are to act in the world are so diversified, and often so different from what those who have the care of them in early life have any reason to expect, that it is quite impossible to sketch any general plan, or lay down any general rules, according to which the details of education should be conducted. Up to the point at which we have been speaking, with the exception of rank and circumstance only, the education of all mankind should be very nearly alike. There are no intellectual differences of children in any way connected with the differences of rank, or even of talents, or of conduct, that may exist among their parents; and, therefore, the natural education as we may call it,—the preparation for receiving even the most rudimental education of the schools, ought to be the same in all; that is to

say, every rational means ought to be taken to direct their attention and regard to subjects which are worthy and useful; and equal care should be taken to restrain from forming an attachment to any thing mean, frivolous, or vicious. At the same time, the other precaution ought not to be neglected; for care should be taken that the strength of the mind is not too much concentrated upon any one subject before the party is capable—which capacity it can only acquire by experience of judgment of right and wrong—of usefulness and its opposite. This requires more attention than many would be apt to suppose, inasmuch as the feelings or emotions upon which attachments and dislikes depend, are mature at the very commencement of life, whereas the intellectual and judging states of the mind are all results of experience, and as such have to be learned.

This last consideration is of the utmost importance to every one who is either concerned in the rearing and educating of human beings, or who wishes well to the performance of that most important of duties. It is true that the emotions do not come into exercise until some subject of sensal feeling, or of mental perception, calls them up; but it is nevertheless true that the emotions exist from the beginning, that they are peculiarly strong in very early life, and that they are the first symptoms, not merely of mind, but of animation, which every child displays. Whatever names may be given to them in after-life, when they are excited by those different objects and events which may come under the cognizance of the party, they

are originally of two classes—pleasurable and painful. At the very beginning of life, when yet there may be said to be no knowledge, pleasure and pain are perhaps the only feelings; and throughout life, this distinction is never lost, for almost all the named affections or emotions—and these words have in so far the same meaning, run in pairs, the one of which is pleasurable and the other painful. Thus it is pleasurable to be cheerful, and painful to be sad; it is pleasurable to be grateful, and painful to be angry; it is pleasurable to be joyous, it is painful to be grieved; it is pleasurable to be confident, it is painful to despond, and torment to despair; and so on through the whole list of emotions to which names are given, either by those who treat systematically of the human mind, or in the more extensive vocabulary of ordinary life.

This difference between the emotions and the intellectual states of the mind, that is, the states which relate only to knowledge as received, as compared, as judged of, or as intellectually extended, is of very considerable importance in guiding us to any thing like sound judgment in mental education, whether the education of our own minds or of the minds of others. In the knowledge, or purely intellectual part of the matter, though we cannot actually and directly give understanding to the mind, we can decide upon the subjects respecting which that understanding is to be exercised. Indeed, those subjects are in a great measure determined independently of us, or of our selection. They are determined by locality; as for example, a child born in England cannot have its elementary education in the phenomena and productions either

of a tropical or a polar climate; one born in a far inland place cannot have rudimental education in the productions and phenomena of the sea; and so on through an endless variety—a variety as great as that of localities themselves. In city and in country, in high rank and in low, among the rich and among the poor, among the industrious and among the idle, among the cultivated and among the vulgar, and throughout the whole of the distinctions which vary society, there are also corresponding variations of the subjects of elementary knowledge—of that knowledge which is naturally first acquired by any one born and nursed among any one of these classes. All of them, however, have this in common, that the knowledge of every thing must be acquired — the phenomena or appearances must be observed, and the causes of those phenomena which constitute the real knowledge must be found out by the party itself, or they must be communicated by the instruction of others.

With the emotions, the case is widely different; they do not require to be taught. They are excitable by external objects and events, no doubt, but they do not originate in, and come from, those emotions, as the knowledge does. They are states of the mind, of which the mind is capable of itself, and without any teaching. We do not require to teach a child to cry, or to feel the uneasiness which makes it cry; neither do we require to teach it its smile, or the pleasurable feeling which occasions that smile. It is the same in the case of every emotion whereby any human being can possibly be affected through life,

be that emotion of what nature and intensity it may, and whether it be delight or torture to the party affected by it. Hence it follows that we cannot reduce the emotions to a science, the principles of which can be imparted to a mind previously ignorant of them, in the same way as we can impart the principles of any of the common intellectual sciences. Thus, for instance, when the principles of language, of arithmetic, of algebra, of astronomy, or of any science whatsoever, are first brought under intellectual notice, the mind under whose notice they are brought is as totally ignorant of them as if that had been the first moment of their invention or discovery. Not so with the emotions,—we find them always ready in the mind; and though they stand in need of direction, and of much more watchful direction, than any thing which relates to knowledge does, yet they never require to be taught—in fact, we cannot teach them. We may thwart them, we may exasperate, or we may soften the emotions, but not one of them can we impart; and not only this, but as long as the character remains natural and without dissimulation, the emotions will not fail to display themselves, with the most perfect truth of adaptation to their causes; and certainly, though it is desirable that the pleasurable emotions should be the ones habitually felt, the susceptibility of the mind to all its emotions ought to be preserved. They are, one and all, part of the very constitution of our nature, and not in any way produced by ourselves; therefore, they are gifts of our Creator; as such they are all good in their proper

time and measure, and they become wrong only when we abuse them.

But the very fact of their being implanted in us, and not acquired as knowledge and the arts and operations founded upon knowledge are, renders the proper conduct of them, both in ourselves and in those of whom we have direction, a matter of more importance, as well as of greater difficulty. The difficulty is further increased by the fact that the emotions are the only means by which the mind can be successfully carried forward, either in knowledge or in action; for, though we may have power over a human being, even to the infliction of torture or death, that power will not change the emotions of those upon whom it is exercised. The utmost cruelty of the tyrant does not convert the slave into an obedient and loving servant; but, on the contrary, it estranges him more than ever. The body can be punished, and the mind may resort to subterfuges for the purpose of saving the body from pain, in which pain the mind itself sympathizes, in consequence of the connexion between them; but the mind treasures up the remembrance of the unjust punishment of the body, and stirs the body on to vengeance when an opportunity occurs.

The tyrant and slave form the extreme case; but these are many degrees short of that, in which the very opposite of what we wish is produced by harsh treatment; and, therefore, unless some moral or social cause, of which the party who is to inflict suffering upon another is seldom in a fit frame of mind, at the time, for judging, it is always a dangerous ex-

periment to attempt driving the emotions. Nor does it seem, in the judgment of reason, that any such experiment is ever necessary. The emotions, which are of all matters the most stubborn to drive, are the most easy, gentle, and pleasant to lead. If the emotion is in itself the wrong one, all that we have to do is, in a judicious manner to excite the opposite one; and if we can do this to the proper degree, the mind is ours willingly and gladly. If, for instance, it is anger, there are means whereby it may be turned into gratitude; only, as anger is a defensive emotion,—an emotion in which the mind puts on its armour and stands by its arms, we must be careful that we do not wound its honour in our attempt to bring it down to the sobriety of civil life. We must always bear in mind that one who is angry is militant—has a soldier's honour to defend for the time—and, therefore, it is not quite safe to treat him so unceremoniously as we can afford to treat a man in his civil senses. Each of the other emotions requires address in the management, as well as anger does; only, as anger is the most turbulent of the whole, it requires the most delicate management. The object in every case is to get rid of the unpleasant, offensive, self-injurious emotion, and substitute a better and more agreeable one in its place. The direct way of doing this is to excite, by the most gentle and inviting means possible, the antagonist emotion,—as gratitude in the case of anger, joy in the case of grief, and so in the case of all the emotions. But this, direct and obvious as it is, is not always so easy to be done as one would at first sight suppose. It must be borne

in mind, that each of the pair of contrasted emotions is a real antagonist to the other one,—in direct hostility, as one would say. Therefore, when one of the more turbulent emotions is up to the full bent of its intensity, the bringing of its antagonist into abrupt and bold contrast with it, has nearly the same effect as would be produced by introducing into the presence of a man, enraged from some other cause, the individual against whom he had the most deep-rooted and implacable indignation.

In such cases it is desirable to make use of what the chemists are, or were, in the habit of calling a "cross affinity," that is, we must endeavour to excite a third emotion, which shall have the effect of making peace between the other two; and much skill is required in the performance of this very nice office of mediatorship. In order to know what the third element must be which you can introduce with proper effect in these cases, we must understand the disposition, propensities, and favourite objects and pursuits of the party upon whom we are to operate; and these cannot, of course, be known at the very early period of life to which we have been making allusion. There is a story told, by whom we forget, but it matters not, of a very passionate man, who lived in the days when all men wore rapiers, and who, when he was exasperated, even with his cook for not having dressed the dinner according to his liking, used to sally forth into the streets, weapon in hand, and tilt at every body whom he met. In consequence of this, he was constantly getting into scrapes, and often endangering his best friends;

and, as he was a good man, talented, just, kind, and liberal, when these "lunes" were not upon him, his friends cast about to find some means of saving themselves and him from the disgrace and the danger. At last they discovered that, excitable as this man was upon ordinary occasions, there was one character for which he had a hatred, fixed, deadly, and implacable, beyond even the excess of his momentary excitements. Fortunately, too, this character was an historical one, to which he could do no bodily harm by the use of his sword. It was Herod Agrippa; and once introduce Herod to the angry man's notice, and all living men were perfectly safe. Well, his friends having thought on this, resolved to profit by it. Accordingly they had a full-length picture of Herod painted on a panel, some six or eight inches thick, and this they had handsomely framed, and presented to their friend at a time when they knew it would not offend him; and at their suggestion, and in gratitude for their kindness, Herod Agrippa was placed in a saloon through which the angry man had to pass before he could get into the street, and its position there was so conspicuous that he could with difficulty pass it without seeing it. The effect of this scheme was perfect; for the instant that the man got into a state of exasperation, and sallied forth to wreak his vengeance upon living men in the streets, Herod Agrippa met him sword in hand in the saloon, and he worked down his indignation in tilting at Herod's substantial resemblance. Herod took all patiently; and thus there were no exasperations growing out of the fits of

anger; and in time the man got cured of his irascibility, and lived with his friends in the exercise of all his better emotions.

We do not, of course, recommend that a Herod Agrippa should be found out in every case of intemperate anger, or that any one passion should be corrected by an excess of the same; but this instance very naturally leads us to the second point which has to be considered, in a right governing of the emotions, either in our own case, or in that of others. What we allude to is, when the emotion is right in itself, but is directed to a wrong object; and this is far more frequent, and also far more difficult to deal with than the former. In very early life, excepting where they have been exceedingly ill-treated, mankind are seldom utterly and hopelessly given up to any one of the turbulent passions. There is a joyaunce of young life, a pleasure in the feeling of a new life, and a new world to study and enjoy, which prevents this; and though bodily disease may make us fretful when we are young, there is nothing, save bad treatment on the part of others, that can make us malignant. Pleasure is, in fact, always uppermost in the cup of young life, if the malignity of some mature hand does not come in and stir up the dregs.

But in proportion as youth is the time of pleasure, it is in the same proportion the time of danger; and the power and perfection of the emotions before the mind is sufficiently formed in experience for getting them, renders this the most difficult time of our lives. We are not ourselves able to see the consequences to

which present pleasures may lead us, and therefore we allow them to seduce our affections before we are aware. The evil of these seductions is aggravated by the fact, that the retribution, whether as pleasurable or as painful, of the attachments which we form in youth, does not come upon us immediately — does not come upon us indeed until we have arrived at manhood, and are thrown completely on our own resources; and then it is generally, if not always, too late for us to alter: not only this, for we often lose sight of the real cause which annoys us, in consequence of the long vista of time through which it is seen; and, therefore, we are very prone to impute to the conduct of others, sufferings and annoyances which are really the results of improper attachments, formed at a time when we were incapable of judging whether they were improper or not. We do not now speak of attachments to human beings only, but of attachments to objects, practices, and pursuits, of all kinds whatsoever. This is necessary, in order to bring the whole case under review, for though our attachments to mankind have of course the greatest moral effect, the intellectual effect of other attachments is probably greater.

The emotions are, in themselves, so numerous and varied, and they depend so much on the circumstances in which individuals are placed, that no particular rule can be laid down for their direction and government. The general rule is to avoid as much as possible the turbulent and painful ones, to cherish the pleasurable, and to take care that these are not

directed to unworthy objects. Our means of keeping the emotions within due bounds is, not to allow them the whole dominion of the mind, but to take care that we have an intellectual cause or reason that will justify us in the exercise of every emotion we indulge. Our profession or occupation is not always adequate to this purpose; and, therefore, those whose pursuits do not afford them a sufficient intellectual resource ought to have one in something which shall engage them in the hours of relaxation. If they have not this, they are in continual danger of sinking into dissipation of some kind or other; and the moment that they do this, the dignity of their character, and along with that the real pleasure of life, is gone. The dissipated may be tumultuous in their mirth, but their merriment is not joy—that real joy of heart, which is followed by no alternation of sorrow. Whatever may be the kind or nature of the dissipation, from simple waste of time down to the most inordinate excess of sensual indulgence, there is always a reckoning to make after it is over; and this reckoning is not only painful in itself, but it unfits both the body and the mind for usefulness and enjoyment. The suffering to individuals, and the loss to society, which are occasioned by this means, are absolutely incalculable. We mentioned that simple idleness may be taken as the least criminal of all the forms of dissipation; but any one who is visited by a fit of idleness, even for a single day, can tell how much he is unfitted for his occupation, both in body and in mind, when he again returns to it. So much is this the case, that we may

say with truth that he who spends one idle and objectless day, actually loses the value of two.

Is there, then, to be no relaxation? and must Man toil and moil from the first moment that he is able to do so, to the day that he breathes his last, without any respite whatsoever? We never said so. We have said that it is both the interest and the duty of every man to make his profession his pleasure; and that no man, when he is awake, can spend one objectless hour without being injured by so doing. But it by no means follows from hence that any man should be condemned to watch the same trundling wheel, or carry the same physical burden, all the waking hours of his life. This is more than human nature could bear, or should bear; and we are so constituted that the attempt would defeat its own object. There is an emotion of loathing for that to which we have been over-long attentive, which is so intolerable that, if we do not occasionally leave it for something else, it renders the performance of it imperfect, as well as intolerable.

But though all men require change and relaxation, and men who are employed in bodily labour require rest from that labour in order to recover the tone of their bodies; yet it by no means follows that this relaxation of the mind from that subject with which it may be saturated, and that rest of the body, which may be necessary for enabling its working structures to recover their vigour, shall be either absolute idleness or dissipation. The mind is never fatigued, though it may be saturated with too long attention to

one subject; and it is doubtful whether, except in cases where sleep is necessary, absolute idleness is the proper rest for the body. In any manual occupation, be it what it may, there are some of the muscles fatigued by action, and others equally fatigued by the want of action; and if the whole system is brought to absolute rest in this state, it is not rested equally, and therefore the rest cannot be of the most wholesome and refreshing description. It is not easy to say what ought, in all cases, to be the proper counterparts which shall bring the whole system to an equal capacity for repose; but it is pretty evident that, if the body has been exhausted by a sedentary posture, some exercise of the limbs, and of the whole of it, in walking, or in some other exercise, which shall bring it into general action, is necessary previous to repose; and, in like manner, if it has been fatigued to exhaustion in any one of its working structures, the exercise of the opposite structure is essential to the making of absolute repose so refreshing as it ought to be.

It is with mind, in the hours of relaxation, however, that we are chiefly concerned. The mind has no rest; but, on the contrary, it is, generally speaking, more active in the hours of relaxation than in those of labour. This may, in part, be owing to the fact, already alluded to, that the business of life is not always, or even in the majority of cases, the pleasure of life. The glee with which children come out of school, and the freaks which they play, as though they never could get enough of use of their limbs, form a remarkable

contrast to the sobriety and snail's pace with which they enter; and, though in after-life the contrast is not nearly so striking, yet there is no period of life at which the commencement of relaxation is not a true joy—joy which, though probably not nearly so tumultuous, is yet more elevating to the mind and renovating to the whole frame than the joy of the most successful events.

But dislike of the labour or occupation in which the party may have been engaged, is not the only or chief cause of the joy of relaxation; for they who love their professions, and are diligent in the practice of them, feel this joy in a more lively and delightful manner than persons of the opposite characters. There is no doubt a general cause for this in the different habits of the parties. A man who loves his occupation, whatever it may be, is always of more happy mood than a man who dislikes what he is engaged in; and so constantly is this the case that it is not easy to say whether the man has the wrong profession or the profession the wrong man. We are inclined to think that the latter is the case in most instances; and he who is in a profession that he does not like, is always a man of ill-disciplined and restless mind, who would dislike the whole round of professions and occupations in turn, if he should make trial of them. A man whose mind is properly disciplined, never can get a wrong occupation, at least in so far as his like or dislike of it is concerned. There are many things which a man would rather not do, let his mind be ever so well disciplined; but still, a right-

minded man will temper his feelings to the necessities of the case, in such a manner as to do whatever he has to do cheerfully, which is the only way of securing the right performance of what he does, and his own happiness at the same time.

This disposition, while he is employed, will not only give him more time for relaxation, but will make him relish that with a higher zest; and will be a powerful means of keeping him from idleness and dissipation, by placing his habitual pleasures in activity. The way in which the body and the mind are adapted to each other points out the proper line of conduct here; and, indeed, under all circumstances, if we would but carefully study the nature and adaptations of Man, we should find better rules of conduct from these than any that are, or can be, in the systems of the theorists. Man, even for the right performance of his every-day business, requires much more knowledge than he can obtain from the practice of that business, and this not merely in the way of preparation—as by schooling and apprenticeship, but knowledge from day to day, which he must progressively glean for himself, or suffer from the want of it. Man, and the business of Man, are not only parts of a system, but parts of a system which is in constant progress and change — for the better upon the whole, as we shall suppose. Now, if every man has the feeling which he ought to have, he will be anxious not to be behind in this progress, but rather to outstrip his fellows. Therefore, he will naturally seek for information upon all those collateral subjects, the knowledge of

which is likely to advance him both in his profession and in the estimation of society.

Now, the very circumstance that the body requires rest and the mind none, is both the means and the inducement to the obtaining of this knowledge. The mind, though not exhausted in its real activity, yet becomes impatient of any subject to which it has been too long directed; and the desire is for change. Therefore, viewing the entire man as composed of body and mind, the natural impulse when the labour of the day has been well and diligently performed, is to go in quest of knowledge—to seek some change of mental occupation, which shall then be a relief and renovation to the intellectual part, and at the same time rest or exchange of action to the body, according as the case may more require the one or the other of these. If the body requires rest,—the suspension of all mere muscular exertion,—then, conversation, reading, the contemplation of objects of pleasure and instruction, or purely intellectual study and contemplation, according to the training and acquirements of the party, is the relaxation which nature points out. The man of comprehensive mind, that is, the man who is informed and has thoughts upon many subjects, and the connexions and relations of those subjects, will naturally take his range of these relaxations, and select them alternately, as circumstance or choice may direct. Mental contemplation, when the presence of no external object is necessary, is the highest order of these relaxations, and the one which allows the body the most pleasant rest. It is

also the one which is least dependent upon circumstances, and consequently it should be aimed at by every man, as his own peculiar and unalienable heritage. It is not difficult to acquire, and it is a more efficient instrument of improvement, both mental and moral, then any other that can be named. If change of action, rather than rest, is what the body requires, then the observation of nature is the proper resource, and the contemplative walk alone, or the conversational one with a friend, is the best relaxation, and the one which is most easily and cheaply obtained.

These simple remarks—and we have purposely made them as simple as possible—contain the most general elements of the Education of the Mind; and to enter into particulars would be to defeat the main object of this volume, which is that it shall be equally intelligible to all. Not only this, for, if we had taken any particular branch of science or other subject, and attempted to show how the mind may be schooled in that, we should have narrowed the scope of our remarks. The man who is most profound upon any one particular subject is not always the man whose mind is best and most usefully educated, but not unfrequently the reverse. The Intellectual Education, which all should aim at, and which all may obtain if they will, is that which enables and inclines them to do all that they have to do, cheerfully, honestly, and to the best of their ability.

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
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